Introduction
What is CEWARN?

IGAD was launched on 25 November 1996 in Djibouti as an expanded version of the former Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), founded in 1986 as a regional organisation focusing on problems of desertification and locust control. IGAD’s new organisational structure and mandate made it the logical vehicle for addressing the deeper malaise in the neglected rangeland areas overlapping virtually all of the Member States’ national borders. Pastoralist conflict remains one of the Horn of Africa’s most entrenched and difficult to manage security problems. At the time of its establishment under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), CEWARN assumed the mandate of developing a robust conflict early warning and response mechanism.

IGAD’s developmental makeover coincided with a period of pastoralist turbulence. The spread of automatic weapons, recession of state authority across the region’s vast rangelands, and related political factors transformed the tradition-

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al pastoralist raiding and livestock rustling into a cross-border menace and economic brake. Conflict early warning emerged globally in the 1990s as an instrument of preventive diplomacy; CEWARN was tasked with using early warning methods to enhance security and develop peace infrastructure on the regional level. Prior to these changes pastoralist conflict was treated as a low priority subject to the control of individual governments. During the 1990s, however, pastoralist violence emerged as a considerably more cogent threat to regional peace and economic development. By the late 1990s the growing incidence of cross-border raiding combined with the spreading impact of civil strife and sub-national conflicts to underscore the need for a more coordinated and sustained regional approach.

The original IGADD brought together Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya—countries encompassing the eastern-most extension of Africa’s Sahel band. Eritrea joined the new IGAD following its independence in 1993, and the new nation of South Sudan became a member in 2011. The seven IGAD member states cover an area of 5,233,604 km² and host a population of some 230 million people who subsist on an average per capita GDP of $1,197 per year. IGAD’s Horn of Africa rangelands host the largest concentration of pastoralists in the world. Even the most generously endowed and meticulously planned project would encounter serious constraints limiting its efficacy and impact in these conditions. The challenges of operating in such an infrastructural-poor environment, further compounded by the limited capacity of national governments (or objective absence in the case of Somalia), informed the design and methodology of the CEWARN initiative. When CEWARN was initially conceived, the complexity of cross-border conflicts presented a shared concern for the region, but it also offered a rare entry point for inter-governmental collaboration and regional cooperation.

It is important to recognise that the prospects for the region’s economic take-off are increasing apace with the surge in cross-border infrastructural projects, discovery of significant energy and mineral resources across the region, and a corresponding rise in international investment. Enhancing regional peace, security, and governance based on rule of law is an essential prerequisite for the region’s economic transformation. These conditions provide the context and backdrop for the diverse perspectives and analyses featured in this CEWARN compendium. They also signify why CEWARN undertook the rangeland conflict prevention and peace-building mission with longer-term goals in mind. The initial phase of the early warning system and rapid response fund was in effect a pilot project for testing
the viability of the mechanism’s key components. These include the data-driven early warning algorithm, the network of CEWARN observers and partners on the ground, development of rapid response capabilities, and the region’s states’ ability to cooperate effectively.

CEWARN’s development has been subject to political vagaries like Eritrea’s self suspension in 2007, the state of governance of Somalia, the 2011 separation of South Sudan, and its slide into civil war in 2013. CEWARN’s contribution to rangeland conflict mitigation may appear minimal to many external observers. While it may not be readily apparent outside the areas and communities where the organisation works, progress has been steady in regard to CEWARN’s methodology and development of structures critical to its longitudinal goals.

At the end of the second strategic phase in 2012, the CEWARN unit was tasked with taking stock of 10 years of existence and expanding its operational scope. Understanding that ultimately the impact of peace building must be felt on the ground, CEWARN embarked on an expansive consultative exercise with communities in CEWARN’s initial three regions of operation. CEWARN staff supported by experts and local guides engaged with over 5000 civilians, civil society actors, and local officials across the region. The findings, validated by national and regional officials, were presented to the IGAD Committee of Permanent Secretaries who directed CEWARN to embark on a new strategy that would expand the thematic and geographic coverage of its work, strengthen its institutional capabilities, and extend its partnerships. This marked the end of the pilot phase of the project preceding full operationalisation of the mechanism and strategy.

The publication of this compendium is intended to document the initial phase of CEWARN’s development, while marking the project’s transition from an exclusive focus on pastoralist conflict to addressing the wider goals articulated in the new strategy plan.

The volume presents a series of diverse perspectives and insights into both the achievements and limitations defining CEWARN’s progress over the past fifteen years. Perhaps more importantly, the compendium’s chapters and narratives provide a positive alternative to the more common narrative of conflict and poor governance.

CEWARN is an information-driven, knowledge-based project predicated on state coordination and community participation. Rollout has been an uneven but sustained process due to varying conditions across the IGAD region, Member States, and local polities—and this compendium documents its development from a number of different viewpoints. CEWARN’s success up
to this point is in part due to its resilience and ability to respond to feedback from what is by definition a complex system in transition. In the final chapter of this volume, Ambassador Martin Kimani (former Director of CEWARN and now Head of the National Counter Terrorism Centre in Kenya) illuminates the qualities and process of regional transformation. Before proceeding further, however, an outline of the CEWARN model, structures, and operational practice is in order.

**The Mode**

Early warning enables the early detection of developments that signal the potential for eruption of violent conflicts. It is used to elicit early response measures by decision-makers to prevent violent conflicts from occurring. Where violent conflicts occur, it is used to mitigate their spread and escalation. Early warning typically consists of standardised procedures for data collection, analysis, and the timely transmission of early warning information to decision-makers and institutions mandated to take response action.

CEWARN’s early warning model relies on field observation data through the regular monitoring of socio-economic, political and security related developments and trends as well as monitoring the occurrence of violent incidents in its areas of operation. The data based on forty-seven diverse variables inform the mechanism’s predictive model. The mechanism utilises sophisticated custom-made software dubbed the CEWARN reporter that enables it to store and do preliminary analysis of vast volumes of field data. A structured system of quality control maintains the reliability, credibility, timeliness, and quality of the field data and information collected on daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly basis.

**The Structures**

CEWARN structures are constituted at regional, national and sub-national level. They are predicated on strong collaboration between governments and civil society in all the IGAD member countries. At the sub-national level, CEWARN’s field monitors and locally constituted peace committees work on sourcing real-time early warning information and deploying response initiatives at the sub-national level respectively. Field Monitors are knowledgeable individuals embedded within their communities while the local peace committees comprise representatives of provincial administration, government security structures, civil society organisations, traditional and religious leaders as well as women leaders.

At the national level, CEWARN works through national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) as a lead hub in each
WHAT IS CEWARN?

Member State overseeing all conflict early warning and response operations. National CEWERUs are composed of representatives of government institutions working on peace and security, including ministries of interior and foreign affairs, national parliaments, civil society organisations and women who are actively engaged in national peace-building efforts. CEWERUs are assisted by independent national research and academic institutions called National Research Institutes (NRIs) that guide data collection and analysis work in each Member State.

Analysts based in the NRIs are responsible for receiving information from field monitors, verifying the information as well as undertaking thorough analysis, and offering recommendations on response options. CEWERUs are responsible for implementing response measures and collaborating across borders to undertake joint interventions against cross-border threats. CEWARN’s senior technical and policy structures oversee its work while providing avenues for high-level regional co-operation.

The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is the overall hub for coordination of data collection, conflict analysis, information sharing, and communication of response options. The work is overseen by two technical and policy organs, the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS), a body that convenes annually to review progress and provide direction on CEWARN’s operations. CEWARN is also part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) through its linkages with the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System and those of other African Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
WHAT IS CEWARN?

CEWARN ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

KEY
- STRUCTURAL RELATION
- FLOW OF INFORMATION

CEWARN STRUCTURE

REGIONAL
- CPS
  COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES
  (Policy Decisions at Regional Level)
- TCEW
  TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ONEARLYWARNING
- IGAD COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
- IGAD SECRETARIAT

NATIONAL
- CEWERU
  CONFLICT EARLY WARNING & EARLY RESPONSE UNIT
  (Steering Committees)
- TCEW
  TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ONEARLYWARNING
- IGAD COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
- IGAD SECRETARIAT

LOCAL
- LOCAL COMMITTEES
  Implementation at Local Level
- CEWARN UNIT
  (Coordination, Monitoring & Quality Control)
- CEWERU
  CONFLICT EARLY WARNING & EARLY RESPONSE UNIT
  (Steering Committees)
- TCEW
  TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ONEARLYWARNING
- IGAD COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
- IGAD SECRETARIAT

EARLY WARNING
- NRI
  NATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTES
- CC
  CEWARN COUNTRY COORDINATOR
  Coding and Analysis of Information, Early Warning Reports
- FM
  FIELD MONITORS
  Data Collection in Areas of Reporting

STRUCTURE IN ALL IGAD MEMBER STATES

(TBC)
- SUB-REGIONAL PEACE COUNCIL
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CEWARN uses a carefully selected set of indicators to track, monitor, and analyse cross-border pastoral and related conflicts. Based on the data gathered in the field, the CEWARN Country Coordinators produce regular early warning reports. These include: a) country updates based on the peace and security situation of the areas of reporting; b) alerts based on impending or existing conflict which requires immediate action, and; c) situation briefs that inform on existing events or events that may affect the dynamics of conflicts being monitored, including natural disasters such as floods or droughts.

THE REPORTS

From 2002 – 2012, CEWARN’s operations covered three cross-border areas referred to as clusters. The Karamoja Cluster comprises the shared border zones of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. The Somali Cluster encompasses cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The Dikhil Cluster is smallest of all areas of operations and covers an area spanning Djibouti and Ethiopia borders.
**WHAT IS CEWARN?**

CEWARN’s presence from community to policy-level structures in Member States uniquely positions it to be true to the needs and perspectives of local communities where violent conflicts occur. Its structure also provides it with the means to channel information and analysis in real-time into national networks and high-level leadership in order to mobilise response action to issues and patterns detected.

Another core strength of CEWARN is the recognition that solutions are located among people most at risk during violent conflict. To this end, CEWARN has focused some of its resources initiatives on support for local institutions capacity for conflict prevention. This was mainly done through the CEWARN Rapid Response Fund (RRF) established in 2009 by CEWARN and its developments partners to regularly provide modest support for community-led peace initiatives. The development of the RRF is a primary focus of the mechanism’s ongoing efforts to support early response initiatives.

**THE RESPONSE FUNCTION**

**THIS VOLUME**

This compendium is organised into five sections featuring several diverse categories of content. The design of the book features a selection of documentation, analysis, ethnographic anecdote, and perspectives of individuals active in different aspects of peace work from ambassadors to field monitors. The compendium encompasses a wide range of subject matter as a consequence, but hopefully the eclectic combination of analysis, voice, and vignette synergistically combine to convey both a broad and nuanced picture of what is arguably one of the most important contributions to African governance since independence.

The first section covers the process and challenges of the initiative beginning with the inception of what was to become CEWARN and its networks. According to Ciru Mwaura (Chapter 2) and other contributors to this volume, obtaining the political commitment of individual governments to support the project and operations was the most critical achievement. Girma Kebede extends Charles Mwaura’s description of CEWARN’s operational framework (Chapter 3) with an overview of the Rapid Response Fund (Chapter 4).
The second section provides an analytical overview of rangeland conflict beginning with A. K. Kaiza’s historical account of the event that catalysed the modernisation of pastoralist conflict: the looting of a government armoury in Karamoja (Chapter 5). Frank Muhereza (chapter 6) follows up by detailing the changing factors complicating the shift from reciprocal raiding to a more complicated mix of pastoralist violence driven by group and individual accumulation. Rashid Karrayu’s case study of the Moyale conflict (Chapter 7) illustrates how longstanding tensions can erupt into communal violence.

CEWARN’s methodology is discussed in Section 3, with contributions from Kaiza (Chapter 10), Doug Bond (Chapter 11), and Bizusew Mersha (Chapter 11). Professor Bond, the Harvard based data scientist who guided the development of CEWARN’s statistical model and predictive algorithm, notes that the methodology is rooted in efforts to develop forms of non-violent direct action dating back several decades. Mersha provides a detailed description of the workings of the CEWARN data base and its software.

Section 4 is dedicated to accounts from the field. The section includes my report from an area on the brink of violence after an extended period of peace (Chapter 12). Many of the essays here convey the work of field monitors on the ground, and Tseday Bekele’s piece provides a play-by-play account of how one such monitor worked with local authorities to prevent an outbreak of religious bloodshed in southern Ethiopia (Chapters 13). A. K. Kaiza’s anecdotal vignettes of social conditions across the Karamoja-Turkana cluster illustrate the challenges of mitigating new and endemic inter-communal pastoralist frictions (Chapters 14-17). The snapshots of pastoralist realities illustrate the huge gap separating livestock herding groups and their neighbours and the equally large internal variations characterising pastoralist societies. Admassu Lokali, Abdia Mahmoud, and Nura Dida offer complementary perspectives on cross-border conflict dynamics, gender bias in conflict management, and implementation of the 2009 Maikona/Dukana peace accord (Chapters 18, 19, and 20). The contributions of Asman Moalim, Adan Bare and Hashi Adan Bare (Chapter 21) and Ilmi Awaleh (Chapter 22) document the establishment and issues complicating CEWARN’s operations in Somalia and Djibouti.

The content in Section 5 updates the themes in the first section of the Compendium, with two chapters on the progress achieved following the developments leading to the independence of South Sudan. The interview with Ambassadors Mohammed Abdul Ghafur and
Abdel Rahim Khalif (Chapter 23) provides insight into the past and current priorities for restarting the CEWARN Mechanism in Sudan. Charles John Taban reports on the efforts to extend CEWARN’s operations in South Sudan (Chapter 24). S.K. Maina, one of the primary architects of the CEWARN project, charts its evolution over time (Chapter 25). El Ghassim Wane (Chapter 26) informs us how this evolution has made the replication of the CEWARN model a central component of the African Union’s the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The volume concludes with the contribution of former CEWARN Director Ambassador Martin Kimani, who outlines a grand vision for the region’s future. Current Director Camillus Omogo captures the progress achieved up to this point by commenting on the role of CEWARN as “the workshop and laboratory” for institutionalizing the peace and security prerequisite for this vision (Chapters 27 and 28 respectively).