

# IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Studies

**Time Period:**

July 2003 through April 2004

**Area of Reporting:**

Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

**Country Coordinator:**

E.S. Kona

**Last revision:**

October 6, 2004

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**Executive Summary**

The purpose of this initial baseline report is to establish the incidence and outcomes of pastoral conflict on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja cluster from July 2003 through April 2004. The reporting locations on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja cluster are five in number for the reporting period: that is the divisions of Turkana South, North, and Central in Turkana District, and West Pokot and TransNzoia Districts. In addition, this report presents both positive and negative precursors to the pastoral conflict situations as a means to illuminate trends that can help signal imminent outbreaks or escalations or mitigate ongoing conflicts in the cluster.

For the reporting period July 2003 through April 2004, 45 deaths occurred and 2500 livestock were lost on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster. These losses were reported in a total of 32 incident reports, and just over a third of which involved parties from the neighbouring countries of Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Violence was highest in October 2003. Peace indicators were highest in November 2003.

The impact of violent pastoral conflict on the local population on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster is severe and far-reaching. A great number of people (though still an order of magnitude less than on the Ugandan side), have been killed and maimed, some displaced from their homes and majority made destitute after their property was destroyed and livestock raided. A number of schools and health institutions were affected and general socio-economic development retarded. The areas occupied by the pastoralist communities of Kenya constitute up to three quarters of the total landmass of the country, yet they are the most underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure and overall human development. They are also the most unproductive owing to the natural dictates of unfavorable climatic and adverse weather conditions.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) unit has coordinated the field reporting and editing of this report. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have contributed funds for this effort.


Suggestions and comments on this initial baseline are welcome. Please contact Charles Mwaura ([c\\_mwaura.cewarn@telecom.net.et](mailto:c_mwaura.cewarn@telecom.net.et)) at the CEWARN office in Addis Ababa with any questions, comments or suggestions. The next baseline update for the Kenyan side of the Karamoja cluster is scheduled for posting in September 2004 and will cover the period from May through August 2004. Over the next year these baselines will be enhanced with specific response options identified and tied to their associated thresholds of indicator values that signal pastoral conflict escalation, destabilization or violence.

## IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

### Current Situation Baselines

*NOTE: The y-axis are dynamically scaled on all of the charts presented below. Therefore, the reader should pay special attention to the upper and lower values presented for each chart. The range of values for all “scores” is from 0 to 100.*


Chart 1 (below) presents violent incident counts for the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster for the reporting period. From October through November 2003, violent incident reports were at their highest levels (6 reports per month). Note that organized raids account for the majority of violent incident reports for the entire period. Among the 32 incidents reported on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja cluster, 35% were identified as cross-border incidents by the reporters in that the protagonists were from different countries; that is from Ethiopia, Sudan and/or Uganda.




The consistently low level of protest demonstrations displayed in Chart 1 suggests that the local communities are used to taking the law into their hands to address their concerns of personal security and crime. In general the communities do not wage protest demonstrations against government authorities, civil society organizations or even development agencies. Instead, they resort to the use of force (raids, counter-raids or revenge activities) through the use of arms. Further evidence for this argument may be found in the “Structural Conflict Aggravating Factors” on pages 6-8 below, particularly on page 8 – in the paragraph beginning “Whenever the government attempts non-military and non-violent...” In other words, the consistently low level of protest demonstrations in this context may actually indicate relatively weak governance.

## IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

Human deaths for the reporting period are presented in Chart 2 (below); the number of deaths range from a low of zero in July 2003, September 2003, and March 2004 to a high of 20 in August 2003.




Livestock losses are presented in Chart 3 (below). In October 2003, 1,308 livestock were raided, clearly the highest number lost for the period. No livestock were raided in the months of August, September, and December 2003, and January 2004.




## IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

Conflict indicators for the Kenyan-side of the Karamoja Cluster are presented in Chart 4 (below). Note that conflict indicators are at moderate to high levels for the reporting period, ranging from 57.0 to 73.3. On average, conflict indicators were at the 70.0 level, meaning that moderately high levels of conflict were present throughout the period in the cluster. The armed interventions indicator is at a zero value. Notably, triggering behavior spikes up to 93.3 in April 2004; this could portend increased conflict in the coming months. Please refer to the Appendix for a description of the conflict indicators.




## IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

Peace indicators presented in Chart 5 (below) show moderate levels of peace activity occurring in the cluster for the reporting period. The lowest levels of peace indicators occurred in February 2004, and the highest levels occurred in November 2003. Alliance formation remains at a low level for the entire period, although it increases in December 2003 and February 2004. Please refer to the Appendix for a description of the peace indicators.



## IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

Chart 6 (below) presents vulnerability ratings for the reporting period. The Politics/governance vulnerability rating had the lowest values for the period, especially after August 2003. The highest overall vulnerability rating was the society/culture context indicator, although it began to decrease after February 2004, and the economy/environment vulnerability rating began to rise substantially after March 2004. The peace indicators in Chart 5 present a more refined account of the vulnerabilities presented here. These vulnerability ratings offer an alternative view or “cut” of the same indicators used above (peace and conflict); in other words, they can help triangulate a conflict situation by presenting a sectoral (as opposed to analytical) aggregation of the indicators.



## IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

### Proximate Conflict Aggravating Factors

As depicted in Chart 5, Environmental Pressures appear to have a cyclical impact on pastoral behavior. While Environmental Pressures and Triggering Behavior decline after September 2003, they both increase relatively quickly in February 2004.

Situation reports indicate that unusual movements in all-male groups were observed in all five areas of reporting during this time period. The TransNzoia District in particular, witnessed more movement of all-male groups than the other areas of reporting. This may be attributed to the increased tensions between the Turkana and the Dongiro of Kibish following a raid that took place in mid-February during which one person from Dongiro was killed. Young men from both communities were reported to be regrouping in preparation for counter attacks. Subsequent reports from the TransNzoia District point to the movement of all-male groups scrambling for arable land.

Situation reports from Turkana Central during the same time period indicate a significant increase in surveillance by the Turkana along the areas bordering Turkana West for fear that they might be attacked by the Pokots or the Karamojong who have formed an alliance. Unusual movement in Turkana North was also reported during the month of February. This may have to do with the high tensions between the Turkana and Dongiro in Kibish area after the later failed to return 44 herds of cattle stolen from the former. The net livestock losses depicted in Chart 3 confirms that the month of February 2004 saw an increase in livestock losses while Chart 1 demonstrates that cattle raiding did increase from January to February 2004, as expected.

Chart 1 also indicates that cattle raiding intensified from October through November 2003. Chart 2 reveals that women and children were included in the fatalities resulting from these violent raids; however, we think that these gendered data are not as precise as the overall death counts. As expected, this violent period saw a significant increase in livestock losses, as depicted in Chart 3. Referring to Chart 5, the decline in conflict mitigating circumstances after November 2003 may have contributed to the decline in the number of peace initiatives reported from December 2003 to February 2004. Situation reports indicate that media coverage during this time period became more negative or hateful which may have hindered on-going peace initiatives and reversed the trend in alliance formation. These trends are also reflected in Chart 5.

### Structural Conflict Aggravating Factors

In addition to these aggravating factors several other incidents have occurred and compounded pastoral conflict in Kenya. These are primarily due to structural causes. The failed July 2003 Lokichoggio disarmament example provides a good illustration of one such incident:

In the months preceding this incident, there had been several peace initiatives going on between the Turkana (on the Kenya-Sudan border) and the Toposa of Sudan. There were several focal meetings and *ng'alogitasia* (plural for *alogita* or peace crusade) held with elders from all the sides to the conflict complete with government representatives in attendance. Then, one early morning, the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) descended on the Lopiding community for an unplanned disarmament exercise. This was met with armed resistance with casualties on both sides.

In the example above, the response by the government to the situation would automatically make the local community feel alienated and their participation in any development initiative or otherwise would not be forthcoming because they will be viewing each other as adversaries. According to the local community, they would not comprehend why their own government would want to negotiate with outsiders (the Toposa) and yet the same government will use force on its own citizens! Such a response will definitely impact negatively on community relations with the government and other actors.

## IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

The role of political elites is particularly pertinent in understanding contemporary pastoral conflicts. Political elites have grown to become one of the most potent triggers of violent conflict between pastoral communities and the scramble for votes the breeding ground for ethnic hatred and cleavages. Unsavory statements by politicians, both from the pastoral areas and from outside, still serve as a trigger for most conflicts in this region. By playing the role of “spokespersons” to their respective communities, their contribution cannot be underestimated as they knowingly (or unknowingly) play communities against each other for their own political gain.

Debilitating poverty is another major cause of conflict among the pastoralist communities in Kenya. The marginalization of pastoralists from mainstream development and the concomitant unequal distribution of national resources play a major role in causing ethnic tensions and discontent. It is instructive to note that the regions inhabited by pastoralists in the area of study, are among the poorest in those countries. The Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL), according to the recently launched *National Poverty Eradication Plan (1999-2015)*, have the highest incidence of poverty in the whole country. The constant rise in the trend of inter-pastoralist conflicts should therefore be seen against this backdrop.

Development is crucial to conflict reduction, and sustainable peace is to a large measure a consequence of sustainable development. The deprivation resulting from poverty and the endless struggle the pastoralists endure in search of basic life necessities like food, water, health services and clothing predispose them to conflicts. Consequently, poverty, accentuated by the violent conflict, and vice versa, is increasing the pastoralists’ vulnerability on a massive scale. Strong feelings of deprivation and neglect provide fertile grains for ethnic groups to engage in communal violence and confrontation. The livestock of neighboring ethnic groups become obvious target. Poverty then becomes a catalyst of conflict. Conflict worsens the already deprivation caused by poverty and leads to a vicious cycle of collective violence that becomes the rule rather than the exception – a kind of a positive feedback, in which conflict causes more conflict. Breaking this cycle remains the challenging agenda for all the actors interested and involved in the peaceful transformation of pastoralist conflicts in Kenya.

Raging poverty within pastoral areas is also occasioned by frequent droughts and loss of herds through raids has made the many attempts at addressing pastoral conflicts in Kenya a nightmare for both non-governmental organizations and government alike. The results of the inroads made in the fields of education and the establishment of income generating activities for the vulnerable groups in these communities will take time to bear fruit.

All the activities designed by the many stakeholders in the pastoralist regions are limited in both time and resources. In these areas for example, many projects that have existed for the past decade or so were focused on the development component while none was directly addressing conflict. It is only until recently that organizations started to appreciate the fact that no meaningful development will take place in the presence of raging conflict.

This phase has slowly seen the spirited attempt by organizations to integrate peace and conflict work in their programmes but if this will mean a commensurate increase in the resource allocation to the conflict component is yet to be seen and even if resources allocations were improved, there is the issue of mandate and limit as to what a given stakeholder can do.

Pastoral conflict in Kenya is getting worse, both in terms of its ferocity and also outcomes. Conflicts, which were once part and parcel of the economic and social fabric of pastoral societies, have undergone marked transformations making it a more violent, unpredictable and destructive phenomenon. This notable increase in the ferocity and fatalities attributable to present-day pastoral conflicts should be seen in the overall context of a complex interplay of multiple factors among which access to and control over natural resources is one of them.

## **IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster**

The traditional conflict management institutions seem to be unable to cope with the challenges posed by contemporary pastoral conflicts as these institutions have been weakened and their legitimacy is increasingly being contested by emergence of new authority structures among pastoralist communities as well as the widespread availability and use of modern automatic weapons. Without the government's commitment to improve the security status of the pastoralist communities in this country, it is inconceivable that the institutionalization of the gun-culture within the pastoralists can be reversed. Like ever before, individuals and entire communities will seek to protect themselves and property from internal and external aggression leading to the acquisition of more guns, some of which may be used in raids and highway robberies.

Raiding among pastoral communities has also evolved into a commercial enterprise through economic entrepreneurs and arm merchants are accruing economic benefit from the continuing violent conflict. A diagnosis of response options to current conflicts between pastoral communities should therefore integrate an analysis of political and economic interests external to the pastoral economic system. The culture of impunity arising from the lethargic, ineffective and inefficient state responses to pastoral conflicts is a factor in the unrestrained escalation of violence and raiding among pastoralist communities.

Governmental interventions have not enjoyed the same fortunes as civil society initiatives. The principal mechanism by which the government of Kenya intervenes in pastoral conflicts is through security operations and 'peace directives'. As the aforementioned July 2003 disarmament exercise illustrates, on many occasions the government intervenes violently, uses armed intimidation and forcefully imposes its authority on communities in conflict. Governmental interventions also do not take in account what civil society actors have been doing to address pastoral conflicts. And despite its monopoly in the ownership of violence and its resort to violent means, the government has not succeeded in coercing pastoralist communities to surrender illicit firearms and ammunitions in their possession. There is also a general trend in which security operations and disarmament missions are conducted partially.

Over the years, pastoralist communities have become more bold and courageous in their apparent attempt to want to break the state's violence interventions by also becoming violent. Pastoralist communities are increasingly engaging security forces in what is akin to direct combat whenever the security forces attempt to disarm them or during stolen stock recovery missions. What is worrying however, is the permissible notion that the versatility of pastoralist communities seems to be exceeding the government's capacity either to disarm them or recover livestock stolen during raids. Other factors that undermine government efforts to disarm the pastoralists include difficult terrain, poor road network, low morale of security forces, porosity of international borders and the burying of firearms and ammunitions under sand, among other constantly changing tactics by pastoralist communities. Additionally, the issue of disarmament needs a regional strategy and is beyond the scope of one country.

The region occupied by the pastoralist communities of Kenya border unstable countries that have for long become a cheap source of illegal guns into the country. For instance, lawless southern Sudan has continued over the past decades to be a source of arms to the pastoral areas of Kenya. Due to the poor policing of these and other international borders, it is been estimated that up to 11,000 of these illegal weapons are in make their way and are sold in Kenya yearly with a sizeable percentage being in pastoralist hands. With this magnitude of firepower in wrong hands, there is little doubt that peace-building is still fraught with many challenges.

A regional attempt by neighboring states under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - supported by the international community (especially the United States of America) has made some headway in bringing the conflict parties in the Sudan conflict to the negotiating table. Over the last several months, agreements have been made that will seek to shape the future of Sudan and the conflicts within the region. Given the influence of a stable Sudan in the regional context, there is hope that most of the contentious issues would have been sorted out within the first quarter of 2004 paving way for a united conflict free Sudan.

## **IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster**

Whenever the government attempts non-military and non-violent means to respond to pastoral conflicts, it uses handpicked chiefs and elders who may not be aware of the feelings and movements at the grassroots and unable to effectively communicate with broad masses. The dominant perception of selected elders and appointed chiefs is that they are used the government administration to legitimate government decisions. The government administrators instead of encouraging community-based deliberations and supporting decisions arrived at through consensus, instruct them to give directives on what should be done ('peace directives'). These directives cannot be binding to grassroots communities who are often detached from the administrators.

It is also traditional for the Minister for Provincial Administration and Internal Security or the Provincial Commissioner (PC) to have a one-day tour of conflict-prone Districts and banditry-ravaged areas to address people at public "barazas" which double up as 'peace rallies'. The former President also used these rallies a lot. It all the more worrying to note that the government does not implement some of the directives they give. Many a times, the government has threatened to confiscate livestock for any community across which territory stolen stock pass, etc. This gives the livestock raiders the impression that the government is not serious and they get added impetus to conduct more raids. In a nutshell, governmental interventions are 'doing more harm' to the communities.

Experience in Kenya indicates that, whenever government *supports*, and not leads peace-building and conflict management interventions, there is a higher chance of these interventions succeeding, as happened in Wajir, Tana River and now in Turkana and other pastoral Districts. The District civil administration, army and the police force should learn from this and begin to embrace more collaborative, inclusive and participatory strategies for mitigating conflicts in pastoral areas.

### **Proximate Conflict Mitigating Factors**

For the period under review, there have been a myriad of peace initiatives aimed at resolving raging conflicts and easing the tensions. By and large, these have primarily been spearheaded by the civil society with the government giving the necessary institutional and legal framework. This renewed collaboration between government and civil society may explain the successful return of animals in various incidents in Turkana District/West Pokot and the Turkana/Tepeth of Uganda. The renewed trust in the ability of all the actors will positively transform pastoralists in the region.

Chart 5 indicates that peace initiatives increased steadily through November 2003. Peace initiatives were documented in all five areas of reporting: Turkana South, North, and Central in Turkana District, and West Pokot and TransNzoia Districts. Situation Reports indicate that civil society groups, religious groups and MAPOTU, CAPE Unit and VSF-Belgium were involved in peace initiatives in Turkana Central in October 2003. These initiatives may have facilitated the establishment of the Loima Peace and Development Committee that addresses inter-Turkana conflict in the region. During the same time period, in Turkana South, the MAPOTU Peace initiative, Turkana Peace and Development committee and Catholic Justice and Peace Commission carried out local committee elections in Lokori division. This steady increase in peace initiatives is appropriately reflected in Chart 5.

The MAPOTU Peace Initiative, the Turkana District Peace and Development Committee (with branches at the location level), the CAPE Unit of AU/IBAR in collaboration with VSF-Belgium are all options that have served these communities well. The conflict environment has witnessed increased activity by these organizations and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, not forgetting the local NGOs and CBOs that are charged with the responsibility of grassroots peace mobilization activities.

## **IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster**

Some of the interventions that have made significant progress in reducing pastoral conflicts in Kenya have been undertaken by NGOs, CSOs and Interfaith organizations (IFOs). The binding peace between the Turkana and the Matheniko was reinforced by sustained effort by Oxfam GB, particularly in the late 1990s; the violent conflict that rocked Wajir District in mid-90s was successfully mediated by the Wajir Women for Peace and the Wajir Peace Group (these two merged and expanded to form the highly inclusive, participatory and diverse Wajir Peace and Development Committee); World Vision's POKATUSA and MAPOTU peace-building initiatives have contributed to the current lull in Kerio Valley, while multi-agency interventions in Turkana District have resulted in the establishing of a grassroots-driven and community-owned peace and development committee, Riam-Riam-Turkana.

One characteristic feature of these successful interventions by NGOs/CSO/IFOs is the fact that they are deeply rooted in the cultures of the communities in conflict. These organizations took time to understand the cultures of the communities they were dealing with, their resources and institutions for peace, and integrated traditional approaches to conflict management with conventional mechanisms of conflict resolution. Another feature of these interventions is the highly inclusive nature, particularly the tendency to work together with government and other strategic actors like the youth, ethnic elites and political leaders.

In as far as the message put across by peace organizations is geared towards creating attitude and behavior change among the communities, this feat cannot be achieved in a short period of time without the attendant change in other structures of society, governance and survival options. Attitude change will occur in a structured manner when communities feel they are part of the greater national fabric and when their specific livelihood concerns are adequately addressed by the government and other agencies.

### **Structural Conflict Mitigating Factors**

In the past – during the Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime, there used to be suspicion amongst some communities in the region that the government of the day was in favour of one community against the other. In the last December 2002 transitional elections in Kenya, which were billed as peaceful, free and fair ushering in a new government, the fears that previously existed were reduced with all communities expecting equal treatment from the government. This new attitude is good for peacemaking and peace maintenance.

Kenyans are currently drawing up a new constitution and therein lie the aspirations of all communities in Kenya. The mood that has prevailed since the last elections portends for greater things to come and in the context of pastoralists, better policies on land tenure and property rights and community empowerment in the exploitation, management and sustenance of the natural resources under their care. The new constitution, it is hoped, will guarantee the equality and access of each and every Kenyan to the basic necessities of life including the free primary education (already on course), better health care, improved minority rights etc.

In the last several months, there has been a flurry of institutional strengthening and capacity building activities by the government and civil society in the entire North Rift region of Kenya. This has been made possible by the realization the local capacities for peace hold more sway in nurturing sustainable peace and peaceful co-existence between communities. Most of these have been successfully carried out targeting the grassroots (community leaders and ToTs), meso-level managers (of CSOs, CBOs and NGOs) and even senior civil servants. The organizations that have taken a leading role in this include: World Vision-Kenya (MAPOTU and POKATUSA Projects), African Peace Agenda (APA), ISGM/PACT-Mwengo and the Oxfam-GB/Government of Kenya supported Riam-Riam Turkana (formerly Turkana District Peace and Development Committee).

## **IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster**

Another positive intervening factor would be the anticipated resumption of donor assistance to Kenya in the near future. This will enable the new government to deliver its electoral pledge of allocating adequate resources to the insecurity-prone regions of this country.

The Government of Kenya is set to commence the resurfacing of the Kitale-Lodwar road which forms a part of the Trans-Africa Highway. On its completion, it is hoped that response to conflict situations will be swift especially along the Kainuk-Sigor stretch. This is because many a times, various actors and individuals have blamed the poor state of the road to insecurity posed by highway bandits who ambush motorists as they slow down in the bad sections of the road.

Within the months of September and October, several organizations within the region undertook to sponsor the purchase and distribution of livestock branding equipment to these communities. The equipment for each community has a distinct insignia that is common to that community. For the Turkana for instance, its symbol is the traditional Turkana stool and the serial number of the division where the particular animal comes from. The concept is built upon the premise that with the symbol branded conspicuously on the side of the animal, it would be easier to track down a stolen animal and return it to the actual owner. If this proves, effective, it is hoped that cattle rustling incidences will reduce though the challenge would be on how to track down those animals stolen, sold and slaughtered away from the Division under which it registered.

The main limitation of NGO/CSO/IFO-led peace efforts is that they are insufficiently funded and hastily convened, with inadequate or consistent coordination and limited follow-up. The resolutions passed during community dialogue meetings are also poorly implemented and rarely honored. It is hoped that the current surge in networking activities in Turkana District will not only address some of these weaknesses but also catalyze the evolution of such a culture in other pastoral areas affected by violent conflict.

# IGAD-CEWARN Baseline Study – Kenyan Side of the Karamoja Cluster

## Appendix: Description of Indicators (from the Situation Reports)

<u>Alliance Formation</u>		
Inter-ethnic group alliance	Ethnic group – government alliance	
<u>Armed Intervention</u>		
Internal armed support	External armed support	
<u>Behavioral Aggravators</u>		
Interrupt other activities Development aid problems Media controls Migrant laborers New Markets Negative media coverage	Pastoral migration Harmful migration policy Harmful livestock policy Influx of IDPs Security escorts Small arms availability	Bullets as commodities Protest Student attendance interrupted Separation of groups Livestock prices dropped Post-raid blessing Livestock sales increase
<u>Environmental Pressure</u>		
Natural disaster grazing areas abandoned	Land competition Livestock disease	More livestock in secure areas
<u>Exchange Behavior</u>		
Celebration Inter-group sharing	Inter-group marriage Cross-border trade	Gift offering Barter trade
<u>Mitigating Behavior</u>		
Access to health care Small arms disclosure Access to education Arms Buy-Back Programs	Relief distributions Markets remain open Positive media coverage Disarmament	Law enforcement Bride price stable Negotiations taking place
<u>Peace Initiatives</u>		
Women peace messengers Religious peace building	Weapons reduction program NGO peace initiatives	Local peace initiatives
<u>Triggering Behavior</u>		
All-male migration	Pre-raid blessing	Traditional forecasting