CONFLICT EARLY WARNING

IN THE HORN:
CEWARN’S
JOURNEY
DISCLAIMER

This volume offers a collection of viewpoints, analyses, and experiences that were selected to provide diverse perspectives into the issues and challenges shaping CEWARN’s development since the mechanism was first conceptualised in 2002. By the same measure, the material featured here does not represent the official position of IGAD and CEWARN. We believe it conveys both a broad and nuanced picture of the institution’s development and challenges, even though it was not able to equally cover all the IGAD Member States despite the sustained effort to do so. This was due to the limited scope of activities in Djibouti, the interruption of operations in Sudan following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, and the suspension of Eritrea’s IGAD membership in 2007.

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IGAD - CEWARN
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Despite its relatively young age, IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) has managed to attract a lot of interest and recognition for being a pioneer African early warning and response mechanism that is based on insights and analysis from field data. Its concept of operations successfully combines use of the latest in social science methodology and ICT as well as multi-level regional diplomacy.

For IGAD, CEWARN represents one of its key programs in advancing the goals of peace and security. It has shaped into an excellent model for other interventions due to its real-time utilization of data and information for unfolding conflicts and crises. CEWARN’s outputs inform the work of other peace and security initiatives, particularly the IGAD Mediation Support Unit and IGAD Security Sector Programme that provide both operational and policy-level response for regional security challenges.

More than ever, the world is facing a myriad of fast-evolving security challenges, and the IGAD region has its fair share. These include both the traditional challenges that the region has been grappling with historically as well as numerous emerging threats.
The highly interconnected nature of the world we live in today – with greater ease of movement across borders; expanded Internet access and increased sophistication of weapons technology coupled with the rise of extremist and criminal groups - contributes to making almost all of our security challenges trans-boundary in nature. Some of the most pressing challenges include the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, which is currently a priority on the global security agenda. At the level of the African continent, our Member States in the IGAD region are amongst the most heavily affected.

A key aspect of effective regional collaboration on combating emerging regional security threats including terrorism and violent extremism is sharing information as well as data-based analysis and insights among Member States. CEWARN’s two-decades long operation provides a strong foundation for continued collaboration in this regard.

This book documents the journey of this organisation. It pays tribute to the brains behind its conceptualisation, its successive leadership as well as talented staff spread out in the field, in Member State capitals and the Secretariat in Addis Ababa who have seen it through its development thus far.

It is also intended to recognise Member States’ leadership and that of the international development partners whose guidance and support has been critical. I wish to thank all of them heartily for their contributions and trust you all will enjoy reading this Compendium.
The CEWARN book project is the product of an extended effort by the CEWARN team and its consultants. The compendium was initiated to commemorate CEWARN’s early journey as IGAD’s specialised unit for collaboration among IGAD Member States to prevent and mitigate violent conflicts.

CEWARN is the legacy of the IGAD Secretariat leadership and our Member States. It began with consultations preceding the IGAD Heads of State and Government Meeting of June 2000. Member States at that point agreed that the problem of conflict and cross border raiding in the region’s extensive rangelands required coordinated action at the regional level. IGAD mobilised a team of consultants including Ms. Ciru Mwaura; Prof. Howard Edelman; Prof. Makumi Wangiru; Ms. Susanne Schmeidl and several others not mentioned here by name who were the brains behind CEWARN. These individuals served in various capacities during the mechanism’s conceptualisation and piloting phases that established the foundation for what CEWARN is today.

CEWARN Directors, beginning with first director Mr. Charles Mwaura, followed by Ambassador Abdelrahim Ahmed Khalil, Mr. Raymond Kitevu, Ambassador Martin Kimani Mbugua, Mr. Richard Barno, and my predecessor Mr. Yufnalis Okubo have piloted the mechanism to its present stage. It has been my privilege to oversee the transition to a new phase of operations based on CEWARN’s 2012-2019 Strategy Framework.
Thanks are in order to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID/EA) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Their respective representatives, Ned Greeley and Niels von Keyserlingk, provided substantive financial support and technical guidance to CEWARN enabling its development into a full-fledged mechanism. USAID/EA has been CEWARN’s long-standing principal partner. CEWARN also maintains strong partnerships with the Governments of Austria, Denmark, and Sweden as well as the European Union, which all generously support many of its regional programs.

A dedicated CEWARN team spread across seven member states is responsible for implementing CEWARN’s mission of preventing and mitigating violent conflicts across the region. This team includes our local networks and field monitors, the national-level networks of National Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs), and the dedicated officials of our Member States who head these units, and those based in National Research Institutes and the team based at CEWARN’s regional Secretariat. The dedication of each and every individual to the organisation is reflected in CEWARN’s work and growth.

Last but most certainly not least, I wish to acknowledge the team behind the production of this volume: Dr. Paul Goldsmith (Chief Editor) as well as writers Mr. A. K. Kaiza and Mr. Parselelo Kantai, and the diverse contributors. The CEWARN Public Relations and Communications Officer, Ms. Tigist Hailu, deserves special thanks for leading the Compendium’s development. Mr. Mutiga Murithi and Mikias Yitbarek contributed to the volume’s copyediting and graphic design. We would also like to acknowledge the many individuals who supported the project but are not mentioned by name here.

I am sure you will find the scope of the book interesting and the analyses informative. The application of the model during its initial phase of development is indicative of its long-term potential, while the many stories included in this compendium convey the inspirational contribution of actors on the ground. It is my duty to speak on behalf of all the people involved to express our hope that you will draw from the book an appreciation of the work of the CEWARN Mechanism and its relevance for the future of the IGAD region and beyond.
SECTION
INTRODUCING CEWARN
THE IGAD MEMBER STATES
Introduction

What is CEWARN?

IGAD was launched on 25 November 1996 in Djibouti as an expanded version of the former Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), founded in 1986 as a regional organisation focusing on problems of desertification and locust control. IGAD’s new organisational structure and mandate made it the logical vehicle for addressing the deeper malaise in the neglected rangeland areas overlapping virtually all of the Member States’ national borders. Pastoralist conflict remains one of the Horn of Africa’s most entrenched and difficult to manage security problems. At the time of its establishment under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), CEWARN assumed the mandate of developing a robust conflict early warning and response mechanism.

IGAD’s developmental makeover coincided with a period of pastoralist turbulence. The spread of automatic weapons, recession of state authority across the region’s vast rangelands, and related political factors transformed the tradition-

Paul Goldsmith

Dr. Paul Goldsmith, the Chief editor of this volume, is an anthropologist based in Kenya with an extensive background of research and participation in rangelands issues.
al pastoralist raiding and livestock rustling into a cross-border menace and economic brake. Conflict early warning emerged globally in the 1990s as an instrument of preventive diplomacy; CEWARN was tasked with using early warning methods to enhance security and develop peace infrastructure on the regional level. Prior to these changes pastoralist conflict was treated as a low priority subject to the control of individual governments. During the 1990s, however, pastoralist violence emerged as a considerably more cogent threat to regional peace and economic development. By the late 1990s the growing incidence of cross-border raiding combined with the spreading impact of civil strife and sub-national conflicts to underscore the need for a more coordinated and sustained regional approach.

The original IGADD brought together Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya—countries encompassing the eastern-most extension of Africa’s Sahel band. Eritrea joined the new IGAD following its independence in 1993, and the new nation of South Sudan became a member in 2011. The seven IGAD member states cover an area of 5,233,604 km² and host a population of some 230 million people who subsist on an average per capita GDP of $1,197 per year. IGAD’s Horn of Africa rangelands host the largest concentration of pastoralists in the world. Even the most generously endowed and meticulously planned project would encounter serious constraints limiting its efficacy and impact in these conditions. The challenges of operating in such an infrastructural-poor environment, further compounded by the limited capacity of national governments (or objective absence in the case of Somalia), informed the design and methodology of the CEWARN initiative. When CEWARN was initially conceived, the complexity of cross-border conflicts presented a shared concern for the region, but it also offered a rare entry point for inter-governmental collaboration and regional cooperation.

It is important to recognise that the prospects for the region’s economic take-off are increasing apace with the surge in cross-border infrastructural projects, discovery of significant energy and mineral resources across the region, and a corresponding rise in international investment. Enhancing regional peace, security, and governance based on rule of law is an essential prerequisite for the region’s economic transformation. These conditions provide the context and backdrop for the diverse perspectives and analyses featured in this CEWARN compendium. They also signify why CEWARN undertook the rangeland conflict prevention and peace-building mission with longer-term goals in mind. The initial phase of the early warning system and rapid response fund was in effect a pilot project for testing
the viability of the mechanism’s key components. These include the data-driven early warning algorithm, the network of CEWARN observers and partners on the ground, development of rapid response capabilities, and the region’s states’ ability to cooperate effectively.

CEWARN’s development has been subject to political vagaries like Eritrea’s self suspension in 2007, the state of governance of Somalia, the 2011 separation of South Sudan, and its slide into civil war in 2013. CEWARN’s contribution to range-land conflict mitigation may appear minimal to many external observers. While it may not be readily apparent outside the areas and communities where the organisation works, progress has been steady in regard to CEWARN’s methodology and development of structures critical to its longitudinal goals.

At the end of the second strategic phase in 2012, the CEWARN unit was tasked with taking stock of 10 years of existence and expanding its operational scope. Understanding that ultimately the impact of peace building must be felt on the ground, CEWARN embarked on an expansive consultative exercise with communities in CEWARN’s initial three regions of operation. CEWARN staff supported by experts and local guides engaged with over 5000 civilians, civil society actors, and local officials across the region. The findings, validated by national and regional officials, were presented to the IGAD Committee of Permanent Secretaries who directed CEWARN to embark on a new strategy that would expand the thematic and geographic coverage of its work, strengthen its institutional capabilities, and extend its partnerships. This marked the end of the pilot phase of the project preceding full operationalisation of the mechanism and strategy.

The publication of this compendium is intended to document the initial phase of CEWARN’s development, while marking the project’s transition from an exclusive focus on pastoralist conflict to addressing the wider goals articulated in the new strategy plan.

The volume presents a series of diverse perspectives and insights into both the achievements and limitations defining CEWARN’s progress over the past fifteen years. Perhaps more importantly, the compendium’s chapters and narratives provide a positive alternative to the more common narrative of conflict and poor governance.

CEWARN is an information-driven, knowledge-based project predicated on state coordination and community participation. Rollout has been an uneven but sustained process due to varying conditions across the IGAD region, Member States, and local polities—and this compendium documents its development from a number of different viewpoints. CEWARN’s success up
to this point is in part due to its resilience and ability to respond to feedback from what is by definition a complex system in transition. In the final chapter of this volume, Ambassador Martin Kimani (former Director of CEWARN and now Head of the National Counter Terrorism Centre in Kenya) illuminates the qualities and process of regional transformation. Before proceeding further, however, an outline of the CEWARN model, structures, and operational practice is in order.

**The Mode**

Early warning enables the early detection of developments that signal the potential for eruption of violent conflicts. It is used to elicit early response measures by decision-makers to prevent violent conflicts from occurring. Where violent conflicts occur, it is used to mitigate their spread and escalation. Early warning typically consists of standardised procedures for data collection, analysis, and the timely transmission of early warning information to decision-makers and institutions mandated to take response action.

CEWARN’s early warning model relies on field observation data through the regular monitoring of socio-economic, political and security related developments and trends as well as monitoring the occurrence of violent incidents in its areas of operation. The data based on forty-seven diverse variables inform the mechanism’s predictive model. The mechanism utilises sophisticated custom-made software dubbed the CEWARN reporter that enables it to store and do preliminary analysis of vast volumes of field data. A structured system of quality control maintains the reliability, credibility, timeliness, and quality of the field data and information collected on daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly basis.

**The Structures**

CEWARN structures are constituted at regional, national and sub-national level. They are predicated on strong collaboration between governments and civil society in all the IGAD member countries. At the sub-national level, CEWARN’s field monitors and locally constituted peace committees work on sourcing real-time early warning information and deploying response initiatives at the sub-national level respectively. Field Monitors are knowledgeable individuals embedded within their communities while the local peace committees comprise representatives of provincial administration, government security structures, civil society organisations, traditional and religious leaders as well as women leaders.

At the national level, CEWARN works through national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) as a lead hub in each
Member State overseeing all conflict early warning and response operations. National CEWERUs are composed of representatives of government institutions working on peace and security, including ministries of interior and foreign affairs, national parliaments, civil society organisations and women who are actively engaged in national peace-building efforts. CEWERUs are assisted by independent national research and academic institutions called National Research Institutes (NRIs) that guide data collection and analysis work in each Member State.

Analysts based in the NRIs are responsible for receiving information from field monitors, verifying the information as well as undertaking thorough analysis, and offering recommendations on response options. CEWERUs are responsible for implementing response measures and collaborating across borders to undertake joint interventions against cross-border threats. CEWARN’s senior technical and policy structures oversee its work while providing avenues for high-level regional co-operation.

The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is the overall hub for coordination of data collection, conflict analysis, information sharing, and communication of response options. The work is overseen by two technical and policy organs, the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS), a body that convenes annually to review progress and provide direction on CEWARN’s operations. CEWARN is also part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) through its linkages with the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System and those of other African Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
WHAT IS CEWARN?

CEWARN ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
THE REPORTS

CEWARN uses a carefully selected set of indicators to track, monitor, and analyse cross-border pastoral and related conflicts. Based on the data gathered in the field, the CEWARN Country Coordinators produce regular early warning reports. These include: a) country updates based on the peace and security situation of the areas of reporting; b) alerts based on impending or existing conflict which requires immediate action, and; c) situation briefs that inform on existing events or events that may affect the dynamics of conflicts being monitored, including natural disasters such as floods or droughts.

AREAS OF REPORTING

From 2002 – 2012, CEWARN’s operations covered three cross-border areas referred to as clusters. The Karamoja Cluster comprises the shared border zones of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. The Somali Cluster encompasses cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The Dikhil Cluster is smallest of all areas of operations and covers an area spanning Djibouti and Ethiopia borders.
WHAT IS CEWARN?

CEWARN’s presence from community to policy-level structures in Member States uniquely positions it to be true to the needs and perspectives of local communities where violent conflicts occur. Its structure also provides it with the means to channel information and analysis in real-time into national networks and high-level leadership in order to mobilise response action to issues and patterns detected.

Another core strength of CEWARN is the recognition that solutions are located among people most at risk during violent conflict. To this end, CEWARN has focused some of its resources initiatives on support for local institutions capacity for conflict prevention. This was mainly done through the CEWARN Rapid Response Fund (RRF) established in 2009 by CEWARN and its developments partners to regularly provide modest support for community-led peace initiatives. The development of the RRF is a primary focus of the mechanism’s ongoing efforts to support early response initiatives.

THE RESPONSE FUNCTION

This compendium is organised into five sections featuring several diverse categories of content. The design of the book features a selection of documentation, analysis, ethnographic anecdote, and perspectives of individuals active in different aspects of peace work from ambassadors to field monitors. The compendium encompasses a wide range of subject matter as a consequence, but hopefully the eclectic combination of analysis, voice, and vignette synergistically combine to convey both a broad and nuanced picture of what is arguably one of the most important contributions to African governance since independence.

The first section covers the process and challenges of the initiative beginning with the inception of what was to become CEWARN and its networks. According to Ciru Mwaura (Chapter 2) and other contributors to this volume, obtaining the political commitment of individual governments to support the project and operations was the most critical achievement. Girma Kebede extends Charles Mwaura’s description of CEWARN’s operational framework (Chapter 3) with an overview of the Rapid Response Fund (Chapter 4).

THIS VOLUME
The second section provides an analytical overview of rangeland conflict beginning with A. K. Kai-za’s historical account of the event that catalysed the modernisation of pastoralist conflict: the looting of a government armoury in Kar-amoja (Chapter 5). Frank Muhereza (chapter 6) follows up by detailing the changing factors complicating the shift from reciprocal raiding to a more complicated mix of pastoralist violence driven by group and individual accumulation. Rashid Karrayu’s case study of the Moyale conflict (Chapter 7) illustrates how longstanding tensions can erupt into communal violence.

CEWARN’s methodology is discussed in Section 3, with contributions from Kaiza (Chapter 10), Doug Bond (Chapter 11), and Bizusew Mersha (Chapter 11). Professor Bond, the Harvard based data scientist who guided the development of CEWARN’s statistical model and predictive algorithm, notes that the methodology is rooted in efforts to develop forms of non-violent direct action dating back several decades. Mersha provides a detailed description of the workings of the CEWARN data base and its software.

Section 4 is dedicated to accounts from the field. The section includes my report from an area on the brink of violence after an extended period of peace (Chapter 12). Many of the essays here convey the work of field monitors on the ground, and Tseday Bekele’s piece provides a play-by-play account of how one such monitor worked with local authorities to prevent an outbreak of religious bloodshed in southern Ethiopia (Chapters 13). A. K. Kaiza’s anecdotal vignettes of social conditions across the Karamoja-Turkana cluster illustrate the challenges of mitigating new and endemic inter-communal pastoralist frictions (Chapters 14-17). The snapshots of pastoralist realities illustrate the huge gap separating livestock herding groups and their neighbours and the equally large internal variations characterising pastoralist societies. Admassu Loka-li, Abdia Mahmoud, and Nura Dida offer complementary perspectives on cross-border conflict dynamics, gender bias in conflict management, and implementation of the 2009 Maikona/Dukana peace accord (Chapters 18, 19, and 20). The contributions of Asman Moali-im, Adan Bare and Hashi Adan Bare (Chapter 21) and Ilmi Awaleh (Chapter 22) document the establishment and issues complicating CEWARN’s operations in Somalia and Djibouti.

The content in Section 5 updates the themes in the first section of the Compendium, with two chapters on the progress achieved following the developments leading to the independence of South Sudan. The interview with Ambassadors Mohammed Abdul Ghafur and
Abdel Rahim Khalif (Chapter 23) provides insight into the past and current priorities for restarting the CEWARN Mechanism in Sudan. Charles John Taban reports on the efforts to extend CEWARN’s operations in South Sudan (Chapter 24). S.K. Maina, one of the primary architects of the CEWARN project, charts its evolution over time (Chapter 25). El Ghassim Wane (Chapter 26) informs us how this evolution has made the replication of the CEWARN model a central component of the African Union’s the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The volume concludes with the contribution of former CEWARN Director Ambassador Martin Kimani, who outlines a grand vision for the region’s future. Current Director Camillus Omogo captures the progress achieved up to this point by commenting on the role of CEWARN as “the workshop and laboratory” for institutionalizing the peace and security prerequisite for this vision (Chapters 27 and 28 respectively).
The Origins of CEWARN

I became involved in this project right at the beginning in 1999. IGAD itself had decided as an organisation to put together a conflict prevention management strategy and within that there were several components. One of the areas was the establishment of a conflict early warning mechanism for the IGAD region. There was growing interest in early warning at the time due to the Rwandan genocide. I had just joined the London-based Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). Then, I went to Addis for work in November 1999, and decided to proceed to Djibouti and engage with IGAD officials on the advertisement.

Our team at FEWER registered our interest in helping IGAD implement the early warning initiative. We put together a strong team that included Howard Edelman, Bethuel Kiplagat, Josephine Odera, and Susan Schmeidl. FEWER had already done some work on this issue, and we were selected to undertake the work. We then signed a contract with the German development agency GTZ (now GIZ) and

CIRU MWAUURA (Interview)

Ciru Mwaura was the Project Coordinator of a team of CEWARN’s founding consultants between 1999 and 2000. She is currently the Deputy Head of the African Union Institutional Reform Implementation Unit.
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) who became the key partners helping IGAD to set up the mechanism. While exciting, the idea of a regional early warning system in the Horn of Africa also struck me as rather ambitious. The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, one of the deadliest recent inter-state wars, was still raging. The Sudan peace agreement was yet to be implemented and like Somalia was in a state of civil war.

The idea that this region could develop this kind of mechanism seemed to be far-fetched. For example: countries had to express a certain level of willingness to engage with each other in conflict resolution. That implied a high degree of trust and open channels of communication. None of these basics were really in place. We spent a lot of time asking ourselves if the region’s governments were really serious about doing this?

It soon became clear that they wanted to do it, and that they had secured funding to do it. Our job was to make the project happen. The very first thing we had to do was ask the member states some basic questions: how do you view IGAD as a regional organisation, what is the level of commitment, and what are your priorities? IGAD was not an organisational priority for many of the countries. Our first task was to go around the member states to understand how they each engaged with IGAD. We were able to get a feel for the level of commitment based on that first round of consultation. We talked with all sorts of people in government, in the security sector and in foreign ministries. We quickly decided that the project was ultimately about developing a plan for collaborative action by regional Member States in order to address shared issues of conflict.

This is where the pragmatism came in. There were many issues of common concern, but that did not mean that these countries were ready to work together to resolve them. You had to be reasonably sure that you could elicit some collaborative action but not necessarily by the whole network of seven countries. We began to explore the matter of process. What is the project’s entry point and what are the issues on which these countries could actually collaborate?

A number of the countries, although not all, were able through a series of workshops to come up with options and issues for further consideration. In the end, we decided that consensus could potentially be achieved by addressing cross-border pastoralist conflicts. We then moved on to the question of geography with a view towards determining where the approach could be tested. This is how the idea of clusters such as the Karamoja Cluster (straddling the shared border zones of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda), the Somali Cluster (encompassing cross-border areas of Ethiopia,
Kenya and Somalia) and the Dikhil Cluster (covering an area spanning Djibouti and its shared border zones with Ethiopia) came about. At the time we also contemplated doing something for the far north of the Horn, albeit the view was that this was probably not realistic at the time. We decided that it would be impossible to have any traction in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict because the hostile relationships between the governments at the time obviated the prospects for meaningful cooperation.

We decided to choose ‘softer’ areas where countries were open to collaboration and where there were already existing structures and initiatives that could be strengthened. We adopted a very practical approach. What we did not do was try to create a kind of a comprehensive system to deal with all the issues of the larger region. That would have been a major mistake.

The thinking was that over time once you succeed this would build confidence, and then we would be able to look at other different issues across the region. This led to the plan to establish national conflict early warning units. The idea was to connect what our analyses showed in areas where there were already national-level initiatives. What was lacking were national actors who would then be able to create a bridge to other member states in order to move the initiative higher up the political chain. This incremental approach arguably added value to the CEWARN project over time.

The national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWE-RU) were established to serve this purpose. Fostering collaboration began with what we determined to be soft areas—places where the prospects for progress were high. Kenya and Ethiopia, for example, offered a long-standing tradition of collaboration and mutual understanding. Coordination on cross-border issues was not something new for these two countries. There was a structure for handling local issues functioning at different levels in place. What was missing was a system for backing up local collaboration on the higher-level policy issues.

I have always found that when you go down to the ground you find the actors are relatively open to innovation. This is because there are not that many of them in the first place and they don’t really have much to work with in terms of resources. So if you really want to be effective first you need to form working partnerships, then continue to meet with your counterparts regularly. You can talk to people in Nairobi, for example, and they might be interested in the problem but when you go down to the local level you find that the practice is already there and you can actually do something to improve how the actors are going about it. We began building on pre-existing forms of cooperation, mapping cross-border issues, and examining
what these countries were already
doing in the domain we were target-
ing. Our intervention was based on
a combination of understanding the
problem globally, utilising regional
experts and holding workshops to
refine the approach. Participants in
the workshops said they wanted to
legalise the initiative in the form of
a formal protocol originating from
within the region. This moved it
from being an ad hoc structure to
something formally embedded.

After agreeing on all of this, we
had to fashion tools of information
analysis and consider what the lon-
ger-term process would be. That
task required its own detailed design
based on what you see in various
other kinds of information gather-
ing and analysis projects, including
how humanitarian agencies operate.
They collect information starting
from the local levels and feed that
up the analytic chain. To develop
the informational component of the
project we needed people who could
do quality control, refine and gener-
ate the data, and then disseminate
it.

The response side and how it works
was the less visible aspect of the
problem. What is the platform for
joint decision-making? Early warn-
ing thinking and theory has been
around since the Rwanda genocide.
But there are not that many exam-
pies of an actual early warning sys-
tem that works. The response side
is critical to the efficacy of other
components such as training, the
information-gathering protocol and
analysis, and developing an efficient
system generating the right infor-
mation. It is not about collecting
information as much as what you do
with the information.

The landmark meeting for devel-
oping and designing the proposed
system for the IGAD region was
held in Nairobi in 2000. It brought
together a range of participants. Ev-
everyone was kind of mystified at the
beginning; there were lots of scep-
tics. People weighed in by claiming,
“Oh, it is not possible for this re-
gion to do this, and the state secu-
ritv agencies will never collaborate”.
The next meeting was held in As-
marä later that year, in December
2000. Ethiopia did not attend but
the head of IGAD peace and secu-
ritý happened to be an Ethiopi-
an national. It was at this meeting
where the protocol was negotiated,
a very tough exercise. There were
arguments about how people want-
ed information to flow, about the
ownership of information, and over
who would ultimately be respon-
sible for collating and analysing it.
But the issues people were most
concerned with focused on how de-
cisions would be made and how the
early warning information would be
treated at the political level.

The participants were taking the
discussions about the operational
and policy dimensions of the initia-
tive very seriously. The differences
were worked out. The protocol was signed in January in Khartoum in 2001. That was quite impressive.

In hindsight, what I would have done differently at this juncture was spend a lot more time defining the geographic areas in order to get a better understanding how the system under development would work on the ground. It would have been useful to visit some of these regions to develop a deeper level of understanding of how the mechanisms would actually operate.

The reality was no one could know how they were going to function in the designated regions until later in the process. The focus of our work was identifying the entry points, and getting member states to agree that it was an initiative they could join. And although we succeeded on this score, it would have helped if we deployed some of the team members across the regional clusters to collect more feedback.

We talked a lot about resource conflicts at the time, and the areas were chosen according to specific criteria. We talked about cross-border conflicts with the reference to the major resource issues in these areas. We were not saying upfront that the early warning system would address all of them, but rather, that we wanted to build a foundation for collaborative action. The objective was to reach some sort of point where people would rely on those systems to support the collaboration and engage in the dialogue needed to resolve their conflicts.

Ten years later, I attended a meeting on Somalia in Nairobi in 2012 where I met a gentleman who said he was the CEWARN country coordinator for Somalia. I asked him what kind of work he did and he said he was involved in monitoring cross-border areas between Kenya and Somalia. I was truly amazed.

I said was that I was involved in the project at some point, but I didn’t go into the details. It was just nice to know this thing was alive and active in Mogadishu. At the time we anticipated that the project would probably take off in a few countries where it was actually functional. To hear someone from Mogadishu saying he was working for the CEWARN was very heart-warming.

Several Member States deeply committed to IGAD valued the organisation for specific purposes. Their representatives advised us that it would not be practical to do something comprehensive. “Yes, it’s a platform, yes, IGAD is influential on certain issues,” they said. But across the board commitment to what was to become CEWARN was pretty low in the beginning. That forced us to be very pragmatic about how we approached implementation, and to focus on niche areas. We built the confidence while understanding that we were building
an organisation that would expand or shrink according to its success.

I cannot think of any member state that stood up in the beginning and said this is an important organisation. But the decision makers did also say that they had to improve their ability to undertake joint action based on common analysis and understanding of the issues. There was quite a demand for that; the issue of common analysis was key to fostering the confidence that they required. Although it was difficult for the diplomats and bureaucrats to work together initially, they became our jump-off point. When the process took off and began to evolve, they began to value CEWARN. And based on that, who knows where this can go. It has already evolved considerably further than many people expected in the beginning.

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Seven countries of the horn of Africa formed IGADD, the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development in 1986 to tackle the challenges of drought and development in the range-lands. IGAD then emerged out of the original IGADD a decade later in the shadow of civil war and intensifying conflict with a mandate that emphasizes promoting regional peace and a.

Early warning methods for monitoring droughts and famine were already present in the IGAD region, so using a similar approach to track conflicts was not new. The shock generated by the 1994 Rwanda genocide led to a shift in IGAD’s institutional focus from conflict management to prevention. Conflict prevention, management, and resolution subsequently appeared as Article 125 in the East African Treaty, and the African Union (AU) also decided to prioritise a similar approach.

The IGAD assembly in Khartoum voted to establish an early warning system in 1999 and this led to the deliberations on

CHARLES MWaura
(Interview)

Charles Mwaura served as the first Coordinator of the CEWARN Unit. He is currently Senior Expert at the African Union Continental Early Warning System and Preventive Diplomacy Unit.
the CEWARN Protocol in 2000. Although the initial proposal was to address the range of potential conflicts in the IGAD region, concentrating on cross border pastoral conflicts was a useful entry point for implementing an early warning mechanism as a pilot project. The project’s success would enable the extension of the system to other forms of conflict over the long run.

The governments of Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia in particular expressed a high level of interest. Diverse military, administrative, civil society and intelligence institutions were represented in the inauguration meetings of the newly constituted national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs). It was a positive beginning although setting up of rules of procedure for the technical committee was not easy. The civil society participants, for example, wanted the same voting rights enjoyed by the member-states.

I participated in the early stage of setting up CEWARN and ended up serving as the first coordinator. Initial recruitment for CEWARN started in 2000 and was completed in 2002; reporting commenced in mid-2002. During the period I was there, we concentrated on methodology and the tools of early warning and we started compiling early warning reports.

The key challenge we faced was translating early warning information into timely interventions. Even with robust intelligence, would decision makers in Member States be ready and willing to act quickly to circumvent imminent clashes?

Making decisions based on anticipation of something likely to happen is a very difficult argument to sell to a bureaucrat. Decision makers are moved by what happens, not by what may happen. That’s why it is not enough to report what is likely to happen or what may or may not happen.

Outcomes are dependent on the particular circumstances. Decisions based on intelligence are subject to different criteria; they are never a predictive exercise. The next issue here is, does the principal recipient trust your information? And the third is does he act on the formal report and not on the basis of other information he may have received. No agency has a monopoly when it comes to information.

**How do you assess if the decision maker is in conflict prevention mode and not in management and resolution mode?**

So, yes we can have an early warning system, but remember that the principal decision makers in intergovernmental bodies are diplomats. So if you raise an issue to a diplomat from, say, Kenya, Ethiopia or Djibouti and claim that certain
things are happening in their country, they may deny that the information is a true reflection of the internal situation. They are not in conflict prevention mode and in any event they are trained to prioritise the diplomacy of conflict management and resolution.

The tendency is to equate handling prevention with fire brigade thinking, either calling for the intervention of the military or supporting the observation of a ceasefire. We have to explore the dynamics of the larger mechanisms and modes of intervention required for conflict prevention. We have yet to reach the point where we can confidently claim we are ready to act effectively on conflict early warnings.

Secondly, there is also a difficulty of measuring success of conflict prevention. How are you able to tell that a conflict prevention effort has succeeded? The fact of the matter is if you prevent a conflict, it didn’t happen. Are you going to then tell the public that the proof of what you prevented is that it did not occur?

It is difficult to measure the success of conflict early warning and preventive interventions in most situations. This is why we need to reconsider how to communicate to the public the efficacy of an early warning system where the proof of success is invisible and conjectural.

Although decrease in violence by itself is not a reliable as a criterion, this does not mean that there are no success stories in Rwanda, Burundi, and Darfur for the African Union, and for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia. This is why assessing the role of an early warning system forces us to think in terms of process. The approach that we developed in 2006 featured the use of early warning reports to initiate dialogue with decision makers. It is important to remember that the instruments deployed on the regional and continental level are not designed solely for prevention, but also for conflict management and resolution.

In CEWARN’s case, we sought to base our case on assessment of indicators on the ground to enhance our credibility rather than rely on what are considered to be measures of the success of early warning systems. I think to optimise the influence of an early warning report requires engaging the decision makers in a manner that balances the influence of other competing ‘reports’ and the level of doubt they may convey.

But we are beginning to collect the information, we’ve developed the tools and the methodology for analysing it and we have recorded some successes in regard to briefing special representatives and the AU Panel of the Wise and similar institutions. There is still the chal-
leng to do more, but the focus of how to increase our impact requires linking prevention to the domain of management and resolution.

What we needed in IGAD was not a fire brigade, but for the member states to address the structural causes of cross border pastoral violence, whether through disarmament or through better livestock husbandry and food security. Every time there is a raid you cannot rush in and bring people together—that’s the fire brigade approach. Cattle raiding and stock theft is a problem where someone comes to take away your livestock and maybe your life as well. By treating cattle rustling as a pastoralist tradition, we give the practice a more acceptable connotation when it is actually criminality. Instead of looking at pastoral issues as something that only affects pastoralist communities, we need to treat them as systemic problems with regional ramifications.

In Kenya and Uganda where we have relatively developed economic systems, livestock is a critical part of the agricultural sector. So you address food security by growing more vegetables and maize, but do not factor for the fact that livestock households are important producers of animal protein, the result is a calorie rich but protein poor society. We need to find solutions for the problems of pastoralism because among other things, open range livestock systems are the most productive use of the region’s extensive arid lands.

Many interventions in this sector cannot succeed as long as herders are so dependent on climatic conditions. Settlement works when it supports the diffusion of technology. Technological solutions have taken longer to take root in these areas and across Kenya’s borders and this highlights the role of the educational system in opening people to different perspectives and production methods. This returns us to the original issue of combining early warning and prevention with conflict management and resolution. CEWARN cannot solve the developmental problems of the rangelands, but by contributing to regional stability it helps create the kind of enabling environment where other solutions can flourish.
A principal challenge CEWARN faced, particularly in its early phase of operations, was linking its strong early warning system to an effective response component that generates appropriate and timely actions to curb the spread of violent conflicts. Response actions initiated by CEWARN were often reactive and sluggish. Member States’ efforts to mitigate the cross-border conflicts centred on security responses by military and police forces to separate the warring parties. The response structures known as the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERU) were ineffective and lacked a coordinated approach to the cross-border dimensions of the violent conflicts. Many of the challenges related to lack of resources needed to mount a timely and effective response.

Aware of the gaps and challenges in its response arm, in 2008 CEWARN began to strengthen the response side of the mechanism. CEWARN sought resources from its development partners for the establishment of a Rapid Response Fund.
(RRF). The primary objective of the RRF was to enhance the CEWARN mechanism’s capacity to address and respond to cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts. Resources for the implementation of the RRF projects were mobilised from the development agencies of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. CEWARN then proceeded to establish institutional financial procedures facilitating proper utilisation and implementation of the funds and to ensure accountability.

**Operationalisation of the Rapid Response Fund**

The RRF is designed to support CEWARN interventions. It is supervised at regional level by the RRF Steering Committee, and at the national level the RRF is managed by the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERU). A Technical Support Unit (TSU) handles capacity building and operational tasks, including review and monitoring of projects. Finance and Administration Units (FAU’s) handle the finance administration and reporting. They also support for Local Peace Committees (LPCs). Local level structures also include the field monitors (FMs) who are organically linked to the lead agency or local CSO responsible for the execution of the project.

RRF projects fall into two categories: urgent and regular. The urgent projects comprise emergency responses to violent conflicts at local levels; regular projects are aimed at capacity building and provision of support to the CEWERU structures at local, national and regional levels. Requests for RRF financial support are submitted to the CEWARN Director and to the RRF Steering committee by the CEWERU of the respective IGAD member country. Allocation of RRF resources is project-based, and there are no provisions for meeting recurrent costs. According to the RRF Handbook, allocations of funds are made in two ways.

The CEWARN Director has the discretion to approve a proposal of urgent projects up to US$ 10,000 after consultation with a CEWERU head, Projects of up to US$ 50,000 require approval from the Steering Committee (SteCom) after considering the analysis and recommendation of the collaborating CEWERUs and a technical appraisal by the RRF Coordinator or a designated technical agency. The CEWARN Unit is obliged to appraise submitted proposals within 20 working days using the substantive and formal criteria developed by the CEWERUs. The SteCom reviews the soundness of the appraisals conducted by the RRF Coordinator, and approves the proposals by consensus.
FUNDING PEACE: THE RRF EXPERIENCE

A conflict between the Gabra and Borana provides one example of how the RRF is fostering peace between hostile communities. Pastoralist elders of the Oromia Pastoralist Association (OPA) from Ethiopia and the Pastoralist Shade Initiative (PSI) from Kenya brokered a peace negotiation that culminated in the signing of the Maikona-Dukana Agreement in November 2008, ending the long standing inter-communal conflict among the Borana and Gabra along the Ethiopia- Kenya border.

Occasional skirmishes and incidents of stock theft interrupted the peace prevailing between the two communities since the signing. The loss of lives and rising tension also threatened to derail the peace process. In order to deescalate the conflict and sustain the peace, leaders of OPA and PSI organised another peace meeting in the second week of January 2012 and selected “neutral elders” to mediate between the Borana of Teltelle and the Gabra of Dukana. After listening to complaints of the respective parties, the elders decided to resolve the conflict as follows: (i) the Boranas from Teltelle would pay compensation of 75 cows to the Gabra of Dukana for people killed by the former; (ii) the Gabra would accept responsibility for the death of a Borana child and wounding of her mother, and pay compensation of 45 cows to the victim’s families, and; (iii) both communities would apprehend and bring the perpetra-

TYPES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RRF PROJECTS

Resources from the RRF have been utilised to support various peace initiatives and the facilitation of inter-district dialogues, responding to cross-border security incidents, addressing conflicts over natural resources, promoting peace through sports and cultural events, capacity building, and applied research. The RRF has funded a total of 55 projects in six countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Out of the total, eleven projects (or 20 per cent) are urgent response activities while the other forty-four projects (or 80 per cent) are other peace interventions and capacity building initiatives.

One of the RRF’s most significant achievements is funding Local Peace Committees (LPC) and providing them with resources required for immediate use during emergencies, enabling the LPCs to mobilize in cases of actual or imminent conflicts. The LPCs have also used the funds to organise cross-border dialogues and peace meetings covering a range of activities including the recovery of stolen livestock, reconciliation efforts, and facilitating access to grazing and water sources. The RRF has assisted the leaders of customary institutions, the LPCs, and local administrators to come together and peer review their performance in the maintenance of law and order and their conflict resolution activities.
tors of the conflict to justice. This case demonstrated how community elder's power and legitimacy can be used to provide restorative justice, to diffuse tension between warring communities, and to restore their confidence in peace.

**ENHANCING TIMELINESS OF INTERVENTIONS**

RRF resources have enhanced the speed and flexibility of emergency response interventions in deescalating tension and inhibiting the spread of conflicts. LPCs and authorities at the lowest level were able to communicate more effectively, to coordinate their efforts to prevent raids and counter-raids, livestock rustling, and to apprehend perpetrators. The real-time sharing of information among the LPCs has improved their capability to undertake rapid joint response actions, as the following example illustrates.

**AVERTING A COUNTER-RAID AND RESTORING THE PEACE**

A series of raids and counter-raids were reported between the Jie and the combined forces of Turkana and Matheniko during the first quarter of 2009. In June, three Jie lost their lives and approximately 2000 of their cattle were taken away. The Jie were preparing to retaliate. It was clear a major clash would occur in the absence of action taken to stop the revenge raid. The District Peace Committee in collaboration with a local CBO, Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN), organised meetings with the kraal elders and political leaders of the district to discuss ways to avert the planned attack. Dialogue with the Turkana was initiated to find a peaceful way of settling the standoff and recovering the stolen animals. The District Peace Committee applied for Rapid Response Funds to facilitate the dialogue; the CEWERU National Steering Committee approved the request quickly. Upon securing the funding a cross-border dialogue commenced between the Jie leadership and the representatives of the Turkana and Matheniko communities. Three months of dialogue prompted the community to put aside the sticky issue of recovery and return of livestock, and instead push for reconciliation and sustainable peace. Religious and clan leaders, women, and youth supported their position. The community leaders subsequently came up with a peace accord for cessation of attacks, raids, and count-raids. The peace accord has held since April 2010, despite minor incidents of thefts of livestock.
AVERTING A COUNTER-RAID AND RESTORING THE PEACE

Most of the peace activities in pastoral areas do not directly involve the youth. The youth provide the warriors who mount the attacks and carry out raids and counter-raids. Occasionally the youth openly defy the elders out of frustration and act as spoilers of peace efforts. The RRF seeks to address the problem by organising soccer tournaments, beauty contests and other cultural events between warring factions to encourage reconciliation and enhance peace.

A cross-border Ethiopia-Kenya Youth Soccer Tournament and Cultural Event for Peace was held from April 8-11 2010 in Moyale, Kenya. The project, designed to bring the youth into the peace building efforts, adopted the motto “shoot to score, but not to kill”. The four-day soccer tournament for boys accompanied a beauty contest for girls. These competitions enabled the youth to interact in a peaceful manner, to demystify mutual suspicions, and to help extend the peace network in the Somali Cluster.

CEWARN was able to bring together the youth (boys and girls) from nine districts on the Ethiopia-Kenyan sides of the Somali Cluster together to compete in sports and beauty contest. They slept in one dormitory and shared food and facilities for nearly one week, and learnt that they can live together peacefully.

A second cross-border Youth Soccer Tournament under the motto “Play sports, live peace” brought together the same teams that played in the football tournament for a second competition during July 2011, in Moyale, Ethiopia. The sports event helped strengthen the ‘living side by side in peace’ message, enhanced the positive attitudes developed during the first tournament and encouraged confidence among the youth to participate in peaceful competition. The tournament was instrumental in spreading the message of peace through sports, and created a multiplier and trickle-down effect across the small urban centres where the administrations and the youth centres have taken it upon themselves to organise similar sports events in their localities.

1 This cluster includes Chalbi, Marsabit, Moyale, and Sololo of Kenya; and Dillo, Dire, Miyo, Moyale (Oromio) and Moyale (Somali) of Ethiopia.
**IMPACT OF THE RRF**

The impact of the Rapid Response Fund interventions among the beneficiary communities can be measured in several ways. Firstly, the utilisation of the RRF in peace-making efforts has contributed to a significant reduction in the level of violence. Secondly, the RRF has been instrumental in improving relations between the pastoral communities in the Somali Cluster and between the Turkana, Matheniko and Jie in the Karamoja cluster. The activities are transforming the confrontational relationship into one of peaceful co-existence marked by cooperation and sharing of resources. Thirdly, the RRF has played a catalytic role in changing mindsets and has helped to significantly reduce the suspicion and mistrust among communities in the Somali cluster. Enmity and belligerence have been replaced by amicable cooperation and collaboration. As one leader declared:

Today this place is overflowing with peace. Peace is the foundation of everything we have. It is a matter of pride and honour that you have worked for peace with a sense of concern and responsibility. We are grateful to CEWARN for providing the funds from RRF sources for organising this and other similar peace events.

The RRF has proved its relevance by filling a critical resource gap in CEWARN’s rapid response activities at the grassroots level. LPCs and government officials attest to the fact that the RRF has played an important role in reducing the level of conflict by enabling speedy exchange of information, instituting preventive measures, discouraging raids and counter raids and by mediating between conflicting parties. The types of response activities implemented -- from building the capacity to facilitating various meetings and tournaments were found to be highly effective and relevant by all stakeholders. A government official from the Southern Region of Ethiopia stated that “the RRF has brought the local peace committees and the government institutions together to work together for peace. The RRF is like the grease and fuel running the peace engine”
FUNDING PEACE: THE RRF EXPERIENCE

RRF REGIONAL STRUCTURE

REGIONAL --- STEERING COMMITTEE --- CEWARN UNIT

Financial Administration Unit
- Administration of funds received from RRF
- Disbursement of Project Expenses
- Financial reporting

Local Peace Committee
- Execution of projects under supervision of Local Peace Committees

NATIONAL

Support to Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) Projects Initiated at the Local Level
Capacity Building to peace Structures: At local, sub-national and national levels.
Technical Studies and Applied Research

TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT
- Development of projects at local level
- Capacity building from local up to national level
- On-going monitoring of projects

URGENT PROJECTS
- Must obtain approval for funding by CEWARN Director
- Projects up to 10,000 USD

REGULAR PROJECTS
- Projects up to 50,000 USD
- Projects in excess of >50,000 USD
- Must obtain approval for funding on the basis of an EXTERNAL Technical evaluation

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS
- Allocation of funds is strictly project-based and only non-commercial organizations (Government, NGOs, CSOs) are eligible for funding

STAKEHOLDERS

PREVENTION
- De-escalate or resolve violent conflicts. Its scope covers three main types of intervention
IMPORTANCE OF THE RRF FOR CEWARN’S FUTURE STRATEGY

CEWARN is in the process of developing a new strategy for the period 2012-2017. Response activities are one of the most important pillars in the upcoming strategy. As stated above, peace initiatives implemented by RRF have effectively assisted in peacefully ending local conflicts as reflected in the declining incidence of raiding, theft, murder and assault. But there are clear limits to local peace initiatives in respect to the root causes underlying violent conflict in the pastoral areas. The political, climatic, and structural causes underpinning conflicts remain unaddressed.

Tackling the root causes is not within the remit of the RRF at this time. Involvement in tackling these conflicts may require macro-level engagement of CEWARN and the RRF in order to play an expanded role within governments through the CEWERUs. This implies engagement of CEWARN with on-going and new initiatives at regional and sub-regional as well as national levels to build linkages and partnerships with other peace and development stakeholders. The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) is just one example. The IDDRSI’s sixth component focuses on resolving conflicts and building peace.

CEWARN also needs to engage other stakeholders working on education and development across the IGAD region. Educating youth will generate a major peace dividend in the form of combating negative attitudes towards peace building and stamping out harmful behaviour. Development activities for building better livelihoods and improving resilience in the face of disasters are also critical. Improving livelihoods is an integral part of peace building and resolving conflicts. The idea that peace should prevail before development activities are implemented is no longer valid. Given the centrality of enhancing livelihoods for preventing conflicts, it is important that CEWARN rises to this challenge in its new strategy.

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This section begins by tracing the proliferation of small arms to the arming of the Karamojong following the collapse of the Idi Amin government in 1979. The circulation of firearms from an abandoned armoury set the stage for major shifts in the pastoralists’ internal relations with each other and with their national governments. The next two chapters detail these developments within the context of pastoralist marginalisation and the historical conditions guiding changes in rangelands conflict. The Moyale case study provides an on-the-ground example of the role of CEWARN field monitors in a conflict aggravated by cross-border factors.
LOPIAR:
The Impact of Firearms During the 1980s

The enclosure in Kopoth is a meter thick in parts. Whole tree stems and inter-locked branches rise as high as 10 meters. The entrance is low. I peer inside. There’s an ante-enclosure, like a lobby. Behind it other stakes rise, as thick as the outer ring. These are like rooms, enclosure upon enclosure. “It is a kraal,” Jean Mark explains. You cannot tell if there are any animals inside. You can hardly smell animals. It seems there are no people here. Jean Mark makes a call. A small boy appears. We have come to see Brother Mark Kawar, a man of the church.

Grownups emerge carrying chairs. We are strangers. Strangers are not welcome inside kraals. We sit in the front yard, out in the open. Brother Mark is himself a peace builder, like Jean Mark. He was born here and lives here, a 48-year old man.

He describes the 1970s as a period of turmoil, he also says it was perhaps the last time people in Karamoja lived as they had for centuries. Although the Ugandan army, losing its discipline, had begun to prey on the people, taking their animals, Karamojong society had not yet broken...
down. The soldiers were not in Karamoja to improve things for the people. Their concern was the wildlife reserves that occupy the parts of Karamoja with reliable supply of water. In times of drought, these places are tempting for cattle keepers. Game rangers keep them out.

Brother Mark is beginning his narrative from the 1970s for a reason. The key date he focuses on is April 11 1979. On that day a new, lethal element drops into Karamoja, the intrusion that would tear the society apart. It was the start of three decades of turmoil sweeping away herds, and produced the monument to the two church-men we drove past: Father Mario Mantovani and Brother Godfrey Kiryowa killed in December 2003.

Before the overthrow of the Idi Amin regime in April 1979, guns were scarce in Karamoja, a rarity in the pastoralist communities of Uganda and Kenya. According to the folklore from here on the Uganda escarpment bordering Pokot West, the first guns appeared in 1911, during the reign of Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II.

It was the Turkana that got their hands on those guns, but only just a handful. They were still enough to give the Turkana leverage over their neighbours. Stories and songs relay the Turkana sense of supremacy during that time.

“Turkana dominated the Karamojong and called them women,” Jean Mark tells us. “We Karamojong used to sit in silence because they had guns. They sang a song saying that a man has come to take the cows. You go and feed on posho and soup. A man has come to take the white cows.”

The Jie, who like the Dodoth, enjoy no periodic fraternity with the Turkana are said to have obtained their first firearm when they killed a gun-wielding Turkana. But it is folklore, undated, names unknown. There were periodic opportunities, as when warriors learnt how to ambush military vehicles. Guns were not unfamiliar by the 1970s. But they were not easily obtainable, one rifle exchanged for as many as 60 heads of cattle. All of this changed in April 1979.

When the Ugandan army fled before a combined Tanzanian and Ugandan-exile military force, the armoury in Moroto was left undefended. The Matheniko Karamojong broke in.

“Women were carrying guns on their heads like firewood,” Brother Mark says. “The Matheniko became powerful. But they had many, too many guns. They started selling the guns. They traded them for cattle. Guns spread to the Jie, the Dodoth. Soon, everyone was carrying guns.”
As fate would have it, the civil war in Sudan, abandoned in 1972, was resuming. The Ogaden war that reached a climax in 1978 opened a third gate. The new weapons market plunged the whole of this pastoralist region—Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia—into communal violence and war. A decade later Somalia saw its own collapsing military bleed guns into the general population after the fall of Siad Barre.

“Young men who carried guns did not see why they should listen to their elders,” Brother Mark explains. Yet more was coming. Karamoja had barely learnt to shoot guns, let alone understand the damage they could wreak when a period described as the worst in their living memory, swept across the land.

The Karamoja famine of the 1980s is largely forgotten today. The Ethiopian famine of 1984 is the highest peak in the graph of famine statistics illustrating the new extended droughts that engendered end-of-the-world predictions for African societies of the Sahel. But in 1980, even worse news was coming out of Karamoja. The famine developed into a three-pronged attack across the land. First the drought came, killing the cattle. A cholera epidemic of unprecedented proportions, followed. It is not recorded how many animals died; the famine left its mark in the annals of human mortality. An estimated 21 per cent of the population died. When that many people die, a society cannot hope to keep its culture. History is broken. Yet for the newly well-armed Karamojong, the worst was yet to come.

The famine gave name to a condition called The Karamoja Syndrome. It is, defined on the UNICEF website as a “…euphemism for the ecological, political, social, cultural, economic and demographic barriers to sustainable development”. The Karamojong captured the event in a non-technical, more poetic word. The Karamojong called it the Sweep, Lopiar.

Before 1980, Karamoja, in the minds of the neighbours, was shorthand for comical, half-dressed cow worshipers. After Lopiar, Karamoja became the menacing land of mythical warriors. It is this image of Karamoja that stuck. Few remember what Karamoja was like before. A wave of calamitous political change in Uganda had also started in 1980 with a civil war in the south. Two military coups followed in 1985 and 1986. The famine passed, but cultural extinction might have followed if the cattle depleted in Karamoja could not be replaced. In this political and security vacuum, the Karamojong struck.

“The clans put aside their differences and went to raid in Teso, Lang’o and Acholi,” says Brother Mark.
I am only learning now that the day in 1987, when I carried my suitcase on my head and fled to Soroti town, was part of a sweep. Now that I look back, it felt as if we were being swept in a flood from a most consequential source.

The raids were a waste in the end. Nothing was gained. Many of the cattle the Karamojong brought in were unsuited to the harsh climate there. What the Turkana and the Pokot did not manage to take back in counter attacks simply died. A reputation for violence was earned for nothing in return.

By the early 1990s, the guns exchanged for cattle had come back home; the migrating weapons were exacting a high price. The ten-year interlude ended in 1992. The imperative for relief food distribution had forced Karamoja into camps. As it happened, stories circulated that an attack on a kraal by a man from the opposite camp triggered a counter attack. It is said that one Kuduyara, a Dodoth kraal leader, led an attack on Jie kraals. As is commonly the case, the identity of the suspect did not matter. He was Dodoth, not Karamojong.

“This is how the peace was destroyed,” says Brother Mark. “Dis-harmony was sowed inside the camp. People abandoned food. The government was very far away from the people. And the people had guns.”

Something close to civil war broke out within Karamoja. The Acholi, Teso and Lang’i were now without animals. The Pokot and Turkana were the only people with cattle in sufficient numbers and were now heavily armed opponents. Jie raided Dodoth, Dodoth attacked the Jie, Matheniko hit the Bokora, and the Pian, and back again. The Ugandan army deployed in Karamoja tried to step in. But with Karamojong now equally well armed, the intervention turned into open warfare. But at least the army was present and could, if it wished, call in additional firepower. But in 1994, another well armed but politically motivated group, was fighting against the Ugandan state. The war with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) war was reaching new levels. This drew the army away from Karamoja. Like a sequel to Lopiar, the following ten years brought hell to Karamoja. When the word “hell” is used in Karamoja, there’s an ironic accuracy to the term. After the army arrested the situation in northern Uganda, following the last, deadly gambit of the Lord’s Resistance Army in 2003-2004, they returned to Karamoja. By then, the herds had recovered to such a level that on a single day, as many as 18,000 head of cattle could be snatched from Karamojong kraals. In what Brother Marko refers to as the Kanyangangiro incident, of March 2005, a group of Turkana who had settled at a good grazing point in Uganda were asked to leave.
“You know the Turkana are sarcastic,” Brother Mark explains. “As they were leaving, they used bad language against the Dodoth. They had come forcefully and settled on Dodoth land.” The Dodoth were not taking it anymore.

Their retreat degenerated into a full flight for the overmatched Turkana. The elderly and children who could not get away quickly fell, many were killed or injured. In all, it is estimated that during March 2005, the Turkana lost some 30,000 heads of cattle.

What would the Turkana do to reclaim their loss? By now governments and aid agencies had grown wise to the cycle of events. The scale of the fight was such that the Ugandan and Kenyan government were drawn in. An NGO called Development Alternates Incorporated was contracted by USAID to assess the conflict. They claimed water was the main source of the problem. The Kenyan army transported tanks full of water to Turkana land to help contain the ever-worsening threat of war. Access to water supply was established, water holes dug, and a buffer zone running 40 kilometres created to separate the combatants. The army tracked the lost Turkana cattle and what was recovered was given back to them.

It was at this point that the Ugandan army won some time and returned to Karamoja. This time they went for the guns. Large swathes of Karamoja were cordoned off for search and recovery operations. But the manner of disarmament drew howls of international protest. Donors, particularly the Danish government, sponsored a program that paid cash for those who voluntarily surrendered their guns.

Two decades after 1979, guns had fallen in value and risen in deadliness. A bullet was now selling for 50 Ugandan shillings, cheaper than a mint drop. And the gun? Its price had fallen to 150,000 shillings, or sixty US dollars. You couldn’t buy a healthy heifer at that price. In the swankier parts of Kampala, this was hardly enough to cover a meal for a family of three in a restaurant.
The Dynamics of Pastoral Conflicts and Their Implications for Regional Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa

This paper explores trajectories of pastoral conflicts, their dynamics, and their significance for conflict mitigation in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region. Pastoral communities across the region, even those that share close ethno-linguistic and kinship ties, are caught in an intensifying cycle of armed conflicts over scarce rangeland resources and increasingly violent variations on traditional livestock raiding. The paper highlights the ways in which the pattern of pastoral conflicts has changed, and the significance of the emergent pastoral conflicts for regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa countries.

The arid and semi-arid zones in the Horn of Africa countries comprise between thirty to seventy percent of the region’s total land area. These arid and semi arid areas are characterised by extremely harsh ecological conditions, high temperatures, low and erratic rainfall, and scanty vegetation. The pastoralists who occupy these

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zones derive their livelihoods predominantly from livestock production based on periodic migration to utilise seasonally available pasture and water. The natural resources upon which they depend are often found across areas that straddle internal and international borders.

These boundaries complicate pastoralists’ access to resources and fuel conflict. Leadership changes in these countries, intensification of internal civil strife, the inter-state wars involving Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia and the proxy wars between Uganda and Sudan significantly influence the nature of these pastoral conflicts. The region’s armed conflicts fuel the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), a major factor exacerbating the conflicts among pastoral communities and their spread across international borders.

For the pastoral communities of the Horn, control over resources critical for their immediate survival was traditionally exercised through gerontocracies, systems of governance where authority and power is invested in the institutions of elders. With the spread of illicit firearms, armed conflicts not only escalated but also became more brutal and indiscriminate, especially when the youth acquired automatic rifles outside the control of the elders. This is also a factor in the commercialisation of livestock raiding for the private benefit of individuals who controlled the warriors. The resulting violence distorted mechanisms for coping with adversity within pastoralist livelihood systems, led to increasing levels of poverty as livestock became increasingly concentrated in a few hands, resulting in traditional justice favouring powerful livestock owners. Internal disputes were no longer resolved amicably but through violence and reprisal attacks, leading to cyclical violence. Banditry and highway robbery intensified as conflicts overflowed to non-pastoral districts.

Unlike in the past, pastoral conflicts between groups with close kinship relations, clans, and within ethnic communities are now common. The trend also manifests as an increase in trans-boundary conflicts between pastoral groups in contiguous border areas. Pastoral conflicts not only escalated, but also became more widespread and lethal as direct military engagement with the army and other state security agencies became a common occurrence. Armed pastoral groups now boldly challenge the authority of the state, even where pastoralists are not motivated by a desire for regime change.

The rangelands interface with the region’s wider conflict systems across the Horn region. Political opposition driving regime change, civil strife and inter-state wars, and armed conflicts in pastoral areas all reinforce each other in significant ways. The wider conflicts influenced pastoral conflicts not only
in terms of their underlying causes, but also by exacerbating conflict triggers and other factors that sustain them. In the different contexts in which pastoral conflicts occur, these various factors are typically complex, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing.

**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PASTORAL CONFLICTS FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

Most of the region’s politically marginalised pastoral areas are far removed from the centres of political power. Pastoral areas typically receive the lowest allocation of state resources from their national governments, lack the social services commonly available elsewhere, and suffer from poor planning and misguided economic policies. As a consequence, these regions are characterised not only by high levels of poverty but also lack the necessary infrastructure and social services. This applies for both the provision of schools, clinics and hospitals, and markets as well as roads and the provision of water and other facilities that stimulate growth and economic opportunities for the population. The problems of outlying areas extend to the presence of state institutions responsible for security and enforcement of law and order and control and monitoring of the long porous international borders. The trafficking of illegal firearms from neighbouring conflict zones (such as Somalia and South Sudan) has contributed to the endemic insecurity and instability reinforcing pastoralist conflicts.

The region’s sub-national political dynamics further aggravate the factors contributing to cross-border conflicts. In Kenya, for example, the post-independence movement for a greater Somalia led some among the Somali in Kenya to align themselves with Somalia, and their support for secession reinforced their marginalisation after independence.

More recently, the new constitutional order endorsed in 2010 mandated the transfer of certain powers of the central state to newly created county-level administrative unit, and this contributed to communal conflicts with cross-border ramifications.

Kenya has been grappling with disputes over pasture and farmland in many areas that have pitted pastoral groups against other pastoral groups as well as settled cultivators. In August 2012, Mandera, Wajir and Tana River Counties experienced violent conflicts. Violent clashes have been reported between Degodia and Garre clans in Mandera and Wajir districts, and between the Orma and Pokomo in Tana River County. Other similar conflicts over border realignments occurred in Marsabit County involving the
Gabra and Borana ethnic groups, while the competition for communal grazing lands is further exacerbated by encroachment by farming communities.¹

Such internal frictions are present although they may take different forms within every country in the region. Pastoral conflicts are partly a symptom of the political difficulties and inadequate political will in the respective countries that complicate the challenges of pastoral development. Only recently have planners considered the need to support pastoralist forms of livelihoods without necessarily seeking to change them.

Over the past decade the combination of population growth and ecological stress has aggravated the problem of diminishing resources. Climate change and variability further intensifies scarcities of critical resources such as water and pastures essential for the survival of livestock. Spells of dry weather have become more prolonged, while rainy seasons are now more erratic with an increase in the heavy rains occurring out of season.

Prolonged extreme weather conditions, whether dry or wet, undermine the traditional capacity of pastoral systems to cope with the environmental stress intrinsic to these regions.

Technocratic responses to such conditions typically focused on promoting sedentarisation. Some pastoralists have been forced to abandon livestock rearing and adopt alternative forms of livelihood. Populations of settled farmers and sedentarised herders have increased in the areas previously utilised by the pastoralists. As the resources in the harsh ecological environments inhabited by pastoralists continue to dwindle because of overgrazing and the conversion of important land reserves to non-livestock-based uses, tensions emerge not only within pastoralist groups but also between pastoralists and their agro-pastoral and agricultural neighbours.

Traditional mechanisms for negotiating flexible and reciprocal resource sharing arrangements that worked in the past tend to become less dependable in these circumstances. The changes noted above contribute to escalated conflicts over access to and control of vital resources, leading to indiscriminate and more destructive forms of violence. In Kenya, for example, competition between different pastoralists groups extends not only to access to pastures and water, but also to ownership of land.²

In other cases, conflicts overlap with issues of national sovereignty. Sometimes disputes left unattended


to or unresolved end up triggering conflicts, as illustrated by the case of the Ilemi triangle, an area of contested sovereignty straddling the boundaries of Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia. Similar outbreaks of armed conflicts are often witnessed along the Uganda-South Sudan and Kenya-South Sudan border zones from Kidepo valley to the Nadapal, Lokichoggio, Kakuma and Oro-poi corridor, which is shared by the Dodoth of Uganda, Toposa of South Sudan and Turkana of Kenya.

A single incident of violence in many pastoralist areas can have multiple underlying causes operating at various levels. That is why a given conflict outbreak will almost certainly beget more conflicts that sometimes spill over to neighbouring communities and across borders.

In Uganda, Karamojong livestock raiding has affected agro-pastoral communities in the sub-regions of Sebei, Bugishu, Teso, Lango and Acholi. The August 2012 clashes between the Degodia and Garre clans in Kenya’s Mandera County may have been triggered by disagreements over altered political boundaries, but in many ways were linked to new governance structures that had been established in neighbouring Ethiopia.

Conflicts in one pastoral area can draw in allied pastoral groups from adjoining areas with interests in the conflicts, especially where pastoral communities occupy contiguous border areas and share close kinship relations or alliances with citizens of neighbouring countries.

These relations are important for accessing pastoral resources across national borders during times of scarcity. During the dry season, the Kenyan Pokot move their livestock to Amudat district in Uganda, where they share resources with the Ugandan Pokot. The ŋikamatak section of the Turkana from Loima in Kenya have been moving their herds into Moroto District since the Lokiriama peace accord of 1973, where they share resources with the Matheniko section of Karamojong. The ŋiwaikwara section of the Turkana maintains an alliance with the Jie of Kotido District. Pokot raiders hide the stolen animals from Karamoja in Kacheliba and Kapenguria in Kenya. The Matheniko raid livestock from fellow Karamojong and hide them among the ŋikamatak Turkana.

The Dodoth of Kaabong conceal stolen animals from Karamoja among the Didiga of South Sudan, and there are other variations on the pattern of trans-boundary resource-sharing networks that fuel raiding activities and the trafficking of illicit firearms across the borders. The dynamics of the regional interconnectedness of pastoral armed

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conflicts in the Horn of Africa mirror the diverse causes and drivers of these conflicts. The inability by Kenya to undertake a simultaneous and systematic disarmament of the Turkana and Pokot, and the situation in South Sudan where the Toposa and Didinga remained armed worked to undermine the disarmament campaigns undertaken in Karamoja. These initiatives also experienced other problems. For example: a recent study published by the Small Arms Survey reported that criminality is a major driver of the market for firearms elements among the Matheniko Karamojong, who participated in disarmament projects, and sometimes borrow weapons from their neighbours across the border who did not.\(^4\)

While pastoral conflicts tend to be localised, these conflicts have a tendency not only to destabilize neighbouring non-pastoral regions, but also sometimes feed into internal civil conflicts and inter-state conflicts. In Kenya, unscrupulous political elites were found to be involved in inciting Pokot invasions of private farms belonging to the Luhya community in the Trans-Nzoia district. The Pokot then began to invade the agro-pastoral Marakwet. This syndrome results in communities neighbouring pastoral groups to respond by organising militias for self-defence against raids by armed pastoral groups, which leads to both proliferation of illegal firearms and also other violent conflicts between different ethnic communities as the case of Kenya’s Marakwet, Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu conflicts demonstrated.\(^5\)

The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis claims that natural resources can provide both motive and opportunity for conflict and create indirect institutional and economic causes of instability. Many pastoral areas are repositories of commercially exploitable deposits of hydrocarbons and minerals. Local conflicts may complicate but no longer act as a barrier to foreign direct investments in all pastoral areas across the greater Horn region. Exploitation of high potential natural resources in these areas, both above-ground, and below ground have led to an upsurge of land grabbing and new conflicts as the indigenous communities are dispossessed and displaced from their lands. In Karamoja, the local ‘resource curse’ initially began with the exploitation of marble and limestone for making cement, foreshadowing the emergence of potentially larger tensions as infrastructure projects begin to open up formerly remote areas for investment and extractive industries—as has been the case with the discovery of oil reserves in Turkana.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) See Broeck (2010), op.cit

\(^6\) Row brewing over how oil revenue from Turkana basin will be shared, The East African, January 3, 2017. [https://www.theafrican.co.ke/business/Row-brewing-over-how-Turkana-oil-revenue-will-be-shared/2560-3505470-sqylp/index.html](https://www.theafrican.co.ke/business/Row-brewing-over-how-Turkana-oil-revenue-will-be-shared/2560-3505470-sqylp/index.html)
To avoid the risk of conflicts over the exploitation of high value commercial resources, these outlying resource-rich pastoral areas need to be designated as first beneficiaries of the revenues generated from the new found wealth. Negotiating this is not easy, as the case of Turkana has demonstrated.

IGAD member states need to invest a significant share of the revenue generated from the various large-scale agriculture and mining ventures in the development of local communities in addition to upgrading the physical infrastructure. But even without these developments, the provision of social services and other measures to support local livelihoods remain key to addressing insecurity in these areas.

The record of misguided attempts to integrate pastoral areas into mainstream development created a legacy of inappropriate policy and legal frameworks governing pastoralist livelihoods. Until recently many governance failures highlighted non-responsive and unaccountable institutions of the central and local governments, and the absence of pastoralists’ participation in national and international policy fora. This is why many IGAD countries’ policies tended to favour non-livestock economic interventions. More recent policy and legal frameworks have sought to modernise pastoralism through commercialisation and other policies designed to enhance livestock exports. The current situation is nevertheless characterised by continuing constraints on livestock production coupled with limited opportunities for local employment for the growing population of youth. As a consequence, even where investments have been undertaken, they have not catalysed multi-sectoral growth in rangeland areas. Pastoral areas remain economically marginalised despite the economic contribution of pastoralism to the respective national economies.7

**What does the Future hold for Pastoral Areas?**

The interconnectedness of these conflicts underscores the case for cross-border regional peace and security interventions like the CEWARN mechanism.

Due to the high level of inter-dependence between pastoralists within countries across the Horn of Africa, conflicts in one pastoral area often both directly and indirectly affect other parts of the country. This means that countries affected by pastoral conflicts need to emphasise controlling small arms and light weapons and implementing developmental frameworks that target improved pastoralist livelihoods and poverty reduction. Consistent with the analysis above, this will require a systematic regional approach that integrates

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measures for reducing pastoral conflicts with other developmental initiatives. At this juncture, programs for reducing the proliferation of arms in pastoral areas, like Uganda’s ambitious Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme, face problems due to the difficulties of integrating local initiatives with broader security and development initiatives.⁸

Pastoral areas afflicted by armed conflicts are located in remote areas where the central state institutions are weak. Some public servants often opt to avoid postings to such areas; some would rather resign from the civil service than accept being posted to these so-called hardship regions. For security personnel, serving in conflict zones come with their own risks. Without effective state institutions for enforcement of law and order, it is difficult to reverse the volatility affecting insecure regions.

In Karamoja, while raiding declined due to the relative improvement in security associated with the government’s disarmament programs, isolated cattle thefts and opportunistic road ambushes by criminals continued. Even in conflict free zones, new flare-ups can quickly engulf communities with a history of conflict. It will be difficult for the communities to volunteer information useful for sustainable peace as long as those who commit crimes, including raiding, theft, and possession of illegal firearms are not apprehended and prosecuted. The limited public investment in law enforcement and the administration of justice means criminals and the perpetrators of communal violence will continue to enjoy the impunity contributing to the malaise in pastoral areas.

The problems of access and responding to local conflicts underscore the need for infrastructural development. In many pastoralist regions, existing roads are poorly maintained and become impassable during the rainy seasons. The extension of telecommunication network coverage has helped, but sometimes coverage is incomplete and connectivity is poor. Fortunately, the transport and communication infrastructure is gradually improving but much work remains, especially in light of the increase in extreme climatic events. In the meantime, the improvements in transport and communications have created new problems including the rapid evacuation of stolen livestock and the use of mobile phones to co-ordinate raids.⁹


**Conclusion:**

**Key Considerations for Conflict Prevention**

Government and development partners need to be sensitive to the tensions that divide pastoral communities, as well as the states where they reside. The drivers of these conflicts are not only diverse but also mutually reinforcing and can also feed into the causes of the wider conflicts occurring across the IGAD region. Because of the interdependent quality of the phenomenon, the failure to address the roots of individual conflicts undermines the success of other efforts to mitigate broader causes and catalysts of regional conflicts. This is why conflict-sensitive approaches should be mainstreamed in all development interventions, especially in areas afflicted by chronic violence in the past. Addressing pastoral conflicts requires security related interventions that also emphasise the need for promoting sustainable livelihoods through supporting interventions for enhancing food security and supporting income generation activities through diversified sources of incomes for pastoral households.

It is important to understand where the multiple forces driving pastoral conflicts originate and the internal and external factors that sustain the cycle of the conflicts. Pastoral conflicts at times disguise the role of actors operating within national and regional political arenas. What may begin as internecine conflicts can become more lethal and destructive affairs with actors across national borders both directly and indirectly fanning the conflicts.

In contiguous border areas where insecurity is associated with presence of armed pastoral groups, it is essential for the respective countries in the Horn of Africa to undertake joint cross-border security
and disarmament operations. The pastoral communities who bear the brunt of insecurity must also be involved in order to develop a sense of ownership in disarmament and peace-building projects. Provision of adequate security for communities after disarmament is essential for reducing their vulnerability to attacks from neighbours who have not disarmed. Countries also need to invest in mechanisms for conflict early warning and response to ensure timely and effective action in response to actual or planned conflicts.

To succeed, this requires measures mitigating the effects of past conflicts, including the commercialisation of livestock raiding activities. It is evident from the above discussions that pastoral conflicts are not only dynamic and complex, but also require collective interventions for improving regional peace and security in the IGAD region. For CEWARN, this means that more efforts are needed to help policy makers and implementers understand how conflict analysis and the participation of civil society is central to conflict prevention.

THE DYNAMICS OF PASTORAL CONFLICTS
Changing Patterns of Pastoralist Conflict

Introduction: The Evolution of Rangeland Conflicts

For decades, policy makers treated the conflicts in the rangelands of the Horn of Africa as the inevitable outcome of an obsolete socioeconomic strategy. Raiding and livestock rustling, by this reading, were manifestations of atavistic traditions that needed to be replaced with ranching and other alternative livelihoods. National political leaders saw the warring pastoralists within their borders as more embarrassment than a security problem. Endemic conflict and other non-progressive behaviours would vanish over time, once the nomadic and transhumant herders settled and embraced Western education. Instead of these developments, the violence incubating in the rangelands erupted during the 1990s, forcing a rethink as the conflicts’ spill-over effects began to impact on national economies. The state lost its monopoly over the means of coercion and large swaths of eastern Africa’s rangeland became de facto stateless regions.

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The rise of the region’s open range livestock economy highlighted generational age sets and other military institutions supporting territorial expansion of cattle and camel monoculture across the lowlands and the region’s highland fringes. Conflict was predominantly a function of competition over grazing and water resources. Communal borders were fuzzy, and symbiotic relations tempered the cultural prerogatives that came with institutional warriorhood. After the trauma of colonial intervention, most pastoralist societies settled into a laissez-faire relationship with the state that mutated into the systemic social exclusion of the post-independence era.

The retreat of the state marked the shift to a new phase of conflict distinct from the traditional conflicts and reciprocal raiding that carried over into the post-independence period. The renewed militancy of the region’s pastoralists dovetailed with the political activism of the 1990s, modern weaponry facilitating a variation on Clausewitz’s famous dictum about ‘politics by other means’. The once politically sedate rangelands emerged as a new theatre of opposition to government hegemony and private sector encroachment. This second phase of conflict—defined by the confluence of banditry and the commercialisation of livestock raiding, civil society advocacy, and political patronage—is now giving way to a third phase of pastoralist conflict spearheaded by the penetration of capital. While many of the drivers accumulating over the first two phases of pastoralist conflict remain active, this third phase highlights the frictions accompanying the incorporation of the rangelands into the regional economy.

Developments have placed herdsmen armed with Kalashnikovs in the same frame with corporate investment in extractive industries, large-scale land acquisitions by governments and their private sector partners, multi-national guerrillas operating behind the cover of Islamist ideology, and state-based actors who see the economic integration of pastoralists as another opportunity for profiteering and primitive accumulation. Such scenarios are further complicated by the impact of climate change and the agency of the Arab and Asian governments seeking to establish influence in the Horn of Africa region.

In his 2015 book1, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, Alex de Waal documents the new politics accompanying the regime of privatisation and the entrance of international capital across the region. The transactional dynamics he documents are closely bound up with new forms of political violence, insurgency, and criminality overlaying the culturally and historically distinct stages of

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pastoralist economic expansion and conflict leading up to the present juncture. Changes in the first two decades of the new millennium are generating a diversified and layered dynamic of conflict where the cultural predilections of the Horn of Africa’s warrior societies, dismissed by modern policy makers and scholars alike, is giving way to less visible forces of violence. The expansion of the CEWARN mandate to cover a spectrum of new thematic areas such as human trafficking and violent extremism represents a parallel response to the changes gaining pace on the ground. And despite the convergence with the trajectories of other regions and their histories, recent developments still reveal the influence of the initial conditions underpinning the expansion of pastoralist societies over the past millennium.

THE EXPANSION OF PASTORALIST MONOCULTURE

Pastoralist nomadism and transhumance were part of a larger response to the decreasing humidity of the past 800 hundred years. Monocultural pastoralism in particular gained impetus from the onset of a long cycle of decreasing humidity beginning in 1250 BC.

The shift in climate selected for group mobility, the ability to defend herds from animal and human predators, and the elastic social organisation enabling pastoralists to cope with unpredictable climate and uncertainty associated with Africa’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Range scientists now refer to such conditions as environmental disequilibrium to explain pastoralists’ opportunistic exploitation of ephemeral natural resources to offset seasons of shortfall and adversity. Adaptation to these conditions optimised the per capita returns to labour and the growth of herds over time sustained the spread of pastoralist monoculture across the vast rangelands of eastern Africa.

Shifting climate combined with environmental variation and niche ecologies to form the template selecting for the Horn of Africa region’s multicultural economic configuration. The movements of livestock keepers from the Horn southward into East Africa date back to prehistory. Nilotic migrations of over the past five hundred years followed the earlier movement of Sirikwa agro-pastoralists and Maa speakers across the Rift Valley before them.

To the east several waves of Cushite migrations extended their influence across the Horn of Africa’s east-

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ern lowlands and beyond. These coevolutionary processes resulted in the complicated overlap of origins and identities documented in Schlee’s clan histories of Northern Kenya and in Lewis’ taxonomy of Somali clan lineages.

Livestock was the region’s main currency of exchange, and monocultural specialisation generated the surplus that saw pastoralists become the bankers of the precolonial economy. Despite the appearance of autonomy, herders everywhere require carbohydrates from grains and other agricultural commodities. This need is met through direct exchange relations with agriculturalists or through long distance trade in the case of camel herders. The explorer William Chanler described the extent of the regional economies based on the succession of ecological zones he encountered his travels in northern Kenya between 1893 and 1896.

The case of northern Kenya was one variation on the pattern of pastoralists influence across the region. Others included the transition of Babito pastoralists into the dynasties ruling the intralacustrine kingdoms, the incorporation of Oromo herders into the Abyssinian empire, and the symbiotic relationships between nomads and the Ajuran Sultanate’s hydraulic state in south-central Somalia. Livestock management innovations adapted to distinctive flood plain environment of the Sudd powered the Nuer expansion that began in the late 18th century and that had by 1845 resulted in the integration of many of their Dinka neighbours.

Ateker military innovations powered the 19th century surge of the Turkana into the large district bearing their name in present day Kenya. Both conflict and the social relations mediating it were central to the evolution of all these distinct systems. The general picture is one of an uneven but consistent pattern of interaction, alternating modalities of peaceful exchange and forceful acquisition, and movement prompted by aperiodic environmental and climatic vagaries. During the late 19th century, the combined influence of climate, demographic increase, and spatial circumscription marked a tipping point for the region’s pastoralists.


The dominance of the Maasai declined as their agricultural neighbours, most of whom had adapted Maa military institutions, began to encroach on their highland grazing areas. This provoked new variations on Maasai raiding and conflict, from attacks on coastal settlements to the far-reaching reverberations triggered by the Laikipiak civil wars. The epidemics and famines of the 1890s prompted realignments extending across the larger region. Rinderpest decimated herds and the famines further abetted the expansion of agricultural communities as they absorbed destitute pastoralists and hunter-gathers on the highland fringe. The Pax Britannica effectively reversed the developmental trajectory shaping the eastern African region, upsetting the coevolutionary equilibria underpinning late precolonial era change. Colonial policies resulted in the separation and isolation of pastoralists across the region’s remote ASAL regions. South Sudan was quarantined and administered separate from the rest of the Sudan. In Kenya and Uganda, administrative units were designed to create barriers between pastoralists and the agricultural regions targeted for European settlement and commercial development.

In northern Kenya, the British created the Northern Frontier District as a buffer zone to counter Emperor Menelik’s expansionary designs. Across the vast lowland apron extending from the Ethiopian highlands the dominant concern was demarcating the contested border with Somalia.

### The Intensification of Pastoralist Conflict

The compartmentalization of ethnic units undermined the arrangements knitting diverse African production systems attuned to the region’s unique ecologies together over hundreds of years. This did not prevent incidences of communal violence, but most were localised events triggered by a combination of climate and the usual disputes over grazing areas, water points, and administrative boundaries. A small number of European administrators were able to govern large swaths of northern Kenya and Uganda, the Sudan, and Somalia with little resistance from the region’s diverse pastoralist groups. This colonial interlude was a period of malaise in the rangelands. Over the decades of colonial rule, formerly wealthy herders retreated into subsistence economies.

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After independence, colonial isolation and laissez faire co-existence soon gave way to the national developmental narratives that regarded warrior societies and their livestock were more nuisance than asset. And prejudicial policies that widened the gap between pastoralists and their neighbours relegated the pastoralists and other minority communities to the margins of post-independence politics.

Systemic exclusion and a corresponding lack of voice in national political arenas acted to conceal the factors that were to give rise to a new and more deadly phase of rangeland conflict. During the early decades of independence a few firearms could tip the balance of power between evenly matched protagonists. A small number of guns, some of them dating back to the reign of Menelik, allowed the Turkana to dominate their pastoralist neighbours in the north Rift Valley. By the early 1980s they were pushing their spear-bearing Pokot neighbours to the brink, upsetting the fragile equilibrium formerly balancing relations between the two enemies. After the collapse of

Idi Amin’s Uganda government in 1979, the Matheniko Karamojong pillaged the armory at Moroto. Before long, the Matheniko were selling and exchanging the surplus weapons for cattle, neutralising the Turkana’s advantage over their neighbours. The Western Somali Liberation Front’s invaded Ethiopia’s Ogaden region later that same year. The failed invasion added to the supply of firearms. The Pokot soon established their own weapons pipeline through connections forged between Somali traders and their future Cabinet Minister, Francis Lotodo.

The new market for small arms reconfigured power relations across and beyond the North Rift Valley conflict system. By the mid-1990s the militarisation of the Horn of Africa’s rangelands was complete. Combatants, including warrior aged youth with little experience using guns, fought some of the largest pitched battles in the region since the Ogaden War. More importantly, modern weapons transformed pastoralist groups into a match for government security forces. The Turkana developed a technique of massing small arms fire that resulted in warriors downing two military helicopters during the late 1990s.

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21 This conformed with the larger global trend of firearm proliferation documented by Phillip Killicoat, (2007). This indicates that the problem was also a result of increased production in a number of countries with factories manufacturing the AK-47, the guns finding their way to illicit markets in Africa, eastern Europe, and other conflicted regions.
including an attack downing a helicopter. These developments dramatised the shifting military power relations across the Horn of Africa’s rangelands. Pastoralist conflicts assumed a political dimension that elevated the internal frictions of previous generations to regional security threat. Commercialisation of livestock markets encouraged banditry while eroding the cultural protocols governing warfare. Years of declining rainfall further intensified the new cycle, abetting the emergence of opportunistic new leaders who forged shadowy connections with high-ranking civil servants and politicians. The primary victims of these developments were the pastoralists themselves, leading researchers to question the cultural survival of the pastoralist community. These second phase changes encapsulated the crisis of security across national and regional scales. Efforts of individual governments to provide security were inadequate even before the spread of firearms changed the equation. The proliferation of weapons turned the alienation of previously passive pastoralist populations into active resistance.

The regions’ new and old insurgencies fuelled cross-border raiding, underscoring a new and more politicised ethos of conflict. The displacement created by conflicts in turn gave rise to secondary problems. The role of refugee camps as magnets for foreign aid incentivised civil servant and private sector corruption. The soaring youth demographic added another potential element of volatility to the mix. All of these factors transformed the new pastoralist militancy into a significant threat for the collective security of IGAD nations. Governing the remote rangelands could no longer be an ad hoc exercise marked by violent coercion based on collective responsibility. While the threat varied from country to country, by the end of the 1990s it was clear that the problem demanded a trans-boundary solution, and this prompted the IGAD states to adopt a coordinated approach to the spreading insecurity: CEWARN was formed several years later.

CONTRAINTS TO COOPERATION

Getting the region’s states to agree on a coordinated approach was the greatest obstacle to the project in the beginning. Some of the countries had fought wars with each other; relations between others were marked by tensions or suspicions. A host of other internal reasons made the member states overly protective of their national sovereignty when it came to sharing the intelligence required for the early warning system to function. A Chatham House analyst described post-independence relations among the Horn of Africa’s states as “hostile neighbours generally acting as enablers and multipliers of one another’s conflicts.”

The ensembles of diverse ethnic groups divided by national borders encouraged reciprocal destabilisation—or the embedded propensity for governments to harbour rebels in order to keep a potentially hostile neighbour state in check. In Africa, it represents a variation on the classical security game where two governments’ efforts to enhance their own security ultimately result in outcomes that aggravate their respective vulnerability.

In practice, the ‘game’ allowed rebel groups to shift their focus to criminal activities like smuggling, the sale of firearms, trafficking in persons, and other enablers of civil conflicts in different parts of the world.

On the urban front, democratisation gave rise to new demands by marginalised communities as political pluralism unleashed forces of ethnic sub-nationalism and identity politics that had previously been held in check by single party governance. A new generation of pastoralist civil society activists began challenging their governments’ political legitimacy. Governments, forced to cede political space to civil society, to accept multi-party democracy, and to develop new methods for frustrating the shifting forces.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government in Ethiopia used state-supported opposition parties to co-opt the political resistance while ruthlessly crushing dissent. In Uganda, the government of Yoweri Museveni created a new Ministry to cater for the demands of the Karamojong.

In Kenya, where civil society flourished apace with the political opening of the early 1990s, the Kenya Pastoralist Forum and newly elected

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The Third Phase of Pastoralist Conflict

Regional and continental bodies have developed diplomatic superstructures to address the problems, but the challenges continue to transcend their capacity to implement mitigations. The immediate former Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub Maalim, summed up the predicament: “the daunting task of helping to resolve unrest in a region that has seen many decades of warfare,” should not be underestimated.34

Over 120 years after the demise of the North American cattle drive, the mythologised image of the cowboy and life on the range still obfuscate the role of financial capital, much of it sourced from abroad, as the primary force taming America’s Wild West. Railroads, meat packing plants, and the invention of barbed wire spearheaded the transition.35 The penetration of capital from external sources is now poised to play a similar role in the Horn of Africa’s rangelands. Markets’ importance as a policy tool cuts both ways. Ensminger traced the success of Orma herders of Kenya’s coastal hinterland to cattle exporters’ efforts to reduce transaction costs.36

The long-term demand for animal protein will support greater efficiency along these lines over time, raising the stakes for control of grazing and water resources. Commercialisation is encouraging new forms of criminality and resource conflict, creating a new set of transaction costs for pastoralist producers and traders. According to research on the marketing-related costs of the cattle trade in the Kenya-Ethiopian cross-border zone, security accounted for 7 per cent of the cattle transport costs on the Moyale-Isiolo route, 5.7 per cent on the Samburu-Isiolo route, and 7.4 per cent on the Wajir-Isiolo route.37

Demographic trends and urbanisation will continue to raise the value of meat and dairy products, but the higher prices will not automatically accrue to the primary producers. These trends and other shifts within the rangeland economy put into question the ability of the livestock sector to replicate the role of highland agricultural commercialisation as an engine of pastoralist household accumulation and development. The expansion of education and corresponding labour shortages are sustaining economic diversification. This emphasises the importance of human capital–rangeland resource synergies.

The acquisition of pastoralist land for capital-intensive agriculture, energy projects, conservancies, and other schemes, in contrast, underscores the fact that indigenous rangeland communities are often unable to enforce the legal ownership of resources and customary usufruct rights to their lands.38

The Horn region’s capitalist makeover will likely increase the disparities among remote lowland populations. Progress towards harnessing the region’s natural resources, while ostensibly promoting the prosperity of marginalised stakeholders, will follow a difficult and often fractious pathway. The discovery of hydrocarbon resources, prospects for extractive industries, and the allocation of large land holdings to international agribusiness and foreign governments are generating grievances over lack of consultation and revenue-sharing arrangements.39

In a paper on the relationship between greed and grievances, the World Bank economist Paul Collier observed that greed is the more powerful force, capable of overwhelming social stability and effective political institutions. As Illife has noted in his excellent study of Africa’s indigenous capitalism, the domination of ‘cash money’ and corresponding

39 Oil, more than other minerals and gemstones, is prone to instigate civil conflicts. Ross, Michael L. (2015). What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse? Annual Review of Political Science, 18.
levelling effects of late capitalism add a problematic new dimension for the leaders entrusted with negotiating the continent’s transition. The raids by Janjaweed militia in Darfur, attacks on Chinese oil installations, and threats by the Turkana to disrupt road transport following disputes over oil revenues are harbingers of how internal and external factors can transform development into a contest over the capture of capital. Capitalist transitions are by definition an uneven process, accompanied by turbulence and new forms of conflict. High rates of demographic growth, technology change, initiatives for economic and institutional integration, and the growing accumulation of indigenous capital all point to a region on the brink of such a transition. Pastoralist capitalists, more than the penetration of international capital, may yet prove to be the critical determinant of how Illife’s case for the rise of a distinctively African capitalism plays out in the Horn of Africa’s extensive rangelands.  

CONCLUSION: FUTURE TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

Climate change is combining with demographic growth to alter range ecologies while intensifying resource-based competition. Reciprocal raiding and its variations will persist, especially in areas where state capacity is weak and poor governance favour opportunistic behaviours. The first and second phases of conflict described here will continue to merge with the new forces at work to present practical policy-related dilemmas. What was already a complicated picture has become even more intricate due to the uneven pace of the developments and distribution of capital investment. All of these factors underscore the importance of CEWARN and other institutions fostering regional integration.

The task of transiting from the project’s pilot phase to adapting the early warning model to other threats requires a broad but nuanced understanding of the general challenges facing conflict prevention and peace work across the larger region. The spread of the Darfur conflict is a cogent example of the third phase hypothesis articulated here. Darfur’s longstanding farmer-herder frictions morphed into a larger crisis, spawning the militant Justice and Equality Islamist


41 Some of the issues to be addressed in the next phase include terrorist networks, electoral political violence, the spread of Ebola and fast-moving disease vectors, human trafficking, and kidnapping.
movement and state sponsored Jannauwad militias, creating linkages to southern secessionist factions, and drawing in the oil companies contributing to Sudan’s abysmal human rights record.\textsuperscript{42}

Its tentacles to other conflict areas led one analyst to state: “The Darfur conflict rides along the fault lines of continental warfare spread from Niger to Djibouti and Somalia, and from eastern Congo and Rwanda through Uganda and Sudan to Eritrea and the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{43} Much effort will be needed if participatory governance and development are to replace the forces sustaining such cycles of violence. But the equation also includes a number of positive trends that are enhancing the productivity, efficiency, and the human capital prerequisite for reversing the rangelands development malaise.\textsuperscript{44}

Ultimately, mitigating the insecurity endemic to the rangelands will not be a function of policing and military deterrence, or as one US Army analyst observed: Security and stability in the 21st century have little to do with traditional power politics, military conflict between states, and issues of grand strategy. Instead, they revolve around governance, public safety, inequality, urbanisation, violent non-state actors, and the disruptive consequences of globalisation.\textsuperscript{45} Providers of security in the form of armies, police, paramilitary forces, and private contractors have also been part of the problem. Another observer posited that the proclivity towards the privatisation of security is emblematic of the shift towards a “polycentric” environment where state authority competes with transnational corporations, global governing bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), regional and ethnic interests, and terror organisations.\textsuperscript{46} Deterrence has its place, but the military solutions employed in the past tend to complicate more than resolve the conflicts erupting across the greater Sahel region.

Twenty years ago Andrew LeSage reported that Somalia’s Islamists were laying a solid foundation for a long-term struggle, and recent events have borne this out.\textsuperscript{47}

It follows that the IGAD states will require an equivalent long-term strategy as the distinctive warrior traditions of pastoralist societies resurface in the contest pitting the forces of international capital against the region’s most resilient survivors.

\textsuperscript{45} Williams, Phil (2008). From the New Middle ages to a New Dark age: the Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy. Strategic Studies Institute.
Anatomy of a Communal Conflict:
The Moyale Case Study

The main communities in Moyale—the Borana, Gabra, Burji and the Sakuye—have been present there for hundreds of years. The Somalis and other pastoralist groups came to the area later. These communities, which broadly share a language and culture, have lived together in peace for a long time. The perception people used to have when they hear a reference to ‘Northern Kenya’ was not objective; they commonly assumed when you come to Moyale you won’t return alive. That kind of thinking has gone away and now many people from other parts of Kenya are coming to Moyale. Members of the Kikuyu, Meru, and even Maasai communities have bought plots and built homes. Moyale is a border town and local business is booming.

RASHID KARAYU

Rashid Karayu served as CEWARN field monitor for Moyale, Kenya and continues to serve as CEWARN’s local peace building partner.

When the CEWARN team needed a person to monitor conflict in Moyale, I was recruited by the first CEWARN country coordinator in Kenya. During the 2008 post-election violence, it was very peaceful here. Moyale was spared the se-
rious violence in the rest of Kenya which almost tipped into civil war. I was a personal witness to how this changed in Moyale during the aftermath of the next national elections in March 2013. What follows is a case study of the complications and challenges of managing cross-border conflicts. I need to start at the beginning to explain how these changes came about.

Growing up, I did not even know that I was Borana. I only knew that all around me were neighbours living together in harmony. We could easily go to the houses of my friends after school when my mother wasn’t at home. I would eat at the neighbours’, who were not Borana. They would also eat with us. I only came to see myself as Borana years later when I joined secondary school in 1997. That’s when the frictions among our communities began. I heard there was conflict between the Borana and the Garre in Ethiopia. Then I also heard the Burji were fighting both the Garre and Borana. This is how my friends and I realised we were from different ethnic backgrounds. Conflict started and internal divisions began opening up within our own communities.

The village I come from supplies water to the whole of Moyale. This was before we had water user associations or committees. Anybody could be elected to these committees. Gradually, everything changed including the composition of settlements. People moved and you began hearing of Borana or Gabra villages. We started developing suspicions of each other, even among the friends with whom I grew up.

Of course there had been issues of livestock theft before this, although they were not ethnic in character. There was a chief in my area, a very tough but learned man. If people were fighting in the next village, he would contain it. He would tell them, “If you want to fight it is ok, but not in my location. Go out in the bush and fight there so that your dead body isn’t brought into my location.” He handled security very well.

The first time I actually saw an ethnic conflict in town was in 2001. It started at a water point and spread into the town. The military camped outside Moyale and threatened to come into the town. The chief controlled it, and he became recognised as one of the outstanding people here for his efforts to maintain security and peace. Those fighting were brought into our location. They were shocked that there was peace here even though the same people were fighting outside. The chief was appointed as the District Peace and Reconciliation Chairperson. We were very close to him and he used to call me to assist in peacekeeping activities. That’s how I found myself involved in peace and security work.
Prior to 2005, there were no major issues except for the usual cattle rustling among the pastoralists. The raiders would go take a few animals and flee with them. But this changed after Moyale became one of the areas perceived as a hideout for rebels like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia. Whenever the OLF crossed to attack within Ethiopia, the Ethiopian military would also come across the border searching for them. The Ethiopian military is allowed to do this due to an agreement with the Kenyan government, though the arrangement is not well documented. At times the two governments conduct joint operations to flush out the rebels. The common people are caught in-between. During the 1990s many people were killed on suspicion of sympathising with the rebels, including some government chiefs.

The Borana are part of the larger Oromo community, so in the minds of Ethiopians, Kenyan Borana were assumed to be harbouring the rebels. In 2000, there was a meeting where the Provincial Commissioner for Eastern Province addressed the Borana. It actually worked. Some of the people stopped engaging in such activities. They handed over their ammunition, guns, and other weapons. Some of the rebels are still in Kenya but they don’t exert as much impact as before. Even so, the problems returned. There were two incidents when rebels attacked police stations in Ethiopia’s Region Four and Five.

When clans began fighting in Moyale in 2013 and 2014 many Kenyans from Moyale fled to Ethiopia. Incidents on both sides of the border were now contributing to local conflicts. The atmosphere of peace and calm began to decline. What happened next stemmed from changes in the Kenyan Constitution. The Borana formerly controlled most of the political power in Marsabit and Isiolo counties. Then people began building group alliances among the different communities. The biggest one was REGABU, an anagram referring to the Rendille, Gabra and Burji formed in 2007, but it was more name than a political force initially. The alliance revived with the coming of devolution under the new Constitution. The three communities came together and started talking within themselves and the smaller communities united against the Borana. The objective was to capture all the political positions in Marsabit County: Governor, Senator, Members of Parliament (MPs), and Members of the County Assembly (MCAs).

The elections under the new Constitution ended up disintegrating the power of the Borana clans. Fighting erupted over the results and the frictions went on until February 2014. A lot of people died, many were displaced, and property was destroyed; two schools were burnt to ashes. Property worth around three million Kenyan shillings was lost. Seven dispensaries
were looted and vandalised in the villages of Manyatta and Elu. I’ve never witnessed such fighting. I don’t know where the people got the money to wage a campaign featuring heavy weaponry like machine guns, small bombs, M-16 rifles, and AK-47s.

These arms reportedly came from Somalia, implicating Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government’s army recruits who were being trained in Isiolo. Some of the recruits ran away with the weapons. It is estimated that over one thousand trainees ended up joining clan militias. While the conflict was raging on the Kenyan side, our women and children were on the Ethiopian side. That’s when the OLA attacked a Kenyan police station and launched the attacks in southern Ethiopia, forcing the women and children to return back to Kenya. The Ethiopian authorities gave an order that no Kenyans should be found in Moyale, Ethiopia. The OLF were trying to influence the opinion of the people against the Ethiopian government. However, it turned out that the result was the opposite as the rebels had become a liability for the Borana here.

We don’t recognise that border as a barrier; we recognise the different security officers’ uniforms from Kenya and Ethiopia. We get almost everything we use from Ethiopia except for finished products and other manufactured items made in Kenya. But the issues that are affecting Ethiopia also affect us. We are separated by the boundaries, but we share all other aspects of life with our people in Ethiopia. Most of the livestock being transported to Nairobi come from Ethiopia, especially cows and camels, and the large livestock market in Sololo serves all communities across the border. When these problems happen it is hard for the Ethiopians to transport their animals to the Kenyan side because they may be attacked anytime. That was the situation along the border in 2014.

As CEWARN peace monitors, our primary task is to share information among our team. This entails circulating the information among the peace monitors and local peace committees in Ethiopia and Kenya; with local and national Kenyan authorities and reporting to the CEWARN secretariat in Addis Ababa.

During the first phase of CEWARN’s existence we played a major role in the recovery of stolen livestock and supporting local peacebuilding activities. Before that, no one could recover stolen animals taken to Ethiopia. Now, if animals are stolen I just inform my counterpart in Ethiopia that a number of animals were stolen from this area and he informs the authorities there. One cannot just cross the border any more and take the animals to the market because there are security arrangements in place. There was a recent case in Moyale where the Borana stole
three hundred Gabra livestock but they couldn’t take them anywhere because the border had been closed. They willingly returned the animals. The incident illustrates the benefits of sharing of information and cross border linkages including the local Peace Committees.

The clashes that erupted in 2014 highlighted an expanded set of drivers, like the role of weapons diverted from Somalia and the regional politics that came to exacerbate Moyale’s growing communal divisions.

The whole country was tense during the period between 2010 and 2013. Like those of us working for CEWARN, many other Kenyans feared a repeat of past experiences like the 2008 post-election violence. Everyone was prepared, including the National Steering Committee on Peace Building. We have established methods for communicating developments on the ground like situation briefs and alerts. In this case, we acted systematically to alert the Kenya CEWERU and proceeded to work with the government’s District and Provincial Commissioners. We were also sending other reports documenting developments to the secretariat in Addis Ababa. We applied to the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) for convening meetings in 2013, but unfortunately the delay in approval meant that the assistance came too late. The response time of the RRF has improved since that time.

CEWARN directed some of us to share information, give directions and advice, and help the local authorities with documentation. We normally have linkages with the villages and beyond and this generated additional information we shared with the local authorities. The sharing of that information was important. I came to understand that sometimes the system works, but other times it fails because the response process is slowed down by bureaucratic procedures.

For example: I inform the District Commissioner who informs the Provincial Commissioner who then has to call the national office. By the time they respond, a number of days have passed. In cases of violence, we usually report to the nearest police station, we don’t involve those other offices. Our relationship with the local authorities is good. Sometimes they request for advice from us and even ask us to assist them in their work.

So, we share information with the authorities and also collaborate in other practical ways. That’s how we help contain the situation; that’s how CEWARN field monitors work.

The conflict in Moyale, as I explained earlier, began with alliances being formed. No one anticipated the amount of destruction and loss in terms of property and human lives that the contest over the new constitutional arrangement — in-
volving the direct election of a Governor and Members of County Assembly to manage resources at the local level - would lead to. It was a unique conflict that turned into an all out war. Even the Kenyan military were cautious about intervening because of the heavy weaponry being used by the ethnic militias.

The conflagration was also linked to some of the regional governments in Ethiopia. It appears that some of the local people behind the violence had sought out their support among the Gabra and the Garre living in Ethiopia’s Region Five, which is governed by the Somali regional government, and the Borana and Oromo inhabiting Region Four. The evidence indicates there must have been an element of Ethiopian security personnel engaged in the conflict as well. There have been reports of arrests made to that effect.

There are also accounts of people wearing police uniforms involved in the fighting and police reservists who should have been neutral were also participating in the clashes, some of them were seen returning to the police armoury to get more ammunition.

I estimate about a hundred lives were lost. Some twenty thousand families were displaced from their homes although fortunately not all the villages were affected. There are people who spent millions constructing their houses only to see them burnt down. Even the foundations were destroyed. The destruction included a school where all the facilities, library and laboratories were burnt down. If I take you to Moyale now to look at the site, you would not even tell there was once a school there.

There is nothing left of the villages in Elu and Manyatta. When I visited after the clashes, there was smoke everywhere and only the euphorbia fences were left standing. I don’t think such a thing has happened in this part of Kenya before.

The Maikona Pact which was formulated by Borana and Gabra elders several years before was left in pieces, and the elders couldn't work together after developments got out of hand. So the case was referred to the Office of the President, and that’s how things returned to normal. But some people had nowhere to go after their houses were burnt down.

Initially, the conflict revolved around natural resources like pasture and water. After the politicians became involved, the dynamics changed to involve frictions over political boundaries, then escalated to fighting over government positions. The political problem was ultimately sorted out through the intervention from above. The two antagonists: the Regabu coalition and the Borana signed a memorandum for the distribution of political offices. The agreement was docu-
mented. Harmony was restored and after the losses, people had a feeling that enough is enough.

Our communities have learnt a lesson. Managing cross border relationships requires more meetings, especially ones that brings on board all the communities involved.

There are still many things to be done in regard to compensation and dialogue. The trauma caused by the death and destruction requires healing. You may bring guns, policemen or the military, but you cannot remove what’s in people’s minds. We need to strengthen support for the victims and to devise strategies for their psychological and social support. Our local leaders are central to the problem. I don’t think things will change in Moyale as long as the same community leaders who are warlords are also the peacemakers. As a field monitor, it worries me that someone who was fighting the other day is taking credit for making peace today.

There are traditional institutions that used to work efficiently before, like the Yaa, the Gada. They had developed guiding principles and rules to manage water points and pasture that worked for generations. Now that we have the County Government, there is the political space for strengthening the communities’ customary laws and rules. If you go to the villages, the elders no longer enjoy their former authority.

Elders’ contribution to conflict is now minimal, while women and youths are often active participants. Women supply ammunition to fighters, cook food, and take water to the battlefield, and even carry guns. The youth can be very cunning agitators, and social media has become an important factor. It’s both very useful yet at times very disruptive. On the eve of conflicts in Marsabit County, there was another war being waged on Facebook and Twitter. But there was also Marsabit County for Peace and other hash tags like that. Although the youth can be a problem, there is a change in their thinking. The orientation of many youths is becoming more issue-based, indicating soon they may prefer to vote in someone who shall bring peace to Marsabit, regardless of their ethnic background.

Personally I feel sad and disappointed after the events of the recent past. But I also see positive developments, although they highlight the challenges of sustaining security over the long run. CEWARN has improved from where it was when we started. There are challenges but we are moving forward.
This third section maps the methodology at the heart of the CE-WARN mechanism. The mapping conflict and distinctive features chapters provide complementary outsider-insider overviews on the system’s architecture. They outline its design and how the data-base and matrix of indicators articulate to generate early warning reports. Notes on Constructing the model provides insight into the CE-WARN mechanism’s DNA n the form of a timeline bridging the mechanism’s deep roots in anti-violence activism and its evolution into a sophisticated tool for monitoring a range of violent phenomena.
The Tepeth family that lost its animals high up on Mt Moroto tracked the raiders to Turkana land in Kenya. The family, already scarred by what happened, thought of taking up AK 47s—but they had to consider whether as a small mountain community they had the means to take on the larger and better-armed plain-dwelling Turkana.

The sale of goats covered the cost of salt, soap and paraffin. Now they had lost 11 fully grown goats. There are young children to treat and feed, as well as unweaned goats to find milk for. The next harvest of the sorghum and sunflower ripening in the mountain air away from the plains is still weeks away.

The second option is seeking what could be a less costly source of replacing the lost animals. They decide to restock with Matheniko animals. Their deliberations have moved away from a retaliatory to a compensatory raid. Again, decisions have
to be made. The Matheniko are no pushover, especially for the Tepeth whose numbers don’t compare. The decision is taken to ask the Tepeth’s perennial allies, the Pokot, for armed support; given the lucrative outcome, the offer is accepted.

The raid sets in motion a chain of further events. The Matheniko consider that counter-attacking the Pokot is too costly. Memories remain fresh of what happened in 1993 after an unwise Pian raid on the Pokot. In that year it felt as though all of Pokot—both Ugandan and Kenya—had pursued the Pian, leaving nearly 200 dead. The Matheniko decide to turn on the Jie. But the Jie, as the Dodoth and Toposa learned to their grief on August 13 of 2003, are no pushovers. Like the Tepeth before them, the Matheniko ask for backup. It is rare for the Turkana to ally with the Matheniko, but in the pastoralist territories, pragmatism is not uncommon. The Matheniko calculate that the Turkana will on any given day ally with anybody against the Pokot.

The Turkana, who, as it were, fired the first shot, are now back in the picture. The Tepeth have not really avoided the costlier alternative, only postponed and complicated it, spreading the risk so the hammer blows don’t fall squarely on their heads. And by allying with the Matheniko against the Pokot and Tepeth, the Turkana are leaving their flanks open to Pokot attacks. That attack happens further to the east, along the banks of the Turkwel River in Kenya.

By now the initial raid in Mt. Moroto has been forgotten; but several compensatory retaliatory raids later, the epicentre no longer matters. There is only the harshness of inter-communal violence, only the endless cycles of pastoralist death and loss. The likelihood is that the raid on the mountain was in response to an earlier incident of Turkana stock loss, perhaps due to a Dassanech incursion from South Sudan. The expanding cycle of raids mirrors a generations-long process. Like a chain, no one link is the original.

How do you stop this cycle of violence if you are a government? Ugandans are involved, as are Kenyans, Ethiopians and Sudanese, Somalis as well as Djiboutians. And as this account illustrates, what happens a thousand miles away in any of these countries can have repercussions at any point in another country.

De-escalating the violence in these far-flung territories is a difficult job. Strong-arm attempts to control rustling since the colonial era came to naught. Merely blaming and acting against a particular group misses the point. It is likely that drought in the Turkana region had killed animals during the previous rainy season. A raid can be triggered by the search for bride price.
Most likely, the elders sanctioned the raid and the young men acted with full knowledge that theirs was a noble cause. Perhaps they suffered a similar raid and were out to replenish their stock. Maybe the rains for a harvest of sorghum they were banking on to stave off hunger had failed. Though they likely set the chain of raids and killings in motion, apportioning causality might be too easy an assessment in these conditions.

The Conflict and Early Warning mechanism (CEWARN) set up in 2002 by the Member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has spent a decade testing a new and different option; understanding the dynamics of pastoralist life by gathering information on a constant basis. As Joseph Muhumuza, Uganda Country Coordinator at the Centre for Basic Research, the National Institute charged with data collection and analysis in Kampala, says: “From 2003 there has never been a breakage in our information gathering, so this captures a trend in terms of programing, and in terms of developing an action point—you can go behind the data and see what you can do with it.”

In 1996 the IGAD member states met to reconsider approaches to the chronic problem of under-development in the pastoralist areas. By 1996, the gun had been present in the pastoralist region for nearly two decades and the violence it occasioned had risen to the level of civil war. The revitalisation of IGAD that year led to incorporation of peace and security issues within the organisation’s socio-economic and environmental development programs, based on the realisation that development could not be achieved without addressing and resolving violent conflicts.

Though the ramifications of the grim story with which this article begins are conjectural, it reflects countless real-life scenarios. In fact, a raid on the mountain community did happen, on August 5 2012, and the Tepeth family did track the raiders to Turkana. The description of inter-communal alliances and standoffs is confirmed by the pastoralists themselves as well as observers working in the region. The Tepeth did go down the slopes of Mt. Moroto, but not to raid the Matheniko. They ended up reporting the matter to Ugandan security officials, an example of the alternative dynamic the CEWARN mechanism is nurturing in the region’s pastoralist areas.
DATA AS WEAPON OF CHOICE

When IGAD finally started CEWARN six years after the 1996 meeting, it was decided that data was the best weapon for systematically responding to the crisis. The new approach was based on studying and understanding patterns of conflict in order to break the vicious cycle of violence. Analysts studied and coded the information, developing a data based model that became the CEWARN system.

At the core of this new approach is the CEWARN Reporter, an essential cog in a system of information gathering and analysis that maps and charts the conflicts as well as the underlying causes. This provides a tool through which decisions and actions can be taken. A workshop was held in November 2002 to designate conflict-sensitive indicators that CEWARN, research institutions, and civil society organizations could utilise in their work. Later that same month CEWARN contracted the Boston-based company, Virtual Research Associates (VRA), to incorporate the indicators generated by the workshop into a software program to monitor and track pastoral conflicts in the IGAD region.

The CEWARN Reporter comprises two reporting mechanisms, the Situation Report and the Incident Report. The first is a questionnaire that Field Monitors, CEWARN’s men and women on the ground, are required to fill on a weekly basis; the second is a detailed report that is filed when incidents occur.

In CEWARN parlance, the Situation Report is known as the SitRep, and the Incident Report is called the IncRep. Joseph Muhumuza describes how this system drives the CEWARN early warning mechanism: “Like any early-warning system, the mechanism is based on information. It is on the import of that information that you are able to act either in terms of response, designing programs that would rectify or address the situation at hand. Without an information system, there is no conflict and early warning.”

Using data as the basis, as Muhumuza explains, was crucial for quantifying, or to assess in terms of numbers the magnitude of a conflict in order to gauge how best to respond. “If the data says 10 people died, this indicates the scale of the problem, if the data says 100 animals were taken at a certain location spot, then you cannot send only two soldiers to rescue the 100 animals.”
THE FOUR KEY COMPONENTS

The Reporter was the first part of a broader information system constituting four key components of the early warning mechanism the organisation adopted:

As one Ethiopian Country Coordinator explains: “At the time (2002-2003) more than four hundred indicators were initially proposed, but further vetting and sifting reduced the variables to forty-two. The underlying assumption, which still holds true, is the fact that conflict dynamics are always in a state of flux. As a result, new dynamics and drivers may emerge at any given time, while older dynamics and drivers may become obsolete.

“It follows that regular review of the indicators is intrinsic to the CEWARN working modality. The indicators have been reviewed many times, new indicators have been included, and redundant ones removed. Others indicators were refined to better capture events. At the same time, the statistical significance and relevance of each indicator were regularly checked and their value adjusted accordingly.

As a result of this rigorous review process the indicators have now expanded from 42 to 55. This figure may change in the future as the review process continues.”

Even with 55 indicators, the SitRep is impressive (55 from 60 field monitors report into the system on a weekly basis). As a tool of early warning, the SitRep reads like the margins of real life events, probing for likely scenarios, circumstances, and behaviours in the pastoralist territories. It is impressive, not just for the sheer number of indicators, but also for the ability to compress indicators in a manner corresponding to a near-total description of pastoralist events. The SitRep groups the indicators into several categories: communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, natural disaster and resource use, safety and security, and social services. As
the parameters indicate, the causes, contexts and circumstances of conflict range across a wide spectrum, and raise an array of questions:

Are peace-building efforts letting up or not; are there efforts to implement inter-communal agreements and to encourage disarmament; and, what are the reactions to relief aid within certain communities? Is trade continuing unhindered, has pastoralist movement been curtailed, is there an increase in the number of migrant labourers? What does it mean when communities refuse to collaborate with authorities and hold a protest march? Do new government livestock policies restrict the movement of animals? Are media reports positive, or have the media themselves been restricted from reporting?

The communal relations category asks what it means when a community blesses young men, and they are praised by women; what does a spike or drop in bride price indicate; what does the offer of gifts from one community to another mean; what is the significance if alliances between different groups have been revoked and inter-group marriages recalled. Activities by civil society will also confirm or modify the directionality of events.

These are some examples of the questions raised; there are many more. The build-up of indicators moves from peripheral possibilities to more direct issues suggesting developments are reaching a tipping point: have bullets become exchange currency; are there signs of external armed support; have the police, the army, local government and the courts been more active than normal; are travellers hiring armed escorts or are there significant numbers of people being displaced?

While the individual questions and corresponding data categories may show trends and likely developments, these may not necessarily be conclusive. The blessing of young men may point to an intention to raid, but a blessing ceremony in itself may not mean anything, which is why the SitRep seeks to know more about what circumstances apply. When women praise these young men, it could indicate they are lionising them, testing their mettle. If this happens in conjunction with a hike in bride price and the sudden absence of young men from school, there is the likelihood the ceremony signals active intention. Again, this may only point more to possibilities than can be confirmed by other indicators. For example, is there an interruption in trade, are bullets appearing in the market, how many animals have died recently, are there other signs of deteriorating security.

The SitRep is detailed to the degree where even reports of young men buying biscuits or carrying water cans is considered to support the indicators:
“Young men buying biscuits? That is a very critical indicator,” says Muhumuza. “If you see a large group of youth meeting at a certain hill, then you need to assess the meaning in terms of early warning. If you can’t interpret that, then what are you capturing? Because the fact is these youth are not talking about a wedding, nor are they talking about going to buy a vehicle, but what they are planning involves a raid. A meeting like this is often indicator number one.”

The IncRep, in contrast, captures real life events: On August 4 2010, CEWARN received the following report from Chalbi District in northern Kenya:

“Field reports are emerging that Borana Community settlers in El Dintu, Sololo District Kenyan side are attempting to re-route trade goods that are destined for Forole, Chalbi District, Kenya. The Borana settlers had initially been in Ethiopia for the use of grazing land. Upon migrating back to El Dintu along with Ethiopian Borana community members information has linked them with attempts to control the trade flow into Forole.” A month later, on September 4, another report came in on HF radio stating that:

On September 1 2010, the Turkana went and stole some property from the Dassanech of the South Omo zone near the Ethiopian police post at Nebremus. The Dassanech fought the Turkana raiders and dispossessed them of more than 200 goats they had stolen. As the Turkana were retreating, they shot dead one Dassanech and took an AK 47 rifle.

The SitRep transforms the answers from field monitors into figures set on a scale of 1 to 10; the seriousness of the indicator is expressed as “weights”. This becomes a narrative in numbers and the visceral difference is that the IncRep reflects the level of activity accompanying rapidly developing news stories. Alone, the SitRep and the IncRep can act as a torrent of information that may make it difficult to get a proper reading of unfolding events. This is why the Country Coordinators, officials who supervise the field monitors, are required to carry out what Muhumuza calls “triangulation”. The other networks that CEWARN collaborates with, NGOs, security personnel, government officials and locals, are called on to verify if the incident occurred, and what the particulars of it are. Triangulation is in effect a form of quality control.

The filing of information itself, as already explained, marks the beginning of an elaborate process. Depending on the urgency, say in the case of a group of Jie youth sighted on a hill, the information gathered is acted upon immediately. Elders will be contacted to talk them out of their plans. Sometimes, the youth may not listen to their el-
ders, as happened in Dire Woreda in Southern Ethiopia when a group of Muslim youths geared to attack a Christian congregation on November 6 2011. On that occasion, they broke through a line of elders interposing themselves bodily between the youth and the church. Anti-riot police had to be called in.

Often, the information goes straight into the system where it passes through the country offices and is picked up by the CEWARN secretariat in Addis Ababa. There, the SitRep is fed into a software program that generates graphs. It is at this point that the real complexity of the system emerges.

Using the 55 indicators featuring in the seven categories listed above (i.e. Communal Relations, Civil Society Activities, Economic Activities, Governance and Media, Natural Disaster and Resource Use, Safety and Security and Social Services), diverse indicators are matched and paired to test possible outcomes, i.e. the best, worst, and most likely case scenarios. The analyst may want to know what the blessing of young men by elders means when paired with a hike or drop in bride price; what the revoking of an alliance means for a blockage in trade, or in conjunction with a shortage in pasture and water.

The pairing may indicate what scenarios are likely to emerge when civil society is in overdrive at the same time pastoralists have been blocked from moving freely and trade has been stopped, and so on. By itself, the SitRep is a forecast, a scenario-generator. Events build upon scenarios that are evolving all the time. The software provides for the generation of graphs for each category and then goes further to create a layered picture resulting in a compound graph. This is done on a weekly basis, so that CEWARN is capable of reading into what the threats are. The IncRep, is a simpler mechanism without the sociological depth of the SitRep. It asks the questions: who, what, to whom, when, and where.

The August 4, 2010 report from the Chalbi District, for example, illustrates how these questions are aligned: The Borana Community are the Who; El Dintu, Sololo District, Forole, and Chalbi are the Where; re-routed trade goods are the What; the Gabra are the Whom the action are targeting; and August 4 is the When.

With so much happening, the likelihood that too much information will be filed in is a constant possibility. To forestall this, the procedures listed in the CEWARN Code Handbook cut through the mass of data by insisting that field monitors report only ‘relevant incidents’ recognisable as leading to conflict. The field monitors are chosen for their knowledge of the dynamics of their societies, and this means they must be members of the communities they are monitoring. As the
August 4 report further explained, the action of the Borana was creating unease among the Gabra, who were already mobilising for attack against the Borana should the trade route extending from Turbi to Forole be blocked. The fact that both the Gabra and Borana straddle the Kenya-Ethiopia border illustrates why CEWARN must coordinate cross-border actions on the regional level.

Though they have different functions, the Situation and Incident Reports tread similar ground. Together, they create a holistic picture. Scenario building at its most basic makes it possible to recognise implications of building events. The September 4, 2010 report on the attack by the Turkana on the Dassanech also describes the context and significance of incidents. The attack was expected to result in retaliation. That the Turkana shot dead an important individual made this urgent. But the Dassanech counterattack was expected to cover the territories of Ng’issiger from Todonyan, Kokuro, Mai-tha, Liwan and Lorubae, which would affect communities that did not take part in the attack, and as the field monitor noted, fishermen from Todonyang had already fled to Lowareng’ak.

A third report widened the scope even more:

The heavy rains of early 2010 washed away roads and forced pastoralists in northwestern Kenya to herd nearer their homesteads. Without proper guard, the herds, along Lodwar-Kitale road, in Lokichar, Kalem’ng’orok and Kako’ng are vulnerable. Already, some 200 to 300 armed Pokot were sighted around Nakapaparat and Ekuonyuk in Kalem’ng’orok sub location near Kako’ng River. It was suspected they were planning to attack the Turkana of Nakabosan, Kakali, Kagete kraal and Nakukulas. As a result, the Turkana had been forced to move with their herds.

In reaction, the CEWARN Kenyan unit, or Kenyan CEWERU, made three recommendations:

1. That the authorities in Turkana South work with peace building organisations to give early alerts to kraals in the Turkana
2. Mobilise Kenyan security to intensify patrols to foil any likely action by the Pokot warriors; and,
3. The elders convene peace meetings between the Turkana and the Pokot.

The issues captured by these questions were present in the early 1980s when historically important famines swept the region and inexpensive guns became available. The hope of the creators of the mechanism was to avoid a repeat of the 1980s famines that fed a rising cycle of unchecked violence. CEWARN produces quarterly reports from the Reporter that are
made available to decision-makers. After a decade in operation CEWARN has gathered a mass of information mapping the pastoralist regions. Enough data has been accumulated to make response to the pastoralist crisis amount to something of a science. In Muhumuza’s estimation, the bigger picture based on the data makes it possible to know with a fair amount of accuracy not only which months violence flares up, but also the meta-causes. After studying the data, CEWARN created the Rapid Response Fund.

Says Muhumuza: “We were gathering information, we had the data about what is happening on the ground, but we were helpless. According to the analysis, we know that every April, incidents go up. If it is known that maybe water is scarce causing the communities to fight then if you can give an alternative water-source the fighting and competition is likely to cease. The first incident we dealt with by using emergency response funds was in 2008 when the Turkana from Kenya crossed over to Uganda through Kotido and the Jie took over 2000 head of their cattle. We released US $10,000 via the CEWERU, the money was dispatched to the Kotido District peace committee, and over 1600 heads of cattle were recovered. That was the first example of emergency funds use by CEWARN.

“That helps decrease the vicious cycle of revenge. Once communities lose their animals and there is no alternative method of recovery they are going to mobilise to recover their animals by force, and they won’t necessarily raid the community that took their animals,” Muhumuza observes. “So the communities are trapped in a vicious cycle. The information that we produce out of this data is put into the report form that now informs strategies and the next action, and not only for CEWARN but for other partners that make use of it.”
In terms of the analytical and methodological frameworks of early warning, the CEWARN data gathering system is cutting-edge. It is based on recent theoretical and methodological frameworks. It tries to marry quantitative and qualitative methodologies, fusing the strengths of both sides into the system. In terms of design, that makes it a most relevant methodology for the issues it is meant to address.

It is not only that we have a combined quantitative-qualitative methodology, it is also advanced in regard to the data collection intervals. There is no organisation out there that I know of that is collecting data on a weekly basis. CEWARN collects data on a weekly basis. That is very different from other systems. Also, the data we collect is disaggregated, which is unique. There are some institutions out there, universities like Uppsala University that use what they call a quantitative-conflicted database, which scholars use to see correlations between different conflict incident data. The data they collect is aggregated, meaning that

BIZUSEW MERSHA
(Interview)

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it’s collected at the national level. You don’t see variations; it is not disaggregated at the sub-national level. Even the indicators are national, without regional variations and most of them are compiled on a yearly basis. In our region it is critical to identify regional, time, and seasonal variations. By establishing the variations among these variations, you can begin to understand and explain the context.

All conflict is local, events all occur in certain areas, certain places. The more disaggregated the data collection methodology you have, the better you are able to capture contextual variations and predict or analyse more precisely than you can with aggregated data.

Let me give an example; if you want to measure the relationship between economic performance and conflict you will not be able to capture the inter-regional variations if your data is only aggregated at the national level, based on GDP, or some other form of economic data measuring the influence or relationship with conflict. GDP is aggregated data, but there are different levels of economic growth in different regions and variations that aggregated analysis does not capture.

The easiest way to collect data is to start from the aggregated level. Disaggregated data is the toughest one. This is where we started. Disaggregated data can be easily aggregated once you have disaggregated data; you can easily convert disaggregated data to the yearly and to sub-national levels. But if you have aggregated data and you don’t have the capacity of accessing the disaggregated streams, then it becomes difficult to distinguish among the smaller units. We have taken the toughest route in terms of the design, but we are doing fine.

There is more than one way of utilising the information we gather. When you collect data on a regular basis and over a long period of time, what you are doing is establishing a behaviour pattern. You cannot simply say that during the wet season the Turkana will behave like this unless you have data to support that statement.

To establish that kind of pattern, you need to collect wet season data for a long period of time, over five or six years. Only after you have done that will you have a rigorous enough database and credible enough information to say that during the wet season the Turkana are likely to behave in a certain manner so that whenever the wet or the dry season comes, you can propose a certain response. This is one way of making a trend analysis on a year-to-year basis. But you have to collect, document, and compile the data on a weekly basis.

Another kind of analysis is to try and identify a weekly change of behaviour. This may not be as rigorous as the former, but it will capture certain, immediate, escalating situ-
ations that you can make available for rapid response at the local level. The relevance of this methodology can be seen from two angles.

What is normally done with this methodology, these two angles, is using the vertical and horizontal flow of information. The field monitors have the leeway to communicate horizontally so that the people at the local levels are able to respond immediately to the field information or to any local peace actor. That is one. But that same data will also be relayed to the national level, the vertical process. We may not have a big role on this one although we issue weekly reports which we started doing in the last three or four years. Given the dearth of the data, analysis of the weekly situation will not be as rigorous as the larger data we have because you cannot specify patterns.

Long-term analysis will inform long-term responses; you are establishing long-term behaviour so the response can also be midterm or long term, to be able to determine that, for instance, environmental stresses have an impact on conflict that allows one to propose an appropriate response based on the data. The value of the system derives from proper use of the data-driven analysis.

Before the weekly reports, the statutory reports were filed each quarter during the initial phase. At a certain stage in 2008, we narrowed the time period to one month. By 2009 the reports were being generated on a weekly basis. Why did we do that? We had to produce information. There are institutions mandated to respond to conflict on a day-to-day basis. They cannot wait another four months to get some kind of report. They have to be provided with some kind of report of the areas on a very short period of time if possible. That is why we are now producing it on a weekly basis. At least they will be kept abreast of developments on a weekly basis. The analysis will not be as rigorous but at least it will keep them informed, it will enable them to devise some kind of intervention before the situation escalates. They will get the big picture later, showing how the region looks over the year. That is where we are now.

For example: in Ethiopia there are mandated institutions (at the federal level, like the Federal Affairs Ministry) established to support peace building and conflict prevention. At the regional level where we work, there are institutions that mirror the federal structure. In each state there is a situation room or line bureaus that resemble those at the federal level. These are the institutions that get the information. There are also institutions on the executive side and on the legislative side, including standing committee members, who also receive the information.

The weekly reports are very helpful.
There are two things to understand as to how this system is very important to the structures. One is that given the nature of cross-border areas where we work, the government presence and systems that feed information to government are weak, which means they do not get enough information about cross-border conflict and cross-border pastoralist issues. Their main source of information, at least on the national level, is the CEWARN reporter. The mechanism is there to complement the existing governance structures. We are giving them the relevant data they were not able to acquire through their own structures. We are feeding the system with additional analytic capability. They have left this kind of analysis to the NRI, a civil society system. We fully understand that governments, even before CEWARN started, always collected information. That is their function, which we are complementing.

We work with some 12 Field Monitors in Ethiopia, one Field Monitor per Woreda (district). In some Woredas we have two. This is also the case for both the Somali and Karamoja Clusters. The information is out there, scattered across the region. The task is to collect it. The field monitors have different sources of information within the community. That is not difficult. What was difficult, given the nature of information and communication infrastructure problems of the time, was to get information on time, on a weekly basis, particularly the Situation Report. Sometimes it took two weeks or even more for information to reach us because they were sending it through the Post Office. But now things have improved because monitors can now send all the 54 indicators on a weekly basis by SMS.

Later it was decided that rather than simply sending the form on the 54 conflict indicators, they can offer their own opinion of developments together with the indicators. Those two sets of responses now comprise the weekly report. But parallel to that, that data is inputted into our special software, the early warning tool. Why do we do that? The long-term trend analysis based on this data enables us to generate the curves and the graphs generated by the software to give the long-term outlook of the area.

The more visible CEWARN became, the more people understood what CEWARN was about. At the beginning, field monitors were intimidated by local officials. Community sources were reluctant to give them information. Some of the information could be about the mobilisation of the youth to attack another community. These field monitors are going to send this information to us, which made the sources appear to be accomplices acting against their own communities; they were leaking the information. There were the kinds of challenges facing the Field Monitors.
What begun to change perception was our ability to induct the official and community structures into the work of CEWARN. That was one step. Two: we were also able to walk the talk; we were able to give, to a certain extent, real peace-building support. When we did that, people started to accept what we were doing. You can talk, but it becomes difficult to win people over to your side if you are not able to act. Establishing of the Rapid Response Fund in 2008 was crucial in this regard. We have been able to support local initiatives. That visibility and support together convinced and changed the perspectives of the communities and officials.

There were two other things that helped. Given that CEWARN is a Civil Society-Government system, we were able to bring government officials along whenever we went down to the areas where we operate. They heard for themselves, from the mouth of their own colleagues, what we were doing. Originally the Civil Society Organizations had seen us as a competitor. But their attitude begun to change when they saw the officials brought along on different trips. Even the fact that the data we collected came to the capital was important. The central government calls a zone where there is a problem and says we are receiving this information, what are you doing about it?

People began to consider this work in a different light. One testimony that I encountered concerned a US-AID-sponsored program supporting cross-border peacebuilding. It was to be run by an international NGO called PACT. They were trying to find a way to distribute money for peace-building activities to the local communities through civil society actors. PACT undertook a stakeholders’ mapping exercise to identify Civil Society Organisations to work with over a five-year period. In the Karamoja and Somali Clusters, all the participants, community representatives and government officials were asked who they thought were the most active and credible institutions. There was a consensus that the funds should be channelled through the CEWERU and the CEWARN structure. That is what they said. We were not there; we did not influence anything. That shows we are doing something that is earning credibility and legitimacy. The people are beginning to see us and the larger network as relevant peace actors.

Bias will always be present. What is important is to build the system with attention to limiting such biases. Everyone has a value system; any research is influenced by these factors to a certain extent. There are certain ways we try to limit biases in our system. This works at various levels. How do we monitor favouritism or bias of field monitors? Since we have two sets of field monitors, we can always crosscheck the data. If there is conflict, say between the Nyangatom and Dassenech, and we
have two field monitors, each from these two communities, then if we get the same kind of data from the two of them, we can use the one report to check the credibility of the other. But at the same time we also check from other sources. Field monitors are just one source, a paid, continuous source. There are many other sources we can use to triangulate the data. We even access government information. We may feed the government with information but they also give out information. There are many ways of quality control we use to crosscheck and validate the data.

One way is in-built into the CEWARN Reporter software. When the data is inserted in the Reporter, the system itself crosschecks, especially the Situation Report. Contradictory answers to certain kinds of questions can be flagged through the software. Logically you expect that if someone answers one question in a certain way, then, somewhere else the response to another linked question should be consistent with the first query. If there is an economic question that asks if sales of livestock in the market has increased, and another question asks if the price of livestock has decreased or increased, then we should expect a positive correlation. The increase in livestock sales usually positively correlates with an increase in livestock price. But if the answer to the first is there is an increase in sales yet the answer to the other question indicates that the price has decreased, the system flags you. There is some incoherence that is picked up by the system. That may not be the case; the price could have decreased while livestock sales has increased because a large number of animals could have been dumped on the market. There may be many reasons or potential explanations, but the system still flags you. Then you go back and ask why this is so.

There are some inbuilt cross-checking levels. There are three, four, levels through which the data passes. It may not be totally fool proof. And we are not saying that our data is perfect but it is the best data out there on pastoralist conflict. That I can guarantee.
Our participation in CEWARN began in 2002 at a meeting of regional experts who gathered together in Addis Ababa to discuss how one could monitor field events to warn on potential escalation into violence. The CEWARN approach—I would not characterise it as a formal model at this juncture—began with the challenge of tracking the failures to prevent violence. Virtual Research Associates’ (VRA) involvement in CEWARN was from the beginning more focused on the technical issues and software tool design and support for other tasks such as regular calibrations, Quality Assurance Control and training. We have had less involvement in the analytic side, except in helping to develop templates to formalise the reporting.

We built on the earlier PANDA project—Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action, beginning with identification of what would become the target or dependent variables mandated by CEWARN. These include, for example, armed clashes, protest demonstrations, raids and other forms of violence.

DOUG BOND

Doug Bond is the Founder and CEO of the Boston-based Virtual Research Associates, a technology company that developed CEWARN’s custom-made software tool for early warning data collection also dubbed as CEWARN Reporter.
and crime. Our focus was on the violence associated with pastoral conflict. Because the sponsors and IGAD prioritised this focus and because the regional expert participants were all familiar with pastoral violence, it was relatively straightforward to translate the phenomena into a reporting template for field observers to use whenever they saw it.

The following statement from the PANDA report summarises the basic conceptual approach based on experience with tracking nonviolent direct action that we subsequently implemented at CEWARN:

We treated nonviolent direct action, then, as a precursor to possible violence. We invoked the notion that violence does not erupt from a vacuum. Numerous precursors, including hate speech, accusations, demands and even flight could signal escalation into violent repression or instability. In this way the utility of the PANDA Project for providing early warnings on violence was established.

During the 2002 meeting we posed the question, “how do you know when such violence will erupt?” At this point we began to tape paper onto the four walls of the conference room listing the many precursors of violence the participants identified.

These precursors ranged from the usual revenge attacks to the pressures associated with economic constraints to changes in bride price and the pre-raid blessings of elders—all factors universally hailed as common indicators of an imminent raid. All several hundred variables were posted on the paper-covered walls during that first planning meeting with CEWARN.

We presented our approach of using incident reports (IncReps) as a target variable to measure the failures in early warning and using a periodic systematic observation template (situation reports or SitReps) based on the precursors to measure how their evolving levels of intensity signalled potential escalation. It took us another two rounds of review with the initial CEWARN staff to reduce several hundred precursors to several tens of operationalised indicators for the SitRep template that was operationalised in July 2003.

The challenges of refining the indicators took over a year. Problems of quality assurance and training undermined data quality, but the first year experience also gave us an important understanding of the potential as well as limits of weekly SitRep field reporting, as confirmed by the reporting of episodic failures as they happened.
We began to have reasonably clean
data by sometime in 2004 and it is at
this point that our attention turned
toward establishing baselines of the
indicators, which we immediate-
ly saw as highlighting the season-
al pattern defined by the long and
short rains each year. Around the
same time, we also looked at the
correlation between the heightened
levels of observed indicators and the
violence reported in the IncRep.
The seasonal climatic patterns we
observed also subsumed how foli-
age and rainfall variables might be
driving some of the escalation of
communal conflicts during times of
environmental stress.

We have developed custom early
warning applications and contin-
uously supported field monitor-
ing operations since 1999 in more
than 70 countries. The applications
range from corporate security to
child protection services to risk to
international organisations’ staff
safety in different countries. Our
monitoring and analysis applica-
tions are currently in operation at
COMESA, CEWARN, CEWS,
and ECOWAS regional economic
communities (RECs), and we have
also worked with the East Afri-
can Community and the UN. All
of the applications implemented
are now in their third generation
of upgrades to make the best use
of emerging technologies enabling
mobile devices to incorporate the
fusion of diverse sources and types
of data.

We have integrated an SMS channel
input to offer a rapid reporting op-
tion that can be supplemented later
via a linked IncRep. Our experience
has shown that it is both scalable
and adaptable for tracking a vari-
ety of dynamic indicators. We also
combine this with structural vul-
nerability assessment applications
that are in use in some of the same
organisations listed above. We also
are deploying an integrated data
console for another African Re-
gional Economic Community with
a community discussion application
featuring an interactive display for
geographic and graphical, tabular
and narrative data.

I do not consider CEWARN as a
“big data” initiative and certainly
not in respect to its focused origins.
Perhaps it going in that direction
in terms of its integration of diverse
data streams, but as I see it, the
CEWARN effort is still focused on
a limited number of thematic con-
texts that were expanded under the

The CEWARN model can be rep-
licated to address problems like
another Ebola epidemic or elector-
al violence. I suggest that the best
tool for addressing these ephemeral
challenges is a more focused mo-
ible-only app for rapid mass use
instead of the customised compre-
hensive model used by our clients
to date. This is not to say that the
two approaches cannot be com-
bined, but only that the urgent
need for rapid, mass participation
in observations would favour the quick deployment of simpler tools.

When people question the costs, it is important to remind them that CEWARN is an investment that will continue to generate returns over the long-run. This is why I disagree with the premise of the proposition that the investment is too high in respect to the outputs, and also with the unstated and ambiguous measure of what constitutes success. I have been asked by dozens of donors, “...but what conflicts did you actually prevent?” The answer, of course, is a logical impossibility since nothing would have happened in the case of a “success.”

What I have witnessed over the years, however, are arbitrary, ill-informed or ignorant decisions based on the view that early warning and monitoring mechanisms are too expensive and require too much time to become effective. These arguments periodically resurface even though the case for the critical deliverables they provide remains the same. This is why the focus of discussion should be the problem-solving capacity generated by the modest investment in the people that participate in programs like CEWARN.

I firmly believe that the funds to support efforts like CEWARN should be counted as an investment with a return, and not a cost simply to be donated. If an investment is to reap a return, human resources have to be given ample time to learn and to sustain their own system instead of spending an inordinate amount of time trying to respond to the logically impossible challenges of substantiating “success.”

After working with these professionals for some fifteen years beginning with minimal infrastructure support, I have seen our CEWARN colleagues develop into competent analysts working on behalf of their communities. Their investigation of situations that may escalate into violence is a form of citizen empowerment and their sustained attention on the precursors to violence are critical to both the prevention of conflicts and to good governance.

I advocate all investments contain a sunset provision that will allow for a mentoring role in order to maintain state of the art development. Recently we have talked about training local technology vendors to take over the technical support of CEWARN and reserving our involvement for periodic mentoring and perhaps assessment. I welcome this development.
ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS

The account above was drafted in 2016. Around the same time CEWARN began a series of consultations with regional analysts to formulate the specifications for an upgraded field monitoring and analysis application. In addition to a technological software platform upgrade, the primary issues addressed in this new formulation were an expansion of the scope of monitoring to reflect CEWARN’s newly articulated theme-based strategy. This requires the adoption of a multi-dimensional analysis approach to CEWARN’s field situation assessments that goes beyond the focus on pastoralist conflict.

The CEWARN review and design workshops in mid-2016 produced specifications for the modifications, and within a year a pilot application was deployed with a view towards generating feedback for its ongoing improvement.

By early 2019, a more robust platform with refined analytic features based on the feedback was ready for review. By mid-summer 2019 the application was stabilised and deployed.

The 2019 version of the CEWARN Reporter includes theme-linked assessments as well as an upgraded interface for both incidents and situation reports. Expanding CEWARN’s approach to address the new strategy entailed segmenting the collection of data into thematic categories: economy, environment, governance, security, society, and response. The CEWARN Reporter now links each incident and situation report with its thematic focus. Its refined interface and complementary features support multi-dimensional contextualised analyses.

The Reporter now provides comprehensive situation risk scores, calculating both raw and mitigated risk values. The risk component scores of impact and likelihood are also presented as indicated by ratings of the current condition and escalation potential, respectively. A response adequacy rating is used to calculate mitigated risk scores. This risk assessment approach offers diagnostic information to better understand the volatile conditions prior to escalation as well as guidance for the formulation of responses.

Perhaps the most important feature of the 2019 version of the CEWARN Reporter is its support for the identification of vulnerable or “at-risk” groups. By providing mainstream integration of gender in every field situation assessment, offering 100 per cent engendered ratings for the groups at risk in all of CEWARN’s situation assessments. The 2019 CEWARN Reporter includes the following seven groups at risk, as well as a residual “other” group that can be specified: boys, girls, men, women, elder men and elder women, plus differently abled, other (can be specified),
Finally, the 2019 version adds the ability to customise weights for the situation assessments. In the past, an equal weighting scheme had been used. This new feature allows CEWARN to implement a country-specific weight by individual thematic foci and indicators for use in all situational analysis calculations.

The resultant country-specific scores are more readily interpretable and hopefully useful for analysts at both the regional and national level. In closing I would like to return to my earlier comment about the CEWARN investment. Ideally CEWARN’s success might be measured by conflicts prevented, but such a performance metric implies an absence of conflict behaviour can be used to support its prevention, but the absence of evidence is not the same as the presence of evidence. Nevertheless, CEWARN has compiled a number of anecdotal reports of its role in activating preventative and mitigation initiatives, and importantly CEWARN engages in an active effort to support rapid response initiatives as well as its preventative monitoring.

What is equally important is the vibrant capacity and network that is clearly evident in the participants involved in sustaining CEWARN activities and the CEWARN network of national, regional and continental partners. CEWARN has conducted regular assessments of their effort and has adapted to its expanded mandates with cutting-edge technologies as they have become available. Still, challenges remain, and they are not significantly different since their articulation in the CEWARN Strategy Document from 2006.

The major challenge facing IGAD and all other African RECs remains the question of sustainability and ownership of these core programs, which are crucial to the peace, security and development of the continent. Heavy reliance on donor support presents problems of sustainability and ownership which must be overcome consciously.

I would like to close by suggesting that building such “sustainability and ownership” is well-rooted at CEWARN, but realising the full return from the institutional investment will require that CEWARN utilise its accumulated mass of regional expertise over the coming years if peace is to have any chance of displacing violence in the IGAD region.
The vignettes in this fourth section range from ethnographic reports capturing the variety of communal conflicts and their dynamics to first hand accounts of peace workers in the field. The travelogues by A. K. Kaiza convey the human dimension of the conflicts in the North Rift Valley. A field monitor from the Ilemi triangle explains the jostling among ethnic groups in one of Africa’s most remote regions. Another documents the fragile nature of local peace agreements, and a third shares the progress being achieved by women peacemakers working with culturally conservative societies.
THE SPEARS OF AUGUST:
TROUBLE IN THE NORTH

The high plain north of Maralal is carpeted with verdant pasture, dotted with copses of cedar and podocarpus, and crowned with rolling fields of wheat. Here in Malaso, perched high on the eastern rim of the northern Rift Valley, one experiences Kenya’s most spectacular panorama. The escarpment plunges down a thousand meters to a plain of eroded caldera and winding watercourses. A wide ledge of savannah, dyed green by an out of season rain shower, juts out from the eastern wall of the scarp. Beyond this tableau to the north lie the craggy badlands of the Suguta valley, and beyond that the parched corridor of the Rift Valley’s floor.

We surveyed this geography of wealth and poverty as several Samburu herdsmen briefed us on the recent raids by their Pokot neighbours. The rustlers left a half-dozen dead while making off with seven hundred head of cattle.

PAUL GOLDSMITH
Dr. Paul Goldsmith, the Chief editor of this volume, is an anthropologist based in Kenya with an extensive background of research and participation in rangelands issues.
The Samburu pointed out the precise position of the sequence of events on the tableau below that looked like a large-scale relief map when viewed from above: thirteen circular kraals emptied of their livestock; an abandoned site 2000 meters to the south where Pokot seeking refuge from the desiccated pastures of their Silali home had been allowed to settle; a distant hill where they ambushed the just promoted Chief of the Police Division who was returning with cattle taken in a second attack; and near the edge of the plain, the contours of a laaga now occupied by a platoon of 300 hundred heavily armed Pokot, who had returned to the scene of the crime.

The Pokot possess powerful new weapons the Samburu have never seen before as well as unusually powerful lights they use to move around at night. The interlopers, brazenly grazing herds augmented by the stolen cows in view of their Samburu owners, threaten to instigate a new cycle of violence after several years of calm.

The combat among the pastoral communities of the north Rift that intensified during the 1990s bore little resemblance to traditional raiding: the following peace did not come about by accident.

In 1996, for example, a large body of Samburu warriors, with newly acquired guns, led by some two hundred Pokot ‘veterans’, marched north to engage the Turkana. The ensuing battle at Lokorkorr left over a hundred men dead. Vultures, crazed by the orgy of blood and flesh, attacked the wounded as they fled. The Samburu District Commissioner and police commandant who went to investigate the scene died when Turkana riflemen hidden in a rocky outcrop shot down their helicopter. Endemic raiding shut down most of the trading centres in Baragoi division, and a number of schools are still closed.

To the south in Isiolo District, friction between Degodia Somali immigrants and their Borana hosts erupted into open hostilities. Several years of highway robberies, attacks on tourists, and tit-for-tat attacks sucked local Samburu and their Il Ngiri Turkana neighbours into the conflict. Borana and Somali combatants—both sides reinforced by mercenaries from afar—fought it out at Mulango Hill in September of 2000. The Somali were evicted from the district; the conflict spiralled into a Borana-Meru affair, and culminated with skirmishes between Christian and Muslim youth in Isiolo town. Seventy-five large and small businesses relocated to safer ground. When the dust settled, Isiolo’s economy was paralysed, the northern tourist circuit moribund.

Following these and other northern wars, an Oxfam-funded initiative established a network of peace committees at district, division-
al, and locational levels across the pastoralist region. The committees successfully restored peace between warring parties. They maintain the new status quo through monitoring, by flushing out bandits who blend into their local communities after attacks and by effectively managing local incidents of violence as they occur.

The raids on Malaso interrupted the moratorium, puncturing perceptions of the new government’s commitment to internal security, and unfortunately repudiated the Momai blood oath underpinning over five decades of peace between the Samburu and Pokot. Our informants said the Samburu of Malaso had embraced the Pokot as friends, allowed them to purchase supplies from their shops on credit and assisted them when they fell sick. But their goodwill was repaid in blood.

The press reported the paramilitary operation against the Pokot in East Baringo on August 9. Apparently many of the cattle were retrieved from Pokot homesteads not involved in the raids, while a yet more complicated story lay submerged within what from afar appeared to be pastoralist mischief as usual. Before the Malaso raid, a Pokot gun runner had entrusted a Samburu intermediary with firearms for sale to Rendille buyers in Marsabit. The deal went bad when the middleman failed to keep his end of the bargain. If this provoked the initial raid, the subsequent aggression recalled Pokot bellicosity of years past.

Elsewhere, pastoralist activism accompanying the expiration of the 100-year old Maasai land treaty in August camouflaged the more cynical gambit behind the invasion of several Laikipia ranches. The occupation by drought-stricken herders catalysed the destruction of farm infrastructure, the evacuation of tourists from an ecotourism lodge on a group ranch, and at least two deaths. The invaders selectively targeted ranches owned by Kenyan citizens, located outside the former northern Maasai reserve. This private land, on the western flank of Laikipia District, was exchanged for an expanded southern Maasai reserve by the 1911 pact. The case for compensation is legitimate; the invasion was not.

Back at Malaso, a security meeting was in progress. The Samburu do not want to go to war. They are aware of the costs of insecurity, the loss of tourism revenue, the hell of Lokorkorr. They will send elders, not warriors, to sort out the mess. But if that does not succeed? Community self-policing works up to a point—after which the cavalry must intervene.

Security forces found the going rough in previous operations against the Pokot. Like the Malaso Samburu, they are not exactly spoiling for a fight. The police clobbered Maasai protesters in Nai-
robi’s Uhuru Park, but dislodging the Laikipia invaders proved more difficult. It was nevertheless unfair and unrealistic to expect Police Commissioner Brigadier Ali Mohammed to sort out complicated conflicts that subsume unresolved legal and historical issues, political intrigue, environmental stress, and calculated opportunism.

August is Kenya’s dismal month, a season of disasters and spilt blood. The calamity of August 2004 was not the death of a long-serving Cabinet Minister, but events transpiring in the north. Bandits in the laaga, trespassers on the range, and weapons merchants crossing borders began putting state policy to the spear. For a while the prospect of constitutional reform had provided a safety valve for the region’s explosive mix of neglect, poverty, and injustice. But the NARC government of President Mwai Kibaki found itself hard-pressed to cope with the resurgence of pastoralist conflict after allowing the process to forge the new Constitutional dispensation go off the tracks.

CEWARN, inspired by the example of original Wajir Peace Committee launched by women who planned the initiative after meeting at a wedding party, was beginning to take form around the same time. As the elders in Malaso remarked, “sometimes it’s hard to fix these problems by ourselves.” A decade later, CEWARN’s regional approach to rangeland conflict is working better than governments acting on their own.
The Eid al-Adhaa Incident of November 2011 in Mega Town

In the past decades in Ethiopia, no one paid much heed to others’ religion and beliefs. Followers of the four Abrahamic religions and traditional beliefs used to respect each other. People buried their dead, helped each other on their farms, and enjoyed each other’s celebrations together. They even inter-married, although in many cases the bride followed the husband’s belief. These traditions went on undisturbed for decades. Nowadays, however, things have changed. Many families now refuse inter-religious marriages between Muslims and Christians, and new animosities have cropped up as the following description of a potentially violent event in late 2011 demonstrates.

The Protestant Conference Incident

A Protestant Conference was held at the Mega Mekane Yesus Church in early November, 2011. Although not an especially large congregation in this particular region, over 1500 Protestants from Moyale, Miyo, Yabello, Bule Hora, and Hawassa came to participate in the meeting held in the Church’s compound in Mega town.

Tsegaye Bekele

Tsegaye Bekele served as CEWARN field monitor for Moyale, Ethiopia. He continues to serve as CEWARN’s local peace building partner.
The following is a play-by-play account of what happened.

Nov. 5, 1 pm: I went to the town to have lunch when I observed small groups of Muslim youth gathering in several places. They were whispering. Although what they were discussing could not be heard, it was easy to see that they were worked up about something. I sensed something was going on. Then I remembered that the following day was the Muslim holiday, Eid Al Adhaa (the Festival of the Sacrifice). Whenever there had been a Muslim celebration in the recent past there had been small skirmishes between Muslims and Protestants. But the problem in 2011 had become considerably more sensitive, as the events were to prove.

Nov. 5, 2 pm: I dialled one of my informants who happened to be a Muslim. He explained that a number of his community’s youths were planning something, adding that there might be a confrontation between Muslims and Protestants the following day.

Nov. 5, 3 pm: I returned to the town and gathered more information that confirmed there was going to be a problem the following day. I immediately rang the local government administrator, who was also a member of the Woreda Peace Committee. This call did go through. I shared all the information I had gathered. He told me that he had also heard about it. Although he seemed reluctant to act on it initially, he nevertheless said he would check it out.

Nov. 5, 5pm: My informant called back and said some people were hatching a plan to attack the Protestant church after the Eid prayers; I immediately called the peace and security head to tell him what I heard. We met and went together to question the Muslim religious leaders about the matter. They told us they were not aware of any such plan. We instructed them to follow it up from their side; if there was any hint of the threat, they needed to tell us about it. At the same time, we advised them that they should caution against any such attack if there was a plan. “Your people should not be allowed to break the peace,” we told them.

The peace and security head and I headed to his office where he convened an urgent meeting of his staff and some members of the local Woreda Peace Committee. We tried to get a rough estimate of the number of Muslims who would be attending Eid prayers, and concluded that 80 per cent of Mega town and its suburbs residents would be present. The next step for us was to check out how many police and militia personnel we had at hand. There was only a
small contingent—not a good thing if the imminent attack was going to be carried out. Members present at the meeting were ordered to gather more information and to keep the religious leaders, the local Peace Committee members, and the Kebele (ward) elders informed. We examined every option available to us to prevent what was clearly going to be a violent situation.

Nov. 5, 8 pm: I received a call from the peace and security head who told me that the attack was definitely on, and he reported that he was going to ask the Yabello zone administration for extra riot police. I agreed, and at the same time dispatched some armed police and militias to keep the peace in the town.

Nov. 6, 7:30 am: Muslims, young and old, women and children, started flowing towards the place where prayers were to be held. Lorries and motorbikes ferried the faithful while even more arrived on foot.

Nov. 6, 8:30 am: Land Cruisers loaded with riot police in full gear and batons and shields arrived in Mega town from Yabello. They took up positions on the two streets in the town leading to the Protestant Church. A message was sent to the Church to close the gates and not to let anyone out. The arrangement was to post unarmed elders to stand at the first point as the youths left the prayers. The police and militias were stationed 50 meters from the elders. The plan was for the elders try to talk the youths out of their plan; if that failed, then the police and militias would engage them.

Nov. 6, 9:30 am: After the prayers, the Muslim youth flowed into the town. They stopped near the Orthodox Church where they began to chant “Allahu Akbar,” and “there is no son of God”, and other slogans. They didn’t stay long at the Orthodox Church, but rushed off in the direction of the Protestant Church. They reached the point where the elders were standing. The elders talked and pleaded with them to calm down. But the elders failed to stop them. They reached the cordon formed by the police and militias, who halted their advance. The police talked to them and advised them against violence.

All this time, the commander of police from Yabello, the Mega peace and security head, and I were observing the situation from a position in the middle of the street behind the police and militias. I failed to notice that a man dressed in Islamic attire, an outsider to the best of my knowledge, had been standing beside us all along.

The crowd did not listen to the police and militia. They overwhelmed them and pushed forward. The commander ordered his men to shoot into the air when he realised the crowd was not going to be deterred. He said that if they still refused to disperse, legal action would be taken against them.
Nov. 6, 10:30 am: We took cover away from the road for safety. Then, suddenly, I noticed that the man who was standing next to us had vanished. I looked at the crowd and saw that the man was now with them, and that the provocative chanting stopped. The man appeared to be having a very serious talk with them, while looking in our direction and gesturing. The crowd seemed to disperse but in fact they were regrouping in an attempt to use an alternative route to the Protestant Church. Fortunately, the police and militia had also blocked the other street. At this point, they resumed their chanting and headed back to the mosque. Perhaps the man who had been standing beside us had also warned them that legal action would be taken against them. I later pointed this man out to the authorities who arrested him together with others suspected to have been behind the mobilisation. Things went quiet and the town appeared deserted after the Muslims returned to their homes to celebrate their holy day in the usual manner.

I can only imagine the catastrophic impact of the attack had it succeeded. Many of the Muslim youth were carrying stones and sticks and who knows how many of them were carrying concealed knives. Many people might have been injured or even killed if the mob managed to reach the Protestant Church. But I think that the majority of those in the crowd were not aware that the incident had been planned in advance.

After the incident, the government called all the town’s religious leaders together for a workshop. When the workshop was over the ringleaders were identified and the Muslim community’s leaders scolded those who planned the abort-ed attack. They were let off with a stern warning not to engage in such disruptive actions again. The events of November 6 2011 taught me that many innocent community members are at risk of getting into serious trouble over matters that they really knew little about. The irony of the situation is that otherwise sincere people are easily incited to rash actions that end up with longtime neighbours and friends bearing the brunt of the trouble. I learnt we have to be wary of those who exploit religion only as a pretext for perpetuating violence. But most of all, I learnt that early information and early response is an essential tool for the prevention of conflict and violence.

A year later,
Eid 2012 passed peacefully.

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We came upon Antony Angiros’ Tepeth family north of Moroto town, near Nakiloro. Nakiloro nestles in the lush green and thickly wooded base of the mountain. The village in northern Uganda is home to a military detachment, a police station, and what from a distance appears to be some sort of missionary outpost but is actually the camp of a Chinese mining firm. As with Moroto town itself, and the missionary complex in Kotido where I stayed, it’s the locals who look out of place. This is due to the intrusion of transformative foreignness and I already sense the beginning of future conflict.

The faces of Antony Angiros’ party detain us. I already feel the excitement of something different in Nakiloro, just by looking at them. Simon Omeri, my guide and interpreter, makes enquiries and tells me that they came down the mountain to report a raid.

A raid. The excitement I feel is not proper. But in a macabre way, I have wanted to feel and see a raid. I try to tell myself that excitement is a neutral reaction. Right now, I see in their faces what it must not
only look but also, feel like. The kneaded-down faces you will see at funerals; the funerary air. Their grief stabs instantly. I see this aftermath and try to forget I wanted to witness a raid. Still I want to go up the mountain.

The exhausted party sits in the shade of a tree. They have been walking in their tire-sandals and gumboots since early morning. Capes studded with forget-me-nots tell they have been walking the wild.

“A group of Turkana entered their village last night and carried away 11 goats.”

A theft then, not a raid. The culprits ghosted in under the cover of darkness. Still, it is a serious matter and calling it a raid when making a police statement raises the stakes. But nothing seems to be happening. Antony Angiros, alone among the men dressed in shorts and shirts of marching cuts, with sneakers and socks, is not too interested in our presence. He utters one-line responses. There are more important things to pay attention to. He’s the patriarch. In his mid-40s, he is husband to four wives, father of 15 children. He looks in the direction of the missionary-like establishment. He walks away.

“How did they know it was the Turkana?” I ask.

“They tracked them to the Kenyan border,” a woman who seems one of the party, yet not of the party due to her lack of traditional Karamojong attire, says. “In Orum.”

I look up into the mountain. Too dense, too much forest.

The police have promised to write to their Kenyan counterparts. This is not what the Angiros family wants to hear.

“It is too hard for us to go and talk to the Turkana,” Angiros’ 18-year old son, Lomogin Charakan, says, deadpanning. “Perhaps if high-ranking people talk to the Turkana...”

Simon Omeri explains that since the Karamojong no longer have guns, the Turkana can walk in and out as they wish. It is a mournful, tortured afternoon. Losing eleven goats from a family of some 30 people, counting Angiros’ grandchildren, hurts. They accuse the Kenyan government of arming Kenyan pastoralist and the Ugandan government of disarming Ugandan pastoralists. “Their lives depend on livestock,” Simon Omeri explains. “If they want to buy something, they sell livestock.”

How to solve the matter then? Peace dialogue, Simon Omeri says. “Joint kraals for protection, open trade, meeting with Kenyan authorities.”

“Let them remove the boundaries so we can go in,” Antony Angiros, who has returned with a not-very
encouraging face, says. “The Kenyans can come in. We can’t go into Kenya.”

The big, peace-building plans, on an afternoon like this, seem too unwieldy. Angiros slumps down in the shed. He looks defeated. I begin to suspect the 11 goats are gone for good. “We will wait and watch,” he says with finality.

My excitement mounts. I want to see the scene of the raid. Angiros sees an opportunity. It is a long way up to the mountain dwelling. His youngest wife is 22 and with a two month-old baby. Other members of his party are exhausted. They walked up to the Kenyan border. We can see the homestead if we take his family. But he stays behind to follow up the reported theft.

The drive up the mountain is slow. Rock-strewn passes skirt the rim of sheer ravines. Hardy roots cut across passages. Dappled shadows, thin mountain air, and the dropping temperature compensate for the climb.

After climbing for half an hour, we are high up in Kakingol. The yellow of sunflowers, the hump of huts, a primary school, a dispensary, are suddenly visible up here where it is all silence. We leave the car at the dispensary. The rest of the journey to the village is on goat tracks.

The sunflowers reflect how brilliant the sun shines here, their yellow petals almost shimmering from being so sun-lit, translucent like lampshades. Everything from mud-walls, blue sky, khaki and burgundy clothing, brown earth, down to my pencil and notebook all catch the sun. I have never seen sorghum growing so vigorously it seems to be in rapturous joy at being alive.

The goat tracks narrow as we ascend. We are walking in single file now. At the head, someone stops. We all stop. I am called to the fore. The lead young man points to the ground.

“You see this footprint,” Simon Omeri translates. “It was made by a young man.”

I nod, pretending to have seen footprints. I only see earth and twigs. “How can you tell the age?”

“You can tell the weight, the height, and if the person was carrying something.”

They think the raiders were young men, the average height around 5’8”. Young men walk on their toes, I am told. The older a person gets, the more their weight transfers to their heels. Old men walk on their heels. A tall person will have longer feet.

Someone carrying a load will leave deep heels and deep toes stamped on the ground.

All easy to read – if you can see the footmarks in the first place.
We are going higher now. Ranges soar up all around us. Blank-faced rock cliffs stare down at us. My attention is riveted on a sheer rock face, slippery and without handholds, rising high above us. It is called Awoyeses. Across the valley, another raised peak like Aweless’ competes for supremacy. This one is called Kasogoliese I am told.

It is very silent up here in the mountains. The crunch of our footsteps on loose, gravelly pebbles re-enacts the raiders’ dark passage last night. They would have had to be careful, for they would have had nowhere else to walk but here. Mountains give few options. This is properly a pass. We can only walk in file and bent over through the thickly thatched mountain vegetation.

The frenzied reception at Antony Angiros’ homestead echoed the funereal faces of the humans we encountered below the mountain. But if I were to choose who were bereaved the most by last night’s events, it is not the humans who owned and herded the goats. It is the newly orphaned baby goats. The kids hear the approach of humans, and associating it with the return of their mothers, begin a bleating-frenzy whose unmistakable mourning is like humans at a mortuary. I hang back a little. The Maasai cattle I encountered in Olepolos, an hour’s drive West of Nairobi, on the impossibly beautiful, big-earth escarpment in Kenya had struck me by their intelligence. I was an outsider and when I happened across their grazing paths, they stopped and turned heads at me, expelling air, nostrils flaring, as if trained to beware of foreigners. I saw this too with the cows in Kotido. In northern Uganda we too keep animals, but they are docile, they know their place, which is not with humans. But here, in Mt. Moroto, I experience proximity to animals in a way I will never forget. Pastoralists’ animals, I conclude, are aware of their elevated status to the point of arrogance.

The young goats made a rush at us, nudged at our shins. They expect to be carried up in human arms. They demand an answer. “Where is mum, where is mum?” There is no need to interpret their cries. We have no answers. Something close to acceptance of fate becalms them. Now like their human cohorts, they are lost for options. The goats stand back from us. I approach one and it runs away, like a disappointed child showing how it feels. It is eerie to see that the greatest depth of emotion appeared to come not from the humans, but from the animals. Not mere objects of production, they subsume the deeply rooted mythical connection tying the pastoralist to their animals.

Now I see that I don’t have the metaphysical literacy to properly understand these pastoralists. Initially I had thought, on first hearing...
the report of the theft, that eleven goats were not so many to demand two national armies mobilise their forces. I was thinking in numbers; statistics lie.

Humans cried at the sight of these caprine juveniles. What strength they had left over from the tracking seemed to melt. I do not speak Ngalakarimojong, but hands to heads, frenzied exchange of words, plainspoken pointing of hands at the young goats can only mean the same thing in any language.

“They will have to look for milk from elsewhere to feed them,” Simon Omeri whispers to me. The homestead would not be easy to find if you are a stranger to pastoralist ways, like me. Like a nest, it huddles in a thick stockade of mountain vegetation and twisted liana. The huts are like the granaries we have back in northern Uganda, set on piles a meter off the ground that you climb up to enter. The roof is terraced grass thatch; walls are woven together like baskets. It smells of goat droppings all around. Bar the modern clothing, it could be any century up here.

“They were drunk last night,” Simon Omeri says as we walk back down. The ground is strewn with empty sachets of cheap and nasty liquor. He points to mud and wattled, low-roofed shacks.

“The bar. The Turkana came when they were all drunk.”

Simon Omeri is a changed man. He’s agitated. He’s Tepeth, I can now tell. The tell-tale signs of umbilical connection to a people in the body language, the manner in which he slumped on the grass with the Angiros family, the possessiveness he had which he did not have in Kodilakeny when we visited the Matheniko, has graduated to fullness in his sharing of their grief.

Yet he continues to answer my questions. He is a professional translator, a “field assistant” for whom there are not enough clients like me seeking information to afford him fulltime employment.

I ask him if the Tepeth are highland Matheniko. The doubts I had when speaking to a young man in Moroto town who told me there are lowland and highland Matheniko is confirmed. Mountain and plain ecosystems are too diverse for a people to absorb simultaneously. Even I can tell that. They are an entirely different people perhaps; the syllables hark back to a separate origin.

Simon Omeri snorts, “The Tepeth are mountain people. They are not Karamojong.”

What about the language? “Many Tepeth are now speaking Ngakarimojong.”

How do the Tepeth say, “Thank you very much?” I ask. I have learnt to say “Alakara noi” – “thank you
very much” in Ngakarimojong. The “noi” I picked up from the residue of my Ateso (Yálama noi noi).

“The Tepeth say Koloka nades,” Simon Omeri tells me. A different people then. Karimojong phonemes would not have the D and the S in such close proximity. Ngakarimojong strikes me as exact, strident even. There is a hint of feeling in “Koloka nades” which is decidedly non-Ateker.

“What is the Tepeth word for leg?”

I know the Karamojong say akeju. “Teg.”

The linguistic spot check appears to support the separate origin hypothesis, as do my guide’s comments.

“The Tepeth are related to the Karenga and Teuso,” Simon Omeri explains. “They are related to the Nakaps of Mount Napak and the Kadamites. They are brothers. The Tepeth travel to Kadam to perform rituals.” Much time would have passed then, or is still passing, from when the Tepeth were Tepeth, or Tepes, speaking their own language (called Soo) to now, when they are spoken of as highland Matheniko. They are marrying themselves into oblivion. Young men climb down for wives. Up climb the Matheniko words; out come Matheniko-babbling children. The Matheniko-isation of the mountain dwellers proceeds in this manner, generation by generation.

The loss of eleven goats to lowlanders underlines this brutal erosion of culture. Only the elders now speak Soo fluently. Coping with the hordes from the lowlands armed with guns and words makes for a viciously busy life.

There are details I almost missed. The young men up here wear pleated skirts, Scotsman-like, not the shorts worn down in the plains. I can imagine what the lowlanders say of that. As we go down the mountain, styles change across ecological zones. Young men coming up the mountain thrust out, forward, masculine, beaded, nylon-vested, caped, their hats are stovepipes rakishly tilted to the side—Dr. Seuss hats. You approach a bend and there emerges a young man, cape billowing, his Cat-in-the-Hat stovepipe precariously tilting in the wind, kilt aflutter, a wrist wrapped in brass, ears bedangling with brass. I am overcome with an unconscious expectation that if I look long enough, that they will cast it all off and confess they are just putting on a show for the outsiders. But they are dead serious, the immensely dignified faces underlining the reality of it.

First the Labwor Hills, then a peace-making clan with the phoneme for “poet” embedded in their name. And now kilts and stovepipe hats and capes. No. It’s not all raids and AK-47s. Karamoja, I have decided, has a sense of style so winningly original. It is an enchant-
ed land. The sense of composure, dutifulness; a people not asking for much other than respect and understanding, for whom the animals are more than a crude factor of economic subsistence. Can you forget it when human beings cry for the pain of orphaned goats? They are also curved-stool fanciers whose faces melt at the sight of first-rate craftsmanship. I bought such a stool in Kotido. It has become my calling card. I more than just meld in. I pull out my stool as I approach. I am instantly accepted.

We zigzag down Mount Moroto on crunchy, serpentine, leaf-shadowed passes. The plains appear over the lip of the mountain, distant, blue, fading towards the horizon beyond.

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“The problem of Karamoja is poverty,” Simon Omeri explains over lunch in Moroto town. “But there are not any other alternatives to survival,” he continues. “Also getting rigid with culture. There’s poor education. There is a problem. Ok, there is not much raiding now. Ok. It’s not a problem of their own making. Drought. When I say drought, let me say climate, it’s not reliable. Clan divisions and inter-clan divisions. Some solutions can work. They have been trying joint kraals for many years but it can only work if there is enough pasture.”

“If you talk of infrastructure, you can say Karamoja is marginalised. These days where the government considers (for resource allocation) is where there is output, where it can get revenue in taxes. You know, those things. We don’t have investors although they are now beginning to come. Karamoja has never had a full minister. They have now created a ministry of Karamoja, but the minister is not a Karamojong.”

“The issue with cows, the culture says if it’s not a cow, there is no marriage. They say when you educate a girl you will not get anything. The girl will go to the town. They have not seen people being married in urban areas. They are not sure of taking girls to school. They say a girl in
town is a harlot. There is no reference point for educating girls.”

I mention the woman in the Angiros group, the one wearing the gumboots who spoke English.

“She cannot live in Kakingol now. She went to Nakiloros from Moroto because they are her relatives. For us men who are educated we can marry any woman but educated girls cannot marry uneducated men.”

Simon Omeri twists his face to make the point. “To marry those elders?” he shakes his head at the possibility. “When it comes to family, dressing, feeding. In a rural setting, it’s a woman who feeds the family. Educated women cannot accept that. They say there should be gender-balance. These learned women say those rural men cannot reason. Somehow they are right. He cannot provide all the necessities she needs. She needs proper feeding. She needs rice, the other food varieties. The rural women depend on sorghum and maize. When it comes to dressing, learned ladies, any fashion that comes, they want it. Rural women can be ok only in a skirt and shuka. You have seen those houses out there. You think a lady can go there?”

What about coming from Karamoja, what does it feel like?

“When the colonialists came, they said Karamoja is a zoo. It’s not fair. I feel bad. Maybe some outsiders thought that Karamojong have tails. People who come here talk negatively about what happens in Karamoja, which also scares people from coming here to find out.” Suddenly I am uncomfortable. I have been fighting the illusion that we have left Karamoja. Moroto town feels like Mbale town, further to the south. Against my better inclinations, I become aware that during these past three days I have been wanting to be in a place like Moroto Town, to have buildings with concrete and glass, to be in a restaurant with a menu. I do not like the food. I am losing weight fast. I thought I hated city billboards until I saw those in Moroto Town and felt safe again. I listen painfully to Simon Omeri.

“I have travelled to Mbale, Lira, Gulu, Soroti, Kampala, Jinja, Toro. What I first saw were the roads. The roads are tarmac. You think ‘this is another world’. Karamoja is not Uganda: business was booming. You find a variety of all things, vehicles, and transport is cheap compared to here. People are moving almost 24 hours a day.”

“As an educated Karamojong, people don’t believe you. First of all, they look at you. They take time to believe you are from Karamoja. People who are learned are not treated as Karamojong unless they hear me talking to a fellow Karamojong in Ngakarimojong. People still think we have tails.”
The scrubby landscape, on which few plants but thorn bushes, briars, and the occasional acacia grow, can only have been so sculpted by cattle. Where in some places you come across Médecins Sans Frontières, here in Kotido, I come across Vétérinaire Sans Frontières. A little further up the road there is a veterinary pharmacy supply store named Happy Cow Fields. Herds of goats tended by boys (feet and faces dust-smitten already so early in the morning) mark their presence with spasmodic bleats and little tinkling of bells. There’s the occasional sheep here and there, but mostly cattle. Cattle, more than people, shape the town. That persistent ting ting tinkle is a cowbell. The smell of Karamoja is the smell of cattle, cow dung, and the sweet smell of cows that makes you think of raw milk. Animal hooves have broken up the topsoil. Hedges and plants flourish if they are indigestible. What business is not about livestock is abrupt, ad hoc. The run-down cars rusting throughout the town would

A. K. KAIZA

A. K. Kaiza is a writer based in Uganda who served as one of the editors of this volume. He also contributed a series of travelogues and two other chapters to the volume.
elsewhere have been kept in repair or cannibalized for parts. Southerners man the stalls and shacks of moulded plastic and rubber wear. The town is full of what’s not useful for cattle. The walk through other towns that build momentum into some corner or new street, here it ends with a view of the land sweeping away towards the horizon. There, writ large, the countryside is cropped, shaped and deformed by cattle.

So it is with the people. Young men, when not walking behind a herd of cattle, look like they have just left a kraal somewhere or are going to one; shuka-caped, head-gear, faces and chests cicatrized, sticks on shoulders, arms up these sticks like on a cruciform, these young men communicate the masculine but mythical masculinity of Karamoja.

The cattle-herding imperative informs the fashion. The shuka slung across the shoulders, running down in a wedge over polyester shorts (mostly green, blue and burgundy), the long-distance trekking wiry muscles, down to the thick-soled car-tire sandals—these are appurtenances of the cattle fields. As are the long cattle-prods men carry from early boyhood, knobkerries born as third limbs, amulets with sharpened edges that with a swipe of the arm turns into a deadly weapon, the sheathed knives fastened to waists which show and conceal as the shuka flap with each footstep, the small, yellow jerry can or water bottle, knitted wool head-gear. The Spartan sartorial style posts an imperative that shaves a community of all other possibilities. You live for cattle; you die for cattle; a life as beautifully exact as it is harshly uncompromising.

In an area one hour north of Kotido there is now fear that the Karamojong are losing control over their animals. It is a cheerless turn of good fortunes. The standing enmity between the Dodoth and Turkana has not been assuaged, has not been settled the pastoralist way even if the probability of violent death has been reduced. But this quasi-peace is not bringing happiness about cattle. The Ugandan disarmament exercise, with its combination of stick and carrot, has been largely successful. After a generation, the gun has come and gone. Elsewhere cattle herding goes largely unmolested. In Kaabong, things returned to normal, but did not stay there for long, and passed on to a new dimension.

Lest they tempt the Turkana, the cows are sequestered in protected kraals in Kasilo, Loleia, Lomsen, Loclom, Kapedo and Loyoro. Cows move where the Ugandan army decides. The army’s decisions are based on safety zones. Safety zones do not always enclose good grazing.

We stop some 10 kilometers from Kaabong town, which we can see at the rising slope of the plains in
the distance. Further to the north lies Mt. Murongole, Kaabong’s own mountain. We are already in that triangular horn of Uganda’s north-eastern border, protruding deep into South Sudan and Kenya. Yet before you reach the inner tip of this horn, one comes upon another mountain, Mt. Zulia. The Toposa, the Dassenech, and the Nyangatom live to the north and east across the border. They are fully armed; southwards, the Dodoth are not.

We have stopped on the flat table-land rising above the general plain, under large clouds that cast idyllic shadows on the now green expanse. This is the idealised pastoral they print on milk and cheese packets. From all directions we see long into the distance. Reinvigorated with rainfall, Karamoja is pleasing to the eye.

Jean Mark manages to convince two elderly men to talk to us. Soon others follow, and we end up in an impromptu focus group. Apana Agira is an octogenarian. Typical of the elderly I have come across here, it is only the white hair and geriatric skin that betrays his age. He walks ramrod straight, stick to shoulder, a fantastic curved Karamojong stool in his fingers. His eyes mist up when he talks of what life was like before 1984 – bar Lopiar. Animals grazed freely, he says. Spears, bows and arrows and knobkerries could only do so much damage in a raid. With elders in firm control of society, the brakes were quickly applied whenever a cycle of reciprocal raiding threatened to spin out of control. The sanctioning of raids by the elderly took into account such matters. He recounts how agriculture mixed in with pastoralism. Lost animals could be regenerated by bartering grain for a few cows needed to begin the long and arduous re-stocking process.

“There was little fear of conflict,” he says. “Animals roamed freely. People were respectful, elders were in control.”

The gun changed that.

“Now the youth don’t listen”, he says and hangs his head. “This is a hard generation. Now as parents we are stranded. If not us, who will the children listen to?”

There have been attempts to channel the youth energy into what in Uganda is called “LDU”, Local Defence Units. There is little enthusiasm for these government militias. Now some young men have joined the focus group. We are sitting under a small tree providing scanty shade. At the end of the open field is a military detachment. To our right is a kraal, the protected kraal. A handful of soldiers walk toward us. A man in his 40s puts up his hand to speak. He gives his name as Aling Lukodetemoi. Whenever there are jobs available, like road maintenance, he claims, “We elders rush in and compete against the youth. We the elders have be-
come so selfish, so greedy, we want all the jobs. When food-for-work comes, we elders jump in. The youth are left out.” This crowding out of the youth, Aling says, is the reason young men have turned to thuggery. He points at the gaggle of young men present and asks “isn’t that true?” They look to the ground.

Action Contre le Faim, a humanitarian organisation, he says, has come up with a program to de-silt dams. But how many young men have they employed? He outlines programs that could benefit Karamoja: road maintenance, a worthy occupation given the ride we have so far had; water harvesting, planting trees—the land badly needs reforestation; then there is the question of minerals, and gold. There is silence at the mention of gold. Those Karamojong who may think that cattle may be an accursed gift from God should re-think what they know of agony when it comes to gold.

Alika is not finished. Even the cattle itself, he says, can yield greater quantities of milk if only the Karamojong are taught better husbandry. But Alika’s ideas seem far-fetched to his listeners. The discussion returns to kraals and conflict and the Ugandan army. The army, they say, had promised that kraals in Dodoth would be merged—apparently a popular idea—to make it harder for Turkana raiders to come calling. This would be an alternative [unclear what this merging means] to protected kraals. The word “protected” seems, in northern Uganda, to euphemise the exact opposite. I first encountered the term in Lang’o and Acholi, where the “protected” people said they were experiencing the worst days of their lives.

The protected kraals don’t shift when they become clogged with disease-friendly detritus or when proximate pastures are exhausted. Pastoralists are by definition mobile. When a kraal becomes congested, they decamp. Now these kraals are three feet deep in dung. The cattle must be forced to enter them at night. They do not give as much milk. Calves die easily. Adult cows are infirm and scrawny.

As the discussion advances, new revelations emerge that portray the 1980s as even more consequential than I have so far learnt. Lopiar forced the Karamojong into alternative lifestyles. It is the period when Karamojong children first went to school in serious numbers. If cattle were gone, would school not provide what did not come naturally to the people?

But the atmosphere, created by what I gather to be the inability of the Dodoth to command their herds, is not suited for happy endings. Even education comes in for criticism. Alika, for all his modernising talk, says now there is conflict between the educated and un-
educated Karamojong. The former, when not hiding or apologising for their Karamojong identity, return to lord over and to prosper as middle men, fixers and translators who claim the lion’s share of foreign assistance.

He’s not finished. “Current records show that most of those arrested for theft are school dropouts.” He pinpoints 1984 as the beginning of the education plague. In that year, acceptance of education had seemed to be going smoothly. But Lorenge Lup – Red Earth - struck. “People dug, ploughed but no rain came.” The resultant famine emptied the schools.

The children from Loreng Lup, he says, formed warrior gangs. Perhaps he spoke too vehemently, and too fast without thinking through each point. He can’t sustain his narrative: “Anyway,” he concludes, “government should have a school-feeding program.”

Army Sergeant Amado steps in and explains why the guns were taken and the cattle put in protect kraals. He says that just recently the Tope-sa stole seven animals, which they have yet to recover. And there are plans to clean the kraals, he explains.

I feel a withdrawal of participation as the focus group becomes polite. Is it the presence of the army they are acquiescing to? Maybe not. Peter Lokwi, a kraal leader and a very able one judging from his build and irascible manner, who joined us late, speaks up. Dressed in full trousers and polo shirt and thick car tire sandals, he stirs up confusion. He’s gravelly-voiced, brusque, and not dressed in the shorts, cape, headgear and beads; he does not carry the obligatory stool, nor knobkerrie. His appearance makes one think of a cattle-trader, one of those brisk characters commandeering the butcher-section of souks. That gravelly voice condemns the disarmament exercise.
He does not appear aware of the soldiers’ standing by. Or perhaps he’s speaking like that because they are listening. The soldiers’ faces are masked. As I start to fear that something unpleasant might happen, Peter Lokwi raises a laugh and proclaims that the problem now is that everyone has a mobile phone. “Can a way be found to disable the warriors’ phones?”

A politician then, but not one looking for votes. I begin to see how it is. The names of kraal leaders I have heard so far have been proffered as synecdoche – personification of the era they commanded. The past recedes. Only the memorialisation remains. The beginning of inter-

necine conflict in the mid-80s are today marked by Lopiar and by Lorenge Lup as much as by the kraal leaders of days gone by like Kuduyara and Lokonkulie: two kraal heads and two acts of nature.

In a generation from now, will protected kraals be equated with a Dodoth catastrophe, or whichever act of nature they will attach to them—how do you say deep dung in Ngakarimojong? Will these times be remembered for the calamity that befell this area during the era of Peter Lokwi? It will not be the kind of legacy memorial-hungry leaders want.
LONG’ILONG’OLE: MEDIATING VIOLENCE AND CHANGE

We are in Amudat, where dewed tufts of grass in the shining fields under Mt. Kadam catch the rising sun. It has been raining. We left the Amudat-Nakapiripirit road and went into the bush. The car weaves among the wiry riverine acacia that characterise this wilderness in Namalera. But we won’t be able to drive for much longer; the trees are clogging up the tracks. The kraal we are visiting is further ahead, beyond the thicket of acacias. It is eerie here, the land simultaneously wooded yet open.

“For the last five years, before disarmament took place, people had to find ways to escape death,” says Linos Lotem, the field monitor for these areas. “You could not find people here. This was a battle ground.” ‘Battle’ is a new term I am hearing since coming to Karamoja.

“You could not keep an animal for five years.”

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Who are the people taking animals from the Pokot? I ask.

“Pian,” he says. He says “Pian”, not “The Pian”. I note this inflection. He goes on: “Matheniko, Bokora, Turkana.”

Long’ilong’ole Lomuma was barely eleven years old when the volleys of gunshots erupted shortly before midnight in December 2005. They came right before midnight and it was too dark to see anyone,” he says, “There were so many Bokora. All the animals were taken. And four people along with them.”

That there “were so many Bokora” would not have been clear that night. Unfolding facts fed memory backwards. The raiders captured close to seven hundred animals. The account led into what begun what I am now learning is a regular ritual. Groups of young men, with the harsh fact of dispossession ricocheting at them from the faces of children and women, picked up their guns and went in pursuit of the Bokora. I imagined the scene on Mt. Moroto—gun-slinging young men, bent over reading tracks. But with so many animals, anyone can be a tracker.

It was not just the warriors of the Namalera and Morita kraals who went out in pursuit. More battalions poured in from across the border in Kenya. Pokot are not Karamojong; and as you hear it from the Karamojong, the Pokot are the most anti-Karamojong of the north Rift Valley’s pastoralist peoples. In any case, there is little friendship between the two communities. But what anti-Karamojong actually means is that they reflect a trait that is not present in Karamoja: internal raids are not permitted within Pokot, and they do not ally with outsiders against fellow Pokot. An attack on any Pokot is an attack on all Pokot.

The tracks from the December 2005 raid led as far as Napak, to the West. Linos Lotem said it was the back and forth series of reprisals which ensued that turned this area into a battleground. But the ritual of the counter-raid is not the problem that stuck in my mind. Long’ilong’ole, a young man barely twenty yet hardly already, gruff-throat-ed and speaking with the brusque mannerism that reminded me of Peter Lokwi, the leader of his age group, a young man with the two lower front teeth removed, says it in a matter-of-fact voice.

“Old men hanged themselves.”

The seriousness of the raid comes alive for me. I pause, in silence asking for explanation.

“Where will he go to borrow from?” Long’ilong’ole asks. And I ask, “borrow what?”

I rue the harshness of a fact, like an honourable death for the shame you never invited.
By all accounts, it is becoming clear to me now, 2005 could be the nadir of a period that started with the coming of the gun back in 1979.

“After raids, when old men lose all their animals, they hang themselves,” Linos Lotem explains.

The fall-out from Lopiar spread to the Pokot. When the ten-year intra-Karamoja peace hiatus collapsed in 1992, the Pian attacked Nabotong, a Pokot area in Uganda. The first raid was in July 1993. Over 180 Pian and Pokot were killed. A second raid followed in December. The largest in the memory of the two sides, it left 231 dead. Pokot clans from two countries assembled.

There’s a cat-like sharpness about Long’ilong’ole. His head is shaved save for the crown. Rough thickened hands, rubber bangles, a long sleeved polyester hunter green shirt clashed with the red and green Maasai blanket fastened to his waist over white-striped blue and burgundy nylon shorts. His eyes focus on an unseen object in the bush.

He speaks in fits and starts. Pokot when heard the first time is a heavily guttural language that sounds like a series of staccato commands.

Ask a question and Long’ilong’ole starts, hands, legs and torso swaying to emphasise a point, vehement arms flaying most every word. He will not have to fight to be kraal leader when the time comes.

His friends watch, shake their heads, and laugh. Long’ilong’ole’s understudies double as audience and chorus. They let him do most of the speaking. They offer a point, a rejoinder, or a mutually understood ehh of emphasis. This is not Karamoja. It is a different land. Men and women are circumcised, enjoined by rites that bind.

In Karamoja, whoever wanted to speak, spoke. Women sat with the men and claimed the right to talk. In Pokot a single voice holds the many together. There had been another daytime raid in August 2005. Tome Kapelikalis, an old man whose age no one remembers, lost all his animals.

“He just died,” Linos Lotem says. “Just looked at the empty kraal and died.” After Kakingol in the mountain I see how that is possible.

“The younger men are still energetic. Because of the pressure from the wives and children, they go on revenge missions. They cannot hang themselves: “Who will look after the children?”

I have not heard friendly words about the Pokot from the Karamojong. Long’ilong’ole brushes this aside as though it’s not worth mentioning.

“We always make friendship with these people,” he says. “From December to March we are friends, when this place is dry, when the
animals are close to Pian. We make peace. But immediately the raids come, we break the friendship. When we go to make raids, we don’t discriminate and say I made friends with this person. I can kill that person even though I know him.”

“What about a permanent friendship then?”

Long’ilong’ole looks into the shrubs. A sixth young man is walking up. He’s carrying a green striped blanket. It flaps. He’s wearing nothing underneath. A seventh young man with his blanket in his arms has nothing on except his earrings. They spread the blanket on the ground, lie down in a sunny patch, cover themselves, and go to sleep. We are under Mt. Kadam. It was cold last night.

“We could have better friendship,” Long’ilong’ole replies. “But we do not have a good mediator.

“We don’t enjoy raiding. We are only forced into it by circumstances. People think it’s our culture, or that it’s some kind of ritual. It’s not our culture.”

December 2005 has marked Long’ilong’ole. A scar the size of his palm mars the inner thigh of his left leg. There are scars all over his body, some nicks from thorn bushes. But there are knife cuts too.

“Outsiders think that pastoralists are simply violent. They have no respect for us.”

Last night in Nakapiripirit, a government employee from Kumam, in Kaberamaido, on the shores of Lake Kiyova told me plainly, “These people are primitive.” He has lived in Karamoja for 20 years.

Long’ilong’ole scowls.

“We are aware. We keep animals for prestige. I have bulls. Prestige so we can be called rich.”

This is a kind of bullishness you don’t hear among the more self-conscious, perhaps chastened, Karamojong. “We learned from our ancestors that animals are everything. We look only at cows. When we go to towns, they call us outsiders. Yet what we fail to learn is that you can have up to 500 heads of cattle but in one day, after a single day, you can lose all of them. If you still have life and strength, you can get them back.”

But things have changed. The reduction of raids and livestock theft due to disarmament has quieted things in Pokot as in Karamoja. Loss of cattle is no longer in the hundreds or thousands. Two or three will frequently disappear. It is more likely for stolen animals to be tracked down and returned. Even at this reduced level of loss, the intervention is proving unpopular among the kraals. The army has upped the
stakes. Whenever stolen animals are tracked to a particular kraal, all the animals in the homestead are impounded. It is not unusual for victims to inflate the number of stolen animals. Normalisation is throwing up things once not thought about.

“When our grandmothers were married, a lot of cows were paid in dowry, fifty, even seventy animals. Our mothers were married for forty. In those past years, the reason they were able to exchange a lot of animals is because there were no raids. For us, even fifteen cows is a large dowry. In the whole of Karamoja, one can now marry a woman for one cow. The same cow circulates, rotating from marriage to marriage.”

I notice that, even here in Pokot, occasional reference is made to Karamoja, not as the Karamojong homeland, but as pastoralist land generally. Legend has it that their name originated with the ancient Teso and Lang’i who before their conversion to Luo, said these were the homes of the ‘tired’—the old. In Ateko, old or tired is mojong, the plural is emojong. The description would have had to have a Luo flavour, for the possessive pronoun in Ateko languages is “Lo”; “Ka” is the Luo equivalent. Even the “ra” rings Luo in origin. As is often the case for such names, it is the outsiders that christen you. To yourself, you are simply ‘the people’.

“Education is what can make us change,” Long’ilong’ole says. “We don’t want to be like our grandparents. Every family has to send two or three children to school.”

“That two to three children are still only boys,” Linos Lotem adds. “They are campaigning to have girls educated as well. The campaign against circumcising girls is high here. We are encouraging people to build houses with strong walls and windows. Manyattas are not ventilated. We are telling them that agriculture is not bad.”

The field monitor continues: People are starting to realise how damaging raids are. When you are raided, first of all, you are traumatised. You think of the survival of the family.
You can imagine the women. They are in the kraal purposely to collect milk. When cows are taken, it creates a lot of trauma. The old die. Children are malnourished.”

I have failed to nail down what people feel about their animals. When I have asked, answers have been evasive, as though the relationship is personal, like a marriage, and not to be discussed with strangers. Long’ilong’ole means a brown animal with a white head. But Long’ilong’ole admits to some feeling for animals when he says that after a raid, people often try to find animals that looked like the one they lost. It’s like falling in love for a second time.

From what I have heard, the Pokot are ultra-pastoralists. They do not describe themselves as agro-pastoral. They are cattle people, an economic monoculture. Farming was never in their history. The Karamojong, they say, are soft. They eat grass. In the glory days of cows aplenty, a Pokot seen eating posho in town was not allowed to drink milk for an entire week.

Yet even that is starting to shift. “Why do we not eat grass?” is beginning to make sense for the few Ugandan Pokot who have ventured into farming. Grain, the Pokot have discovered, remains when the animals are gone. Part of the attraction derives from the fact that some of the maize can be sold to buy animals. “If cows can come out of maize, why not?” They have learnt this from the Kenyan Pokot who have been farming for years.
Background to 
Cross-border Conflict 
In the Karamoja Cluster

I was born and raised in Nyangatom Woreda, in the area near the Omo river in Southwest Ethiopia. I have worked in many organisations starting with a local CBO and working as a national peace expert employed by GIZ before I joined CEWARN. I grew up in an environment where there is endemic violence. The unrelenting conflicts motivated me to work for peace organisations in order to help my community.

The Turkana and all the other groups around the Nyangatom always clash. The Nyangatom resided in the disputed land called the Illemi Triangle before they were pushed into Ethiopia due to friction with the Dassanech and Turkana. The dynamics of conflict in this area are very complex and are not limited to one cause; most involve a combination of competition for pasture, cattle rustling, and territorial disputes. Some of the lands are our people's traditional pasture, but now the Turkana occupy it so we no longer have access to it.

Admassu Lokali
(Interview)

Admasu Lokali served as a field monitor in Nyangatom woreda, South Omo zone, Ethiopia. He is a Peace and Human Rights activist in the lower Omo valley.
The Nyangatom moved out of the Illemi triangle around 1980, after the Kenyan government bombed the locals. I remember when President Moi came to the area called Kibish and told those present to process Kenya identity cards but the Nyangatom said we already have Ethiopian IDs, why do we need to have two identities? The Turkana militia then began to attack the locals in Khalata, Natodomeri and Kanyeremo. A unit called the KPR (Kenya Police Reserves) also stole cattle and the militias killed many people. The Toposa and Nyangatom made an alliance to revenge attack the Turkana in Lokamrigna and other places I no longer remember by name. After the conflict started, it spread to the Toposa, Dassanech, Mursi, the Surma and other communities in Ethiopia.

Kenya’s General Service Unit paramilitary deployed there after the Ethiopian government requested the Kenya government to handle the issue. The Kenyan government allowed the GSU to attack the local communities in the Illemi triangle. Some 100 Nyangatom were killed and they used a helicopter to herd many animals away. This is what we were told by the elders who were there at the time.

After this, the Nyangatom split into two groups. One moved to South Sudan to join their kin already there and the other moved to a place called Kangatong in the Omo area of Ethiopia. Other people from both the Toposa and Nyangatom fled across the Kenyan side of the border. Because they were clashing with the local Dassanech after two years the Nyangatom returned to Kibish.

The Illemi Triangle is a disputed territory where inter-ethnic conflict is a real problem. The positive diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya was also a factor in the events forcing the Nyangatom out of Illemi when it came under de facto control by the Kenyans, who claim it because the British administered the area from Kenya during the colonial era.

There has been instability in this region since that time but one of the worst periods was the famine of 1984, which catalysed a new wave of conflict across the cluster. The Ugandan Karamojong describe this as beginning of the “white period” when famine, cholera and the rinderpest epidemic ravaged the area. Many cattle perished and an estimated 25 per cent of the population was wiped out. The UN came to describe the combination of famine, disease and underdevelopment as the Karamoja Syndrome.

The raiding has destabilised Nyangatom since 1988. Instability of this sort further aggravates tensions among the communities in our area because there was rarely harmony among the groups before. The conflicts escalate in Kibish and Lekchoggio when the Turkana raid the
Toposa then both the Toposa and Nyangatom counter raid the Turkana. The communities in South Sudan, southern Ethiopia and Kenya then attack herders in Uganda like the Dodoth. The conflict that started at that time was a function of complicated historical factors and continued for years.

The Nyangatom and Toposa call themselves the grandfathers or close brothers. The Turkana and Nyangatom also do the same but the tensions between them are deep rooted. These communities all originated in Uganda and used to be part of the Karamojong. They included the Turkana, Jie, Toposa, Nyangatom and other smaller groups. The relationship was determined by their migrations. After the Turkana separated from the group, the Toposa and Nyangatom remained in a close relationship. They continue to form alliances because their languages are related and culturally the Nyangatom and the Toposa are almost indistinguishable.

But don’t they tend to co-operate when faced by another outside force, like the intervention by Moi’s Kenyan government you mentioned above?

Since the time they split up and migrated, there has been competition among these Ateker speaking groups; one always wants to dominate the other. Competition is particularly fierce between the Turkana and the Toposa due to their population and their power, political or otherwise.

Although the Nyangatom are not large in number, they are strong warriors who like fighting. The Nyangatom and Toposa say the Turkana want to occupy our territory so we must constantly defend the land from their incursions. The Jie and the Dodoth feel the same way. The general feeling among the Ateker is that the Turkana are very arrogant. Historically, the Turkana are dominant, aggressive, and not liked by their neighbours, especially their sworn enemy, the Pokot. There is a song the Turkana sing when they come: “The men have come to take their cattle back, you boys go and drink porridge.”

The Matheniko [Karamojong] are perceived in the same way as the Turkana. They were the first to get AK-47s in 1979. They are also seen as arrogant, and sometimes proclaim unity with the Turkana. But the Turkana and other clans like the Sepek don’t see eye to eye and the Matheniko exploit this from time to time by playing them against each other.

Going back fifteen years or so, the Turkana were not so aggressive. There was a time when even the Dodoth managed to ambush them and take many Turkana guns. They enjoyed good relations with the Kenyan government back then. But during President Mwai Kibaki’s time, Turkana politicians pro-
cured guns and ammunition that were used in the raiding against the Nyangatom and Dassanech. Before this, there was a period when the Nyangatom and Toposa were the aggressors because they had automatic weapons acquired from the SPLA (Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army) during the civil war in South Sudan. They were frequently raiding and killing the Turkana, although this has decreased due to intervention from the national and the Turkana County governments. The role of the state, however, varies according to circumstances.

We had a chat with someone from the African Union about these issues. He said they consider cattle rustling to be just a cultural activity yet we are talking about conflicts over livestock worth millions of dollars. So what rules are we using when other interest groups, including some military people, are involved? When raids happen now there are trucks waiting to transport animals to abattoirs in Nairobi and Kampala and other major towns.

Now even people from towns participate in raids. For example, there are cases when students who are unable to pay their school fees decide to steal animals and sell them in the market to raise money. Sometimes businessmen or powerful chiefs in the village organise youth groups for raiding in order to exploit the profits from the cattle trade.

Animal diseases are another trigger for Nyangatom and Turkana violence. Sometimes cattle contract contagious diseases when they migrate from place to place. In 1999 the Nyangatom migrated to Karamatong in Surmaland. There was abundant grass and the Nyangatom resided there with the consent of the Surma community. Then anthrax broke out and many animals died. People then started to die from eating contaminated meat. After this the Nyangatom decided to leave Surmaland and resolved they would no longer go beyond their own territory, except to parts of Toposa country and sometimes to the vicinity of Kibish so they could avoid contact with the Turkana.

This is necessary because the conflict starts again whenever they migrate close to the Turkana. Envy is a problem for all three groups here. When they see herds of healthy cattle, the youth group become excited and begin mobilising to take them away. When the Nyangatom and Toposa come to Sepeng the Turkana prepare to raid. When the Turkana move away from Lokamarinya to an area called Makaronya, the Nyangatom and Toposa see the cattle and prepare to take them. The practice is mutual and things are complicated. What makes the conflict complex is that the Nyangatom and Toposa take cattle stolen in Kenya and hide them with their kin in Ethiopia. The animals circulate from one group to the next.
Since animals are the means of subsistence, when animals die, famine follows. In 1994, there was a large drought leading to famine across the region. It resulted in many succumbing from hunger in Nyangatom as well as in Turkana. But there were good relations between the Turkana and the Nyangatom at the time. Turkana used to bring maize from Kitale market and the Nyangatom used to take maize from Jinka to Topisede, and this allowed both groups to exchange supplies and get by. In the cases where people cannot travel for long distances they used to cultivate grains such as sorghum. So there is famine.

How have famines and conflict affected local livelihoods?

Not substantially. There are Nyangatom living around the Omo River who cultivate in the margins when the river retreats, although what they harvest is not enough for the whole community. I estimate close to half of the Toposa are now farmers. They cultivate sorghum along the hills of Naganachar and ferry it to the Nyangatom when there is famine, and the Nyangatom do the same for the Toposa when there is famine in their land. But the conflict always intensifies the problem because you cannot go to the market.

The Nyangatom are not involved in fishing but many Dassanech are now fishermen. Fishing has become a source of new hostilities on the border because of the stealing of nets, boats, and other equipment. Over the past year five boats have been stolen from the Turkana leading to revenge attacks that have killed seventeen Dassenech fishermen. The Turkana say that some of the fishing points the Dassanech use belong to Kenya, so the Dassanech should not use them, and the same is true of the Dassanech who want to deny Turkana access to certain spots across the border.

The same people who are exporting fish without the two governments’ knowledge are behind the new frictions on the lake. There are some investors who have certificates from the central government to export fish to Addis Ababa and other towns and it is only those people who are licensed to buy fish from fishermen. But on the Kenyan side there are Somali who buy fish from Dassanech and the Turkana to sell in Kenya and export to Uganda.

The Kenya government deployed marines in the lakeside to control the illegal fishing in the lake and there have been talks with the chief administrator of the South Omo zone to establish joint Ethiopia-Kenya patrols. Last month the zone administration on the Ethiopian side carried out an assessment to define legal and illegal fishermen.
With all these different challenges, how do you begin to build the basic infrastructure for peace work?

It is difficult to cope with conflict in general, and particularly so when it involves the pastoral communities who are always mobile. The monitors share information with each other to mobilise community leaders when there is an incident. We use the local elders and we are working with the youth groups who are the key actors in terms of triggering conflicts. Of course it is difficult to access the youth since they are always on the move with the herds. There is a project funded by the Rapid Response Fund from 2010 that we use to organise dialogue among the conflicting communities.

We also organise conversations among herders from different communities to discuss on how to share natural resources in a peaceful way. We hold exchanges among the peace committees on each side of the border so committees can learn to negotiate using traditional mechanisms. These are called Arbor peace negotiations. The Arbor trainers are locals who explain key procedures to the elders from both the Nyangatom and Dassanech so they can go and use it in their area. The challenge with the elders is that normally they are biased when negotiating for peace. The Arbor people are trained to remain neutral during these meetings.

The flow of arms from South Sudan is another difficult issue. Although as field monitors we always communicate with the Woreda and zone administrations, it is beyond the capacity of the local administrators to deal with this problem. The Nyangatom and Toposa who joined SPLA came back with the guns to sell to the cattle herders. Now everybody has access to guns and controlling the illegal arms is difficult.

Are there any examples you could give us of these peace efforts bearing fruit?

The CEWARN Mechanism, in my opinion, is an excellent initiative because the information gathered from the ground is based on the reality. But after this information is reported to the CEWERU, the response is often slow. Often, there is no immediate response from the concerned parties, be it the government or the local administration. As a field monitor I gather information from the elders, women groups, youths, local administrators and also I go to the spot where incidents happen. After I collect and report the details, people on the ground expect that I will come up with some kind of response. When it does not happen we can lose their trust. When I return later and say “help me with this information because we need it”, they say, “you always take information but then there is no response; you don’t bring us solutions”.

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There is a new CEWARN strategic plan but at this time I am not aware of the details. It is important more attention is devoted to enhancing the response mechanisms. The reason I am saying this is because there is a lot of information sent by the field monitors and the local administration that require action on higher levels of the system. The CEWERUs of the member states need to work together better and meet more frequently.

I am new here and have only been working as the field monitor for this area this past year, but I have a lot of experience doing peace work. Experience directs me to emphasise that any new strategy will be of little importance to those of us working in the field until it is implemented. The role of the field monitor should be strengthened. I think the position can be given more scope for undertaking activities with the local peace committees and the government administration. Rather than just reporting, they should be empowered to help deal with the situation.

We are making progress. The Nyangatom now live in peace with the Hamar and there is even inter-marriage now. The same has been replicated with the Dassanech and another group called the Kara in the South Omo zone. We have tried to extend the practice to Surma but due to the remoteness of the area where they reside we could not follow up the issue. Even so, they and the other small communities are willing to live in peace with the Nyangatom and their neighbours.
THE PROBLEM OF GENDER BIAS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The community approach to disarmament has been one of the country’s most successful exercises of this kind. As a field monitor and a member of the Women Peace Forum, I have participated in it and can report that several women are on record having returned these guns after they were handed over by their sons or husbands. We are happy Kenya’s CEWE-RU has documented this and we have our own documentation that we can share with others.

We engaged the police commander in charge of the disarmament process in Isiolo in eastern Kenya. We went to the camp and told him, “We know the exercise is generating some friction, including the human rights abuses that often accompany it, so how do you intend to carry it out, and what is your response to our suggestions?”

He replied, “Do you think it’s really possible to have any female police officers on board?”

ABDIA MAHAMOUD
(Interview)

Abdia Mahamoud served as CEWARNs Field Monitor for Isiolo, Kenya. She is currently the Executive Director of Isiolo Peace Link. She is a recipient of the 2012 Head of State Commendation (HSC) from former president of Kenya H.E. Mwai Kibaki for her contribution in peace building across Kenya.
We said, “why not?”

Women police officers were identified and we also suggested that community elders accompany the police to the houses because there have been incidents of rape and looting in the past. The commander proved to be very cooperative. He agreed with our proposal. We went to every village and identified appropriate elders. He also gave us his phone number in case we needed to report if an officer was engaged in any other activities other than disarmament.

Because our people know each other, they also know who deals in arms and who are the brokers. So it was prudent to bring some of them on board. When we did this, the informants identified some local Somali and their Turkana and Borana counterparts who were known to trade in arms. We put the mechanisms in place and when the disarmament exercise began, everything ran smoothly because people owned the process. I have pictures of the weapons that were returned that time, including one of a woman returning arms and receiving the certificates from the District Commissioner. There were more than thirty weapons that were returned and tested, because there is always the claim that during disarmament people return obsolete arms. The late Prof. George Saitoti, then Minister for Internal Security, presided over the handover ceremony in the company of the elders.

We are happy the CEWERU continued to support the group after the disarmament exercise. Unfortunately, to be more effective the Isiolo exercise needed to be carried out in Meru, Samburu, Marsabit, and other contiguous districts. Disarmament needs to be uniform to systematically eradicate the problem of small arms in the country. As it stands, the communities in Isiolo returned their firearms but they became vulnerable because the other communities did not return theirs. At the moment if you talk about disarmament in Isiolo, you will meet resistance because the other communities are not disarmed. A hard earned peace can be shattered by a single gun.

What is the attitude of local people towards the different forms of illicit activity including the problem of human trafficking?

Interdicting human trafficking is the government’s responsibility. How do these people pass so many barriers only to be caught in Nairobi? Although people talk of nyumba kumi (ten-house security cells) this kind of community monitoring is not something our people are ready to embrace. The people feel it’s something being imposed on them. In my view, it’s bound to fail because it requires dialogue to implement—it is a concept that is not understood well by the community. I think community policing could have worked better because it’s a matter of the equipping the
community with a policy they can work with. But those propagating the nyumba kumi initiative also feel community policing has its challenges, like when people form vigilante groups.

**Why has the security situation in Isiolo deteriorated?**

Before, people were fighting with spears. But with the proliferation of small arms the whole situation changed. It is now a major cause of the rampant insecurity in Isiolo. The flow of information is another factor. The conflict early warning system needs to be more inclusive, with systematic reporting and everybody in the mechanism making use of information. Any one should be able to report when they witness people gather in suspicious manner or young people being armed. What are the channels for sharing this information? And how can rearming groups be dismantled before they proceed with their plan? We need greater focus on information networks. This would help us tap into information flows and share the details before an incident happens.

The other variable here is that local politics has changed for the worse. The scramble for leadership and power among the different communities residing in Isiolo has disrupted the peace. Previously, the Turkana in Isiolo could not imagine getting into leadership positions because many people believed that they were ‘outsiders’ and could not represent the area. The issue of land is a major trigger of conflict in Isiolo. Within Isiolo itself, people are speculating that the government will compensate them over the LAPSSET (an infrastructure project designed to link the Kenyan port of Lamu with South Sudan and Ethiopia) and some of those positioning themselves to receive the compensation are displacing others.

The structure of peace building still excludes women from the process. There is still the attitude that a woman is a lesser person and not worthy of engaging in the peace process. The Modogashe Peace Declaration of 2001 was designed to accommodate the Samburu, the Somali, and even the Meru. I participated during one of the reviews and witnessed how the whole gender based violence issue was not mentioned anywhere. It was absent from the declaration while all the other issues were highlighted. But we insisted that a clause be included and I became a signatory to it.

**What led to the Modogashe Peace Declaration?**

The first peace meeting in 1998 addressed the conflict in the local conflict triangle including Meru. Despite the heightened tensions among communities, people felt that Kenya's Constitution did not address the issues driving the conflicts. They did not have any control mechanisms to fall back on when-
ever violence broke out. Provision of security was invested in the state with no role for local participation.

The Modogashe process started with the elders from North Eastern Province coming together. The CEWERU facilitated the first joint meeting in 2001. The people who came together discussed conflict management options but also differed on some issues. If a man is killed the compensation is 100 animals but for a woman it’s 50, and this raised human rights issues. So here we are with Islamic principles that say 100 and 50. The Samburu, in contrast, said when a man dies in conflict there should be no pay. Another round of talks was attended by human rights activists who said a soul is a soul, whether a man or a woman. These are the kind of differences we encountered.

Last August, a Somali was killed in Isiolo and his livestock stolen. The Turkana and Somali elders came together and decided to refer to the declaration and see what to do as far it was concerned. They found that if a man was killed, a hundred camels or cows were to be paid. The Turkana felt this was too much, and they asked for a middle ground by suggesting the hundred livestock include donkeys. The debate went on and on. In the last review meeting in Garissa, the Muslims from the North said they should proceed according to their own customs, so that if one party is Muslim let them handle it within their own tradition. This is what’s now playing out in Isiolo among the different communities. It was a mutual agreement.

There were also differences on how to deal with cases of stolen livestock. The initiative was spearheaded by the CEWERU in conjunction with the government. It has brought an element of sanity to pastoral conflicts. There is another agreement in Marsabit called the Maikona Declaration that addresses specific issues on the border between Kenya and Ethiopia. My role in these fora is to speak on behalf of women. I see myself in a leadership position in the county whenever there is a need for dialogue or negotiation. We give talks in schools as well as to parents when there is need to promote tolerance in schools or to address youth radicalisation.

I was in Kigali recently. We went to present our case studies and to explain what we do in schools when such problems arise. I talked about the contribution of women leadership in bringing peace to schools and mediating interreligious conflicts. What we do in Isiolo is what Muslims call dawa, a form of context-specific peace preaching that fosters interreligious tolerance among our communities.
Would you say that CEWARN’s work in Isiolo is having an impact?

I have seen things move beyond pastoralist conflict to include issues like religious and urban conflicts and the issue of small arms. We also address the new frictions that come with devolution and issues of gender based violence. The mechanism is broadening its focus to include a number of things including the financing of conflict.

One weakness is that peace workers require more training in gender based violence, governance issues, and methods for controlling small arms. These are thing that should be looked at by the CEWARN family to ensure that the monitors are familiar with the specifics of these particular areas. In respect to the problem of visibility, while some people may simply see me as Abdia, others do not associate with me because I’m a woman. So we are trying to move forward to ensure greater visibility for women at the county and local levels.

What is CEWARN’s role on the ground?

The first mandate is to relay information related to impending conflicts through our alerts—conflict prevention in short. In my collaboration with counterparts in Samburu, we have managed to use information that we shared with local authorities in order to help de-escalate some conflicts. One example is an incident in 2010 when the CEWARN monitor in Samburu relayed information about a raid to the CEWARN monitor in Isiolo. I relayed the same message to the local authorities. They went to the location and determined that some of the warriors were planning a raid; disengagement proceeded after two of the raiders were killed. There was another incident in 2011 where a local elder on the district peace committee relayed information about a group of young armed men gathering near a mountain called Lowangisu.

The police used a helicopter to patrol the area and prevent an attack. We also organised a temporary response centre during the last elections. Because of the experiences I’ve gained over the years from CEWARN, our CEWERU sent me to Sierra Leone to monitor elections there. We replicated some of the activities we used in Isiolo. We called every stakeholder into a tent together with the police, the District Administration, humanitarian organisations and other stakeholders. We formed a small reporting and response centre. The District Peace Committee was feeding the centre with information that was going to all the polling stations. Whenever there was conflict in any area the centre would get information and people concerned like the police would go to maintain peace. The initiative worked, and I was proud to be associated with it.
In addition to the standard monitoring and reporting for CEWARN I also track the state’s efforts to control firearms. We are looking at it from different perspectives and we, in civil society, are planning to digitise their register in tandem with periodic inspections of the weapons. Some former police reservists originally possessed a gun for years pass it on to the sons before they die, who then pass it on to their sons. So we are now dealing with the weapons by ensuring when a reservist dies, the guns are returned to the government.

How many field monitors are active in Isiolo?

I’m currently the only one. I think this limits our effectiveness. The area is vast. I am in charge of two sub-counties, and another is left out at this time. Employing more monitors so someone is in charge of Garbatula would enhance coordination in Isiolo, which could serve as a model for other counties due to its diverse mix of ethnicities and faiths. We also need satellite phones for reporting from remote locations. It also helps when the field monitors from the IGAD countries get to meet. Gatherings like the meeting held in Nakuru last year are productive and allow us to share our experiences, which is why they should be convened on a periodic basis.

Do you ever feel intimidated or pressured because of the nature of your work, like when people are obstructing the disarmament program?

There are problems when people question the capability of a woman to bring peace. Apart from that I haven’t faced other major obstacles in the course of my work. There are problems highlighted by other monitors of maintaining credibility when there is no response to an alert, or in the case of recommendations that are not acted upon.

At times, it is difficult to work through the CEWERU, the CEWARN secretariat and the National Research Institute. It is the duty of the field monitor to cultivate relations with the local network and authorities and to maintain good rapport, but sometimes it is hard to follow up and act on the alerts due to the gaps in transmission. The fact that community-based monitors are part of the mechanism makes a big difference despite such problems. The CEWERU has otherwise been very supportive, and I am proud to report that I received a Presidential Commendation, the Amani Award, in recognition of our work.
A Perspective on
The 2009 Maikona/Dukana Peace Accord

The Maikona-Dukana Peace Accord is an example of how local dynamics underpin peace-building initiatives between pastoralist communities. The progression leading to the pact was initiated by elders from the town of Dillo in Ethiopia and Dukana in Kenya in November 2008, resulting in an agreement to halt hostilities and to provide compensation for stolen animals. The Declaration, agreed upon in July of 2009, was a spontaneous breakthrough at the local level that galvanised the peace process leading to the formal accord.

After trust was restored between the communities, local leaders agreed to try to extend their mandate along the entire border area where both communities reside. This coincided with the revitalization and creation of CEWARN peace committees in the border woredas, the Ethiopian equivalent of Kenya’s sub-counties. This enabled the local communities to institutionalise their peace building efforts. These areas were

NURA DIDA (Interview)

Nura Dida is a Borana elder well recognised for his peace building efforts along the Ethiopia-Kenya border where there have been recurring inter-communal conflicts along the common border.
included in the November 2009 cross-border peace meeting that was convened by CEWARN in Moyale, Ethiopia.

The numerous peace processes led to the adoption of resource sharing agreements. In Kenya there is sufficient grazing ground but frequent water shortages, while in Ethiopia there is a shortage of grazing ground but sufficient water. Following the Maikona peace gathering and the revitalisation of CEWARN local peace committees, Borana livestock from Dillo and surrounding kebele (community associations) began travelling long distances, sometimes as far as the Hurri Hills inside Kenya, to access grazing areas. Following heavy rainfall and the flooding of ponds at Badhuhuri, Kenya in 2010, Borana communities took their livestock to Ethiopia. They returned during the 2010-2011 drought, migrating deep into the interior as far as Yabello in search of pasture.

The Maikona/Dukana peace process succeeded because of the cross-border linkages that were restored after a long period of conflict that had separated the communities. The agreement has brought the communities closer and provided an opportunity for them to interact and share resources peacefully. Before the agreement these communities frequently attacked each other. This led to the loss of many lives, including the schoolchildren who died in the 2005 Turbi Massacre in Kenya. Since the conclusion of the agreement, even when incidents happen, they are contained and no longer assume massacre-level proportions. Instead, communities seek solutions by referring to the agreement.

Another success story is a peace agreement between the Konso and Borana communities. They have been enjoying peace and have done so with full commitment. The fact that the communities have used the agreement as an instrument to deal with conflicts and hold culprits responsible makes me happy. In all of these initiatives, our role is to bring the parties together and play a facilitative role. They do the rest. They make the decisions. Another thing that’s heartening is when they decide by themselves to initiate the process without anyone having to influence them or make the decision for them. They discuss their problems openly. They also discuss and acknowledge the different roles men and women play in conflicts, and decide what each of them can do to contribute to the peace process. This also makes me very happy.

In our facilitation we challenge them to reflect on the high cost of conflicts. So now they are more aware and more prepared to sort out their problems than before.
In the Bale area, for instance, Oromo and Somali communities have been sharing resources peacefully since a peace agreement was concluded between them at Medolabu three years ago. They even share relief supplies and have not experienced conflict since the agreement. This is because they recognise the negative impacts of conflicts and its high cost. If they did not understand it before, the escalation of conflicts and new firearms raised the stakes and increased the suffering and horror that conflicts bring. They are now more receptive to reconciliation. This is the reason the peace processes are bearing more fruit now than before.

The fact that we acknowledge there has been progress does not mean there are no more problems. What is different now is that when one person was killed in the past, it led whole communities into conflict. But now when a killing occurs, it is the culprit who is held accountable rather than drawing in the communities. What is now required, in my view, is continuous follow up. With sustained efforts there will be even more significant improvements. There is always at least one bad person in a community; there is always someone ready to provoke a conflict. There are people who benefit from a conflict.

This is why follow-up is essential. Even though new conflicts will erupt, I don’t expect them to be as bad and as unmanageable as in the past. Collaboration has really made a difference. CEWARN contributed by bringing the two governments together—which proved to be an invaluable addition to the peace process. The inclusion of all members of the community and local government officials strengthened the accord, which received further reinforcement through the sports tournament and the complementary activities that were held later.

While it is also important to make use of elders and other influential people to educate the public against killings, these efforts should also target the youth and women. Women, children, and the youth suffer the most when conflict breaks out. At the same time, women play a central role in both fuelling and resolving conflicts. The provocative role they can play in conflicts should not be underestimated. For instance, when you look at cycles of revenge, if a woman’s relative is killed, she will incite her husband and relatives to revenge. Women do this through songs. This forces the men to rise and go to war. The man will not be respected if he does not act to protect home and community. He will be insulted through the woman’s songs.

In Teltelle, for example, a man was caught after a revenge killing. When he was asked why he did it, he said the women insulted him...
and they would not leave him alone until he acted to preserve his honour. By the same measure, women are also powerful in influencing the men to stop fighting. They tell them, “the fighting is not good for us and our children and our youth—we are all suffering”. Some of them may even be pregnant or with young children, which motivates them to stop their husbands and their sons from fighting. Women occupy a central position that deserves acknowledgement. Their voices are influential because those who get killed in conflicts are their sons, husbands, fathers and brothers.

When the women speak on these things in the peace meetings, the men accept what they say. The Kenyan women came with messages of peace when we convened a peace meeting in Yabello as part of the Maikona/Dukana peace process. They composed songs, sang, and mourned the people lost in the conflict, including the cabinet ministers and other government officials who died in a plane crash on their way to a peace meeting in Marsabit. They composed songs about the lives lost, mentioning the officials by name.

These songs were later released on cassette for wider distribution. When the women sing these songs in peace meetings, men and women start crying and lamenting the cost of the conflict. This can change the minds of hardened warriors and elders with bad intentions who incite them.

We need sustained collaboration with CEWARN to protect the peace like one protects a valuable property. This is because a single person is capable of doing so much damage that many people working together may not be able to repair it. In particular, we hope that CEWARN continues to facilitate the operations of local peace committees and encouraging local administration officials to meet every three months in order to share information and situation reports. This facilitates their ability to take early action whenever problems arise. Having government officials present in these meetings also prepares them to respond to issues that are beyond the capacity of the committees.

When new frictions arise, a single event can divide communities, placing the peace at risk. Such incidents pose a threat to agreements like the Maikona-Dukana Accord, which is why such cross-border agreements should be revisited on a periodic basis. Meetings like the two-day summit held in Ethiopia in 2017 that revalidated the original declaration are important, but they also require the support of institutional arrangements on the ground.
The History of Somalia's CEWERU Establishment

Somalia was a signatory of the CEWARN Protocol but the long-standing civil war and the absence of a strong central government delayed the establishment of the national Conflict Early Warning Unit (CEWERU) until 2010. The USAID-funded PEACE II program, a cross-border conflict mitigation program targeting remote border areas, assisted the establishment of the CEWERU by enabling Somali civil society organisations to collaborate with their counterparts in Ethiopia and Kenya. The national CEWERUs of Kenya and Ethiopia also played instrumental roles in the establishment and operationalisation of the Somalia CEWERU.

In 2009, Djibouti offered to host the first consultative meeting on the establishment of the Somalia CEWERU. The meeting bringing together government and civil society representatives was shifted to Ethiopia at the last minute. It was held in April 2009 and was attended by 37 representatives of government institutions including the police, intelligence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and civil society. I was the Director of the Soma-
lia Youth Development Network (SOYDEN), an NGO that was doubling as CEWARN’s National Research Institute (NRI) for Somalia. CEWARN subsequently appointed me to serve as the first national country coordinator for Somalia.

Once we had firm proposals on the modalities of establishment of the CEWERU, we received support from Ambassador Abduselam Hajiliben, who was the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time. His first hand knowledge of the CEWARN protocol and Somalia’s interest in it as a signatory helped move the process forward. In collaboration with the Peace II program we proceeded to organise a meeting in the border areas so key government officials could gain appreciation of the situation in the border areas. I travelled with the Ambassador to Garissa, where we met with Community Working Groups (CWGs) and other NGOs doing peace work in Somalia.

Their presentations impressed the Ambassador, who said “all these things are happening in the border zone, yet we are not aware of them.” Ambassador Hajiliben offered us full support, leading to the launching of the Somalia CEWERU in Nairobi on June 10, 2010. We also elected the National Steering Committee, which consisted of 17 people representing the Ministries of Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs, the intelligence service, religious leaders, elders, as and women representatives. The Steering Committee shifted to Mogadishu and continues to work with the Peace II program and peace committees from the border areas.

**Establishment of the Local Peace Committees**

Pact’s Peace II program supported peace practitioners to conduct a wide-ranging action research program in 2011. The practitioners also received a small grant for peace building activities including assessment of the local peace infrastructure in Somali border zones. The objective was to identify the hot spots on the Somalia–Kenya border and to set up district peace committees in order to improve the collaboration between Kenya DPCs and Somalia DPCs.

We set up seven local peace committees: four in Gedo and three in Lower Juba regions, areas that share borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. The methodology comprised training researchers who live in the area to make assessments and identify peace actors in these areas. The CEWERUs of Ethiopia and Kenya sent experts to assist in the trainings of researchers and peace workers, who learned about the work of peace committees as well as the work of CEWARN and the national CEWERU. They conducted elections for the committee members and started the work of creating strong linkages across
the border areas. There are now twenty-seven active peace committees mandated to operationalise the early warning—early response system, including the seven border committees established in 2011. In 2012, UNDP supported setting up another 16 district peace committees including those of Mogadishu, Beledweyn, Jowhar, Baidoa and Kismayu. The Mogadishu peace committees mainly focus on community safety and the reduction of armed violence. They are also working with other NGOs to promote job creation for the youth and rehabilitation of former militia in Mogadishu, although their primary responsibility is the early warning work.

All peace committees are linked with the CEWARN mechanism and other institutions within and outside the country in addition to actively engaging with other stakeholders like NGOs and other institutions in their areas. We had to initially lobby and advocate for them to work in partnership with the government institutions especially security institutions of government. Currently, we are happy to have well-recognised, community-owned peace institutions in these 27 localities.

All local peace committees hold regular meetings in their localities and convene annually in Mogadishu to consult with the national steering committee. This helps keep the members of the national steering committee informed about the security dynamics in the border areas and to provide response measures as necessary.

**The Function of the Peace Committees**

The peace committees work through two parallel channels. One is the peace committee structure from the grassroots up to the Somalia national CEWERU, and the other is government security institutions. But in most of these areas the government security institutions are either weak or non-existent. So at times, the peace committees end up acting as proxies on behalf of the government in dealing with peace and security and to represent the community. Based on my experience traveling across Somalia, peace has relatively increased in areas with local peace committees in comparison with the areas where there are no local peace committees, especially in areas with recurring conflicts. The Baidoa peace committee is a good example of the model in terms of effectiveness and impact. Recognition by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) provided a basis for mutual collaboration and now the peace committee is acting as the link between the community, local administration and AMISOM. The communities often use the peace committees to raise issues requiring attention and this has become common in every district.
We ensure local legitimacy of peace committees by facilitating the election of members. After identifying worthy candidates in the districts we share our findings with the local authorities. Then we invite people who are drawn from villages in the district to represent different sectors and groups. Youth and the internally displaced (IDPs), for instance, are examples of the kind of categories requiring inclusion. These representatives then proceed to conduct the committee elections. The process of committee formation can take two weeks including time for assessment and training in addition to the election.

The assessment insures members are elected from people active in peace building and who also have a good image within the community. They undergo three days of training to understand the peace committee Terms of Reference and the basics of conflict management. After the training, we cluster participants into groups. All the women gather together, the elders do the same as do the religious leaders, youth, private sector representatives, and IDPs. The process helps us to elect people that understand that they represent their sector not their village or their clan. The process allows the local authorities to recognise and engage with peace committee as a legitimate, legal entity. This reminds us of the importance of local/traditional institutions in Somalia. Even though the Somalia government collapsed in 1991, there was no vacuum of authority in the society. Somali society has internal structures that continued to function while the elders filled the gap. Most local problems are sorted out through customary law.

Somalia is primarily a pastoralist society operating under two justice systems: a formal one and a traditional one. The communities have always trusted customary law more than the formal courts. Somalis accord a lot of importance to community-based mechanisms that confer strength and legitimacy on the peace committees. For years there was no stable government in Somalia and the clan militia groups were controlling many border towns. On the other side, the Kenyan government was not willing to negotiate with the militia groups in control of areas along the border in Somalia. The peace committees in Kenya and Somalia border areas provided the bridge allowing the two countries to work together to deal with cross-border issues.

This being said, there has been some resistance from local customary leaders to the setting up of peace committees in some areas. Some of the committee members think they can replace this group since they have been through an election process while the local elders have not. This happened in Beledweyn in the central Hiraan region. And the reason it happened was that there was an elder council set up by one of the former governments. Several of the
elders thought that the peace committees would challenge the elder council on the community level.

Towards the end of 2011, two Kenyan teachers crossed the border from Mandera to Beled Hawo. Al Shabaab controlled Beled Hawo at the time; when they crossed the border on their own Al Shabaab arrested them. The next day the leading newspaper in Nairobi published the headline, ‘Al Shabaab Kidnaps two Kenyan teachers’.

As the Kenyan Defence Forces mobilised to respond to the incident, the District Commissioner of Mandera communicated with the local Peace Committee of Mandera to determine what had happened. They contacted the Beled Hawo peace committee, who reported that Al Shabaab arrested the two teachers on suspicion they may be spies. This was communicated to the Mandera peace committee and the local administration.

The District Commissioner of Mandera could not negotiate for their release as the Government of Kenya recognises Al Shabaab as a terrorist group. So the peace committee of Beled Hawo asked the Al Shabaab leader to clarify the issue. The two peace committees were then able to work together on the issue and secured the release of the two teachers.

**Observations on the National CEWERU’s Role**

The above-mentioned achievements are encouraging. Unfortunately, the collaboration between the CEWERU and its peace committees on the one hand and AMISOM and the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) is very limited despite our efforts to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship. We shared a conflict mapping and analysis report on the Central Region with the KDF commanders in Jubaland.

We are keen to engage with AMISOM to ensure sustainable peace and stability in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab. There is the need to fill the vacuum with peace structures in areas liberated from Al Shabaab. Liberating areas from Al Shabaab and ensuring security will not succeed without mechanisms for sustaining lasting peace and reconciliation in these areas. This is why AMISOM and other actors’ in Somalia need to be prepared to address the roots of clan-related conflict.

The international community’s focus on political stability at the national level requires active support for the process of peace building and reconciliation at the communal level. CEWARN is well placed in terms of learning from our unique challenges and from some of the unique initiatives undertaken by the national CEWERU. For example, the national CEWERU has
developed materials for healing the trauma and breaking the cycle of violence in post-conflict situations. These Somali language materials are a very useful tool for addressing post-conflict problems and are being translated for use in other countries like South Sudan.

Somalia is a unique situation that differentiates the mandate of our CEWERU from its counterparts in Ethiopia and Kenya. AMISOM is active on the ground, while IGAD is implementing other programs through the IGAD facilitation office but unfortunately there is no coordination in the conflict zones and the parties are not exchanging information. We have submitted requests to CEWARN for budgetary support to enable us to introduce peace structures and capacitate local communities on peace building. We will need that support as up to now the Somalia government has not been able to allocate funds for CEWERU operations.

There is little continuity on the government level and the frequent reshuffles of government officials in Somalia and in the cabinet is part of the problem. Improvement of direct communication and collaboration with AMISOM is a high priority. We hope to receive CEWARN’s support in establishing this given the complementary function of early warning for AMISOM’s mission. IGAD is supporting the formation of regional states in Somalia. That is an area where we feel the need for a conflict prevention and mitigation dimension and therefore CEWARN’s close involvement is acute.

We face many practical challenges in participating in CEWARN activities, including the difficulties of traveling outside the country to attend these activities. Sometimes we feel excluded and not taken seriously because we are an inter-governmental agency based in a failed state. Yet there is arguably no other country in the IGAD region where CEWARN can potentially achieve such a significant impact as here in Somalia. This makes the country an ideal test case providing multiple opportunities for CEWARN to test its methodologies and to apply the early warning model to new and existing threats.

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Managing cross-border conflicts in Djibouti

I have been working with the National Research Institute (NRI) since the end of 2006 in my capacity as the CEWARN Country Coordinator. We are a small program but have nevertheless realised some important achievements. The RRF (Rapid Response Fund) has been set up and operational since 2008. We have also implemented three projects and have actively assisted in the resolution of conflicts. We file assessment reports and evaluations of what’s going on. Conflicts in this region always involve issues arising between the country’s two communities, the Afar and the Somali. Most incidents involve the theft of cattle and the occasional cases of physical violence.

We have set up local peace committees in Dikhil and Asa-ila, and trained them on Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR). These help to bring all the knowledge to the traditional chiefs and local leaders. We’ve discussed with the various issues in the province.

Ilmi Awaleh Elabeh served as the CEWARN national country coordinator for Djibouti.
and the local stakeholders and pointed out that the real cause of conflict in the region is competition over resources. There is really no infrastructure in this area except for Asa-ila, and no wells from which to draw water. During the dry seasons, the two communities graze in the dry places with little water, and most conflicts arise at these points. People from either Ethiopia or Djibouti who also have families across the border tend to commit most of the thefts. They steal livestock and then escape with them across the border. On the Ethiopian side, the cattle market is rarely profitable, so they bring an animal and sell or just kill it and eat it on the way.

This tends to happen only in the Dikhil cluster because the two communities live together there, unlike other areas. In the north the community is more homogeneous on both sides of the border. There are, for example, the Issa from Ethiopia who enter Djibouti and take animals belonging to the Issa on this side of the border. This is a problem particular to the Dikhil-Asa-ila region because both communities, the Issa and the Afar, straddle the international border. The Issa know that the other tribe, the Afar shall be accused instead. The same is true for the Afar on the other side.

The frequency of these incidents, however, has decreased since we became actively involved. Consequently, the number of cattle being stolen has also decreased since 2010 in pace with the many training sessions held and resolutions concluded. The leaders of the two communities have been sensitised and know that the theft usually comes from outside. The conflict resolution workshops for the community are generating results. In one incident, a nomad with his goats spotted another herder walking with five camels. He recognised that the camels belonged to members of the Afar, and he called upon his community to return them.

The absence of field monitors to report friction on the Ethiopian-Djibouti border is compensated for by the fact that there is an autonomous regional administration in Dikhil. The two administrative counterparts coordinate to solve the problems immediately. This facilitates collaboration but it is not always as efficient as it could be. What is important on our side is that the governmental authorities are aware of the problem and have sensitised people to deal with their issues and to grasp the scale of the problem. They are convinced that a given incident will be solved sooner or later, although it cannot be completely eradicated, it will be managed better than before. We have a trans-border committee, but until now the CEWERU was not part of it. But the Prefect is a member of the CEWERU, and this gives him authority to talk to his counterpart in order to resolve
the problem. The custom officers, the army chiefs, the police and the ministries of commerce and foreign affairs are represented on the committee. The fact that all these representatives are part of this committee helps make the leaders aware of what’s going on, and this acts as an incentive to follow up on developmental projects and humanitarian assistance when required.

There are traditional conflict resolution mechanisms but they are not effective if governmental representatives are not taking part in the consultations. There are no peace agreements between the two communities; what forces them to come together is the intervention of a higher authority. Otherwise they are suspicious of one another. Nomads do not easily forget what happened in the past, even if it was many years ago. There is also influence from political parties, especially around election season. Political parties typically favour one community over the other, which aggravates pre-existing tensions.

Until late 2012, the CEWERU did not have a formal presence. It came to life in 2013 through a presidential decree. We consider this to be a promising development. As a result, our people in the field are now mandated to sensitise leaders and their communities. Even though the CEWERU now has legal status, it still has problems of finance and insufficient means to act. Another weakness derives from the fact that most of the administrative personnel we have invested in through training and sensitisation have been transferred, and their replacements do not have a good grasp of the problems we are dealing with.

Despite all these difficulties, we developed an action plan based on CEWARN’s expanded operational framework. We recognise that the action plan requires adequate funding. We are also focusing on research and documentation that was not done in the past. The most vital aspect of the desired capacity building is the need for social services and amenities to reduce competition over resources like water and schools that will encourage herders to settle and reduce their movements. It is hard to reach the nomads on the range in order to provide them with assistance and basic infrastructure.

We have nevertheless been able to solve many conflicts caused by the theft of cattle and camels. In many cases, the return of stolen animals has preserved the peace but the work takes long because of the lack of resources. Negotiations between the two conflicting parties involve bringing some gifts to create a conducive atmosphere before kicking off discussions. There are two cases we have not been able to solve.
MANAGING CROSS-BORDER CONFLICTS IN DJIBOUTI

The murder of two people from the Afar and Issa in 2008 and 2009 is still feeding suspicions and contributing to the latent conflict between the two communities. The traditional conflict management mechanisms are not working in this case because of the lack of trust. The government claims it happened across the border, and that they have no authority in the matter.

Although limited financial resources are a major constraint for the effective functioning of the Djibouti national CEWERU, the local peace committee we set up in Dikhil is operational. All the community leaders have been sensitised and are aware of CEWARN’s work. The field monitors have been in place since 2007 and execute their jobs properly.

DISCLAIMER:
The designations in this map do not imply the opinion on the part of IGAD concerning the legal status of any country, or the delineation of its frontiers of boundaries.
This fifth section concludes the Compendium with several perspectives, the first presented by a discussion of CEWARN’s history and restart in Sudan. The next chapter reports on the issues facing CEWARN in the new nation of South Sudan. Like the Somalia account in the preceding section, the Sudan chapters report on some of the organisation’s unfinished business. In the two interviews that follow, S.K. Maina provides an account of the early days of CEWARN while El Ghassim Wane highlights how the model has provided a template both for other African regional organisations, and for new threats like the spread of Ebola. The Compendium ends with a historically nuanced vision of the IGAD region’s future, and concludes with a statement from the Director outlining CEWARN’s next phase of development.
All the CEWARN national steering committees (or CEWERU) are designed to do the same thing in terms of early warning, security, and development. But conditions vary, sometimes wildly, and in terms of the member nations’ internal development, Sudan probably qualifies as the outlier among the countries active in CEWARN. The Sudan achieved independence in 1960 with the potential of becoming one of Africa’s wealthiest and most influential nations. Endemic conflict instead compromised the country’s developmental potential. This is not surprising. The Sudan is an expansive territory with poor infrastructure and multiple ethnic communities. A wide spectrum of cultural orientations complicated the country’s formidable logistical and political challenges. It gained independence beset with deep-seated regional dichotomies and equivalent socio-economic divisions.

Two wars of secession waged by the Anya Nya and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation
Movement (SPLM) have tended to overshadow both John Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ vision and the region’s structurally embedded insecurity. Instead of alleviating the conflict constraining Sudan’s potential role within the greater Horn of Africa region, independence for the South aggravated the internal frictions beleaguering Africa’s largest state. CEWARN officially came into existence in Khartoum and promptly inherited one of IGAD’s most intractable problems.

South Sudan’s independence in 2011 disrupted the rollout of CEWARN’s early warning mechanism based on the CEWARN Protocol of 2002. But the vagaries experienced along the way are also emblematic of the organisation’s unique developmental pathway. CEWARN’s Sudanese project is on track despite the interruptions and shifting system parameters. In this chapter, two Sudanese diplomats share their experiences to provide some perspectives on past developments, present activities, and future prospects for the organisation.

Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar

I became the national conflict coordinator for Sudan when CEWARN moved to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs in 2006, a position I continue to hold. I attended many workshops during the time and made two visits to the South during the transitional period leading up to secession. We travelled across the region: from Juba to Torit and from Torit to Kapoeta. The objective at this time was to meet the people responsible for the peace process in the South. Security was always a problem. We were to travel by convoy but it was delayed so we took a helicopter to Torit, then we travelled by bus and by other means. We met the Governor and after discussion we were in agreement about the nature of our work with CEWARN.

During the first trip, we met with government officials and during the second we met with civil society representatives. The main objective of these missions was to determine CEWARN’s areas of operation. The dynamics of conflict in this area involve groups and alliances. The Didinga are with the Jie their allies in Uganda, and then there is the Toposa who are allied to other groups at different times, like the Mursi on the other side of the Ethiopian border. In Kenya there are the Pokot and Turkana. The groups have different strategies.

The Toposa, for example, are known to travel long distances inside Sudan. They raid livestock and they sell the cattle locally but they never go across the border with them. They enter an area in stealthy fashion, but do not encroach upon their allies. These alliances are very important. They can move very long distances but
they do so with a plan. They bring food with them that they stash in different places so they have supplies for when they come back in the same direction. They leave cattle with their friends, a few here and there, and then they return and utilise them when they need to. The alliances do not extend to all the groups of course—the Turkana and Pokot, for example, have their own systems on the other side of the border.

It’s all very complicated; alliances shift, and the briefing was very informative. The fact of the matter is that it is clearly necessary for the sake of conflict prevention to know and understand the alliances among these groups. This was one important factor. A second challenge was to know the differences in their culture and how their culture can change over time. This represents a big challenge for the monitors working in the area.

**What was it like coming from Khartoum and dealing with these issues while at the same time coping with the North-South divide?**

This is part of what we do, and at the same time it was something totally different and interesting. We had some prior experience in this area. There was a large roundtable conference in Khartoum that was convened in 1965 to address the same kind of issues on the national level. We looked at the issues of contention in the South with a view to finding a common solution. The commonalities between our governments’ mandate and CEWARN’s mission remain.

The issues of cross-border interaction, for example, are critical to the work CEWARN does. This means we have to be cognisant of the economic and political relationships between different areas. It is something we observe as diplomats, and was a critical area of interest before the civil war. The position of pastoralists in the borderlands is a longstanding concern and the problems between the Turkana and neighbouring herders across the border at that time led the government to deploy the military in the area. This is the kind of problem CEWARN was created to resolve. The issues go back to the colonial era. The Toposa claim that the area we now call the Ilemi triangle is theirs; it has always been their land. But the administration based in Kenya allowed the Turkana to move in. This led to periodic clashes where as many as three hundred people can die in a single incident.

The Turkana were not resident in the Ilemi Triangle before. They occasionally accessed it for grazing, but their home was always in northwestern Kenya and they only came into Ilemi to stay while President Daniel Moi was in office. This has created a lot of problems for the Toposa, especially during
the dry season. It is around 136 kilometers from one side to the other border. It took us two hours to drive across this area. The Toposa move from inside South Sudan into the area during the dry season and when they meet the Turkana, there are often clashes. Skirmishes can occur on a day-to-day basis during the dry season. There are dynamics at work that governments do not deal with so well; for long the local communities managed things better among themselves. It is obviously something that someone who is actively working in the area will understand better than someone based in a distant capital.

We have a similar problem in Hala’ib, an area of around 18,000 square kilometers in the north of Sudan. It is sometimes called the Hala’ib triangle, a region that was part of Sudan and administered by Sudan since independence but taken by Egypt in 1992. It is another of those complicated stories.

As CEWARN national coordinators, we belong to something called the National Research Institutes, or the NRIs. We share all our reports with the CEWERUs. The CEWERUs convene steering committees that we participate in. CEWARN is intergovernmental, but it is also governmental. I am a government employee. I am also the national coordinator in the CEWARN system. Like myself, the assistant national coordinator, field monitors, and other support staff are all part of the same system. But we work for the CEWERU that is inter-governmental. There is a system for coordination that’s spans CEWARN, the CEWERU, and the governments.

Does it work well?

That’s the idea, but sometimes the reality is more complicated. The government is concerned with secrecy and this can be a bit obsessive at times. It’s a shared tendency that at times affects the partner organisations participating in cross-border communications. They are supposed to operate independently but then they are told to report directly to the headquarters and the government. This leads to delayed responses.

All of this refers to the time before the separation. After separation, everything changed. Now our concern is about the border problem between the North and the South in addition to the usual pastoralist conflicts. Our pastoralist communities living on the northern side have always moved into what is now the South. Modern developments are impacting on this arrangement, and the mix of issues are discussed in an article I wrote on the issues called Oil and Pastoralism in Sudan.

Investments like oil production in these settings require trade-offs. If we can better involve the pastoralists in our negotiations over the re-
Sustaining any solution requires the involvement of CEWARN. The model is designed for monitoring cross-border interactions. The greater problem is how to get the two governments involved on the ground. This is a prerequisite for CEWARN to become operational in this zone. Again, there is a trade-off. If we can get all the stakeholders involved, solving the pastoralist conflicts becomes easy. There is a pastoralist problem and there is the government problem but we have a political problem between the north and the south that is much more difficult than the pastoralist—government problem. Getting the governments to come together over this border is much more difficult to resolve. There are issues on each side. Do we use the pastoralist problem as the entry point for resolving the government problem, or is it the other way around?

Information drives the process. Of course the pastoralist problems link up with the political problems and all of these forces link up with the problem of the South and the North in Sudan. There are some ten areas that are disputed; if questions of these areas cannot be fixed then the pastoralist conflicts aligned with them also cannot be resolved. Many of the larger challenges are to be found on higher scales of the system. Ceding sovereignty is not the real problem; the actual issue is one of security and how this undermines confidence among the member states. It is easier to sort out a conflict among pastoralists on the ground than to deal with differences on this scale.

To do justice to CEWARN and its development we have to look at the model in terms of the process, which has, for the most part, been a bottom up phenomenon. Having said that, we know most of the blockages in respect to conflict are higher up. Despite the arguably more complex issues of operationalising CEWARN in Sudan, it appears that all or most of them were overtaken by the larger matter of the division following the separation of South Sudan.

Abdelrahim Ahmed Khalil

The pastoralist areas are a major focal point of the north-south border conflict, so solving the conflicts arising there is part of the larger regional problem. The insecurity caused by the militias is a bigger problem than the pastoralists themselves. Controlling the militias, which may include pastoralist fighters, is the larger priority. That is to say, the pastoralists are actually a sub-set of the larger problem. Almost all the conflicts in Sudan are by definition cross-border. We are a large country with very lengthy boundaries. The South may be one source of cross-border conflict but there
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are the same difficulties in northern Darfur, eastern Darfur, and Kordofan. The militias fighting the government are a source of insecurity in all these places.

The demarcation of the north-south border is another source of friction. The North says the border is 2,010 kilometers; but the South claims the border is 300 kilometers longer. The North treats the border as more or less a straight line, but the South claims that it is uneven, in other words not a straight line but one that zigzags in a number of places. A zigzag line is longer than a straight one and the pockets of land where it zigzags are disputed.

So we have the militia problem, we have the border problem, and we have the pastoralist problem all operating together. Which one comes first? When one settles down then we go to the next one, but naturally one cannot start with the pastoralist problem. For the pastoralist problem we have to do something, but to do something in this case means a lot of work. We have to bring them together in meetings, we have to appoint coordinators, we may have to do some kind of environmental rehabilitation, and finally, we have to deal with the across-border dimension. But presently we cannot operate in cohesion with our counterparts in the South. This delays everything in Sudan.

Sudan is a very unique case with its own distinct variations. There are many kinds of conflicts to address in addition to the cross-border ones. There are communal conflicts, environmental conflicts, resource-based conflicts, farmer-herder conflicts, and internal pastoralist conflicts. There are many complications. The role of the African Union and IGAD is to resolve conflicts among the Member States. This does not necessarily mean resolving conflicts within the Member States. The priority of the AU is to deal with cross-border conflicts and not internal ones, and you can see where this leaves us in Sudan. This is part of the reason why CEWARN’s progress in Sudan is lagging behind. Without solving the larger problem, it will be very difficult to resolve the pastoralist dilemma. In theory there is the mandate, but it cannot be put into operation.

The protocol is there, but so are the intra-state problems. The objective truth is that the progress of CEWARN has been effectively short-circuited by the separation of the North and South into two different countries. CEWARN had a plan to look at the Sudan conflict; during the transitional period the relationship between the South and the North could be described as a case of two systems within one state. It was similar to the situation in the former Yugoslavia involving the Serbs and the Bosnians, again two systems within one state. The
cross-border issue is important but not as important as the question of sovereignty for each side. Before the separation it was much easier to deal with cross-border pastoralist conflict. This continued to be the situation during the period between 2006 and 2011—one state but two systems.

It functioned up to 2011 reasonably well, before independence for the South led to a new system based on two states. We ended up with two competing sovereign states. Subsequently, the focus of the government in Khartoum shifted away from cross-border conflicts.

Mohammed Abdul Ghaffur
Up to the time of the separation, development of the CEWERU progressed reasonably well. But then the segment of the Karamoja cluster that was the focus of Sudan’s participation in the regional organisation and remained with the South. Not surprisingly, progress for the Sudan CEWERU started to decline at this point. There was supposed to be identification of new conflict areas for the North, but until now this has not happened. We were also thinking something could be done on the border with Eritrea where there are problems of cattle rustling and other cross-border conflicts but nothing was done to address this in the end. So we were left without anything to do in our region, and the role of the Country Coordinator ended. Now it is time we revive it, appoint a new coordinator, and work with the CEWARN Secretariat to identify new areas. There is no shortage of problem areas to focus on, like northern Bahr Al Ghazal to name one.

We need to revive the national mechanisms. In Sudan there was a national committee to get things going in the beginning and the two of us happened to serve on it. We established the national early warning mechanism according to the blueprint. Now we need to reactivate the CEWERU, identify reporting areas, set-up the local structures, and to move forward in general. We have to return to the border zones, specifically the conflicts occurring across the borders with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and South Sudan. The AU has actually asked all member states to do this.

Abdelrahim Ahmed Khalil
The new border zone with the South is now the most important for managing pastoralist conflicts. We need to reinvigorate the National Research Institute and appoint a new Country Coordinator. We can do this in conjunction with the CEWERU Secretariat. When I first came to CEWARN the mechanism had already been operating for three years. The CEWERUs had been established in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and were in the process of being established in the other member states.
We participated in the meeting held to establish the strategy for the five years between 2006 and 2010. The process was set in motion and we agreed on several objectives.

The first was to improve the coordination among the neighbouring states, especially in relationship to the three clusters. It was agreed to launch the CEWERU in Sudan and that was done, along with the National Research Institute. We toured the cluster as discussed earlier, established the requisite committees, but then the progress on this front was overtaken by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement opening the way for South Sudan’s independence. We had made some progress, and there were discussions of which areas in Sudan with incidents of cross-border pastoralist conflict should be a priority, but movement forward stopped after the subsequent separation.

Another objective was to develop the capacity of the organisations and their partners. Workshops were convened and training sessions held for the peace committee members. One other objective was to widen the resource base of the mechanism. The operation depends upon two sources of funding: the first is the member states, and the second is contributions from our partners. Everyone agrees the governments need to increase their support for CEWARN.

In addition to growing the basic functionality, the creation of the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) was among the other major achievements of that period. During the 2006 meetings we discussed the need to establish a separate fund that could respond by promoting peace interventions in the conflict areas. This was done and we canvassed for funds to support peace building activities in the different clusters. So the RRF was established as an entity with its own budget and a separate operational mechanism.

Another achievement we saw as being significant was to broaden CEWARN’s relationship with the governments by fostering mutually beneficial relations with Civil Society Organisations. We were able to develop CSO partnerships in many of the conflict areas, bringing in the elders and various youth and women’s organisations. We met our objectives for the most part, although there were many challenges. We held a comprehensive evaluation, and then we sat again to discuss a new strategy framework for the post-2011 phase.

One of the largest challenges had to do with how the member states emphasised their own priorities in regard to national security, and this impacted on the effectiveness of the individual CEWERU. The location of these units within their respective government structures was especially important. In Ethi-
opia, for example, the CEWERU is located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in Kenya the National Peace and Security focal point is based in the Office of the President; and in Sudan it is parked in Humanitarian Affairs. The most successful CEWERU, from my point of view, is the one in Kenya because of the more central location of the CEWERU within the structure of the national government.

The Kenya CEWERU is able to act effectively because it can maintain close contact with the National Security Council and other government bodies. If they have a problem, they can talk to someone without many delays. The Sudan example is a case of the obverse situation. Humanitarian Affairs deals with relief, disasters, natural events, donations and funding support and does not deal directly with conflict. The Ministry’s priorities are different; the concerns are different. This is a factor that should be emphasised in tandem with the need to enhance CEWARN’s administrative and technical capacity. We need to develop or raise the competencies for the different countries to the same level. In the specific case of Sudan, we need to improve relationships with the authorities and improve accountability in order to make it more effective and more responsive. The CEWARN secretariat will have to reach out and help us realise these objectives.

Is this to say that not all the problems of the CEWERU in Sudan are due to the secession of the South?

They are actually two different issues. When we look at the effectiveness and priority of the CEWERU, it is a function of its location within the government. If you look at Kenya again, they have set up peace committees everywhere, they have a security presence on the ground and their people are for the most part supported with the proper equipment. This is not the case in Sudan. Sudan has many problems and many conflicts and not all of them are pastoralist ones. So when two communities are fighting each other in the middle of the country, that is not necessarily a concern for CEWARN.

We need to develop a new strategy for Sudan, and the mandate of the CEWERU needs to be updated. We need to amend our approach so the focus is not so much on conflict within pastoralist communities, but more on the larger problem of conflict between pastoralists and settled farmers. This issue is becoming more fractious over time. The other issue abetting local conflicts is the problem of land grabbing. In Sudan the current problems over land are predominantly due to the government’s allocation of large areas to foreign entities. The government is giving land to different interests including wealthy Gulf-based companies,
The situation across large areas of our region has been chaotic with no form of weapons control. The solution comes down to the ability of the states in the IGAD region to cooperate and coordinate actions. It is the same for the IGAD region, the region of the Great Lakes, the western Sahel, and Central Africa. There are now linkages between these areas that further encourage the circulation of small arms. One source is the zone bordering Darfur in western Sudan. Although some may see our country as the source of weapons proliferation, Sudan is actually a victim of the phenomenon, and a destination for weapons pouring in from Chad, South Sudan, and Libya. They fil-
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The question of where CEWARN is placed within the larger IGAD administrative architecture parallels the issue of the location of the CEWERUs within national governments. CEWARN is under the Director of Peace and Security in the IGAD Secretariat. I attended a series of meetings including ones with high-level Ministerial delegations and not once did I hear the name of CEWARN mentioned, or any of the issues we have discussed here mentioned at the Council of Ministers or at the Heads of State Assembly. I don’t think it is really a matter of obstruction. Maybe we should say it’s a matter of under-exposure or the message being lost within the high volume of information being reported. There are many things that come under the category of peace and security and many reports dealing with them. Sometimes CEWARN’s contribution is reduced to one paragraph in a large document.

The role of CEWARN is vulnerable to issues affecting IGAD’s membership and to bilateral relations between individual states. Maybe sometimes we are seen as part of this problem, although that is not really the case. That is not to say we have not exerted some internal influence internally within IGAD and some of its departments, including the orientation of how people view conflict and how they coordinate efforts to address it. These are not small developments within the greater scheme of things. Although appearances may suggest otherwise, in the Sudan we have made strides towards developing a new approach for managing conflict.

For the Sudan, IGAD is a very important organisation and the Sudan is a unique part of IGAD. It is a large country and in terms of conflict, it should be of very real concern and treated as a priority country. If you want to enhance regional peace, you need to elevate the CEWERU in Sudan to the level of other countries. We will have to identify the appropriate regional cluster or focal area, like Darfur, where the mechanism can be operationalised in the future. To do this you need to empower the CEWERU. We are ready to work with all the IGAD countries and with partner organisations.

The reality is we are two countries but one nation. The South Sudanese call themselves Sudanese and we call ourselves Sudanese and this is not disputed even though there are two governments. When
the clashes started between President Salva Kiir and his rival Riek Machar, it affected everyone, and set people in motion through all of the Sudan. We do not refer to those displaced by the conflict as refugees. The Khartoum government said they are all free to come here; they are all Sudanese and we deal with them like they are Sudanese.

The relevance of the mechanism is global. Its methods and approaches are tested on the ground and what has been accomplished up to this point is very credible. There is something to be said for the way managing conflict is being integrated into conventional approaches to the developmental process and not treated as something separate and operating on its own. We have done a lot to raise awareness in the clusters where CEWARN has been operating. Even in Sudan, we have done a lot of work with community-based organisations at the local level. There is a new more devolved way of dealing with cross-border issues. I think one can say we have pioneered some new ways of thinking, a form of culture change. We can see some change of viewpoint and attitude in different actors’ contribution to conflict prevention, and even in traditional sectors like the military.
CEWARN’s South Sudan CEWERU has several structures. The national steering committee is constituted from the government, representatives of civil society groups, and the security agencies plus some representatives from international bodies like the United Nation Mission for South Sudan (UNMISS). The chairperson of the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC) heads the steering committee. This is at the national level. The second is the state level, where we have a parallel committee that is headed by the peace commission coordinator who works with the state government. At the community level, we have the county peace response mechanism headed by the county commissioner, who works with local peace committees.

The county mechanism operates at the grassroots level and it is not to be confused with the Rapid Response Fund. The national government needs to prioritise issues of response. Response should be something taken very seriously at the

**Taban Charles John**

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national level, but that is not the case at this time. This is one of the reasons why most of the CEWE-RU’s work has focused on Eastern Equatoria, the area of South Sudan overlapping with the Karamoja cluster, where it has worked for eight years in conjunction with the Catholic Relief Services (CRS).

Most of the activity takes place on the ground where CEWARN staff coordinate with the RRC, or the Relief and Rehabilitation committees. The RRC commission has been active in the countryside for a long time and although it has been changing names they are still doing the same work. Most of our work is undertaken at the lower levels of the system where people have done a credible job. We do a lot of capacity-building with organisations, some with NGOs but especially the indigenous CBOs who operate within a given locality.

CEWARN’s main function is coordination and sharing of information. We also support analysis undertaken by the NRI at the Centre for Peace and Development Studies in Juba University. It is important to underscore that the nature of conflict in South Sudan is different from that in Uganda, Kenya, or Ethiopia. There is a mix of ethnic groups and most of the population is focused on their own communities. They have their own ways of doing things. The same pertains to conflicts and related issues. The situation in each area varies and although CEWARN’s early warning mechanism is based on a uniform template, the kind of local problems relevant to different regions can vary considerably. This is a key challenge faced in expansion of the model across the region.

We were expanding into Upper Nile and rolled out conflict early warning structures in Jonglei, but efforts were disrupted by the 2013 political crisis. We also initiated a similar process in Unity State, which is operating very well now and in Lake State (the former Great Lakes State), where we conducted training for the peace actors that are now active. We trained the peace workers and monitors but then conditions across this region became difficult because of the political crisis.

In Bahr al Ghazal, we are targeting the seasonal movement of nomads across the international border. The Sudd, the large wetlands region, dries up during the dry season, attracting different herders who congregate there with their animals. Cooperation among the cattle keepers is the norm but they occasionally raid each other. We are doing an assessment of the issues and how we can build on pre-existing forms of cooperation.

CEWARN is also working with us to spread the mechanism to the area of West Equatoria including the border with Democratic Re-
public of Congo. The administrative system in Congo is not as well established as the one in Uganda, and we do not enjoy the same relationship with the Congolese on information sharing. Even so, we are looking into how we can try to do something to alleviate the trauma caused by the cases of child abduction. The young children abducted by the Lords Resistance Army, for example, were isolated for years. When they grow up they are not able to reunite with their families. We can use our cross-border networks to help them.

We are also collaborating with the local authorities and our counterparts in Uganda to monitor the movement of Ambururu nomads. The Ambururu are an unusual case even by our standards. They speak a language that is different from any of the others in the region, cross the borders with little concern for national governments, entering our region from the north, sometimes travelling on horses. They look like Darfurians but they come from outside the Sudan, and as far away as western Africa. They typically come in large numbers, sell cattle to the locals, and at times they instigate conflict in the areas they pass through.

I personally met with some of these nomads. I found out when they come they don’t get any permission from the central government but they do have relations with local authorities in many areas of southern Sudan they pass through. This is an example of how the national government tends not to have effective coordination with the local authorities. This is why the government does not know what the Ambururu are doing. They come and sell their animals and go back. We completed an assessment of the issues but we were not able to act on it.

The 2013-2018 political crisis at the top of the government interrupted most of these initiatives. Eastern Equatoria remains the focus for most of our activities as a consequence. The CEWARN structures are working well in terms of data collection and timely responses, even though distance and poor infrastructure makes communication difficult. Even so, we are able to operate effectively in Eastern Equatoria compared to Jonglei, where it is difficult for the local government and the state authority to act in a coordinated manner because the region does not enjoy the same level of infrastructure as elsewhere. They lack information and even if they do have the relevant information, events can still spin out of control. If something occurs in Equatoria, by contrast, the information reaches the county commissioner quite swiftly. It is easy for them to mobilise, where it is hard at the national level because of the problems of communicating with Juba.
There is more bureaucracy at the centre, so it takes some time for the national committee to look into it. Early warning doesn’t function well with a lot of bureaucracy—although we also cannot do without bureaucracy.

What is the nature of the relationship between pastoralist conflict and political conflicts?

We have two domains of conflict: the traditional pastoralist conflicts and the national level political conflict. Although we can assume they are separate, sometimes they overlap because they all involve competition over resources. There is always some kind of political dimension. People tend to view conflict in Sudan mainly through the lens of opposition at the national level. This conditions how we see the Dinka-Nuer frictions and the ongoing political conflict, but for us the issues revolve around what’s happening at the local level. For the most part, CEWARN operates in a neutral zone, so the work is not directly affected by the national conflict.

In any event, East Equatoria is different from the other states. There is usually little political influence across the borders. The politicians are not involved in cross-border raids. The local people may cross borders for their own reasons, but the politicians are not causing any harm. The politicians have more cows than the local people.

The people who are taking care of the cows have guns. Sometimes the people who are taking care of the cows put on uniforms. That’s where the problems start, but it’s not political.

Jonglei, unlike eastern Equatoria, is a bit unique because there is a lot of interference from the politicians. They have committees that oppose each other: members of Committee A fight the members of Committee B, and they all collaborate in selling cows across the border so they do not pay tax. Naturally there are problems of Dinka versus Dinka in some places. In addition to Dinka versus Dinka, there is Dinka versus Murile, or Murile versus Nuer, and of course Dinka versus Nuer is the big one. But most of the raiding is ethnic and not political, one tribe raiding another tribe for livestock.

In northern Bahr al Ghazal the problems are similar, but involve the Darfurians, like the Misseriya and the Rezigat. Interestingly, there is a committee composed of the Dinka, Misseriya and Rezigat supported by an organisation called Concordis (an American NGO). They constructed a Peace Centre and they hold a ‘Peace Market’ where the communities meet. If there is any problem among them then the committee resolves it. There is also a conference that brings all these communities together. It is held once a year, usually in Aweil, and is attended by all
the people from the border areas, the politicians, the herders, and the traders. The Rezigat and Misseriya visit the market, and this allows us to meet with them and develop insights into what’s going on.

In any event, the pastoralists are the main concern as well as the resources they depend upon, and it is in the case of militia activities that the problems occasionally overlap. Some herders become bandits and some bandits are affiliated to politicians or are available to do someone’s bidding. This is a general problem in places where government structures are weak. It is easy to go from being a bandit militia to a political militia. The militias in eastern Equatoria are just bandits and they do not have any affiliation with anyone in the central government. They don’t know anyone in the government and their main objective is to steal and kill.

**What are some of the other key challenges?**

The presence of the militias, for example, is very connected to the circulation of small arms. Disarmament has to be undertaken at the regional level with strong government coordination to be effective. Kenyans have a lot of reservations over the issue of disarmament, perhaps because it is too expensive or maybe there is a fear of the unknown. It is the same in South Sudan at the moment—there is fear over disarming. Herders maybe fear another community may come and take all their cattle or they find themselves in danger of being attacked. The government provides security but it is not sufficient so the people believe that they have to protect themselves and to protect their property.

At this juncture, we can aim for reduction of arms but not their elimination all at once, like nuclear disarmament. Once you upset the existing parity you have an even bigger problem. There are also the questions of ammunition; where do they get the bullets? There is no way the militias can supply the ammunition on their own, which suggests that some local authorities are involved. The root problem is that it is quite easy for someone to get a gun. The presence of the small arms is again mainly due to the weakness of the regional governments. Uganda now has a strict law controlling possession of guns with heavy penalties that make it unattractive for someone to hold a gun. Here, there is no proper law controlling the movement of small arms. It is difficult to disarm but you can try to control the commerce. The many regional peace conferences going on both in the south and the north may help over the long run, although they rarely bear fruit in the short term. The problem with peace conferences is the lack of provisions for monitoring and evaluation required to sustain the process.
Other pressing issues, like the incidence of child abduction have not been taken seriously. If the culprits return the child, then everything continues as before. The practice of abduction, like small arms, is becoming commercialised. In many cases abducted children become like slaves forced to work within the house or they are trained to engage in crime, and the females are sold into marriage. The discrepancy in prices when abducted children are sold follow market forces, which is why prices are higher for the female captives because they can be exchanged for bride price.

Is it possible that you may be setting yourself up for failure when suddenly you significantly widen the objectives to include new categories like abduction; what are the major priorities to make the new strategy objectives work?

For this new strategic framework to work well we need the government and the locals to take ownership. CEWARN may operate well most of the time but cannot take responsibility for everything as we go forward, so how can the actors on the ground assume ownership? We do a lot of training but in South Sudan, people everywhere are facing different challenges. Most South Sudanese believe they are not part of the system although we really want them to own it.

It is important that such issues are addressed at the policy level and then followed through at the county level where there are the usual gaps between policy and practice.

The cross-border circulation of livestock is a practical example. When livestock cross borders to access pasture, there is no real problem. When the cattle cross the border for sale, problems arise because they do not pay tax. The revenue lost is significant and the local government does not benefit from the commerce. But when the cattle are stolen the same administration is supposed to take action. This is a key policy challenge for the IGAD Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who play a key role in governing cross-border interactions and coordinating the implementation of policies.

There are limits to what CEWARN and its partners can do in this case. It is an area where people have their own ways of doing things. Keeping in mind that we also have our ways of doing things means we will all face a common challenge, but we may succeed and help this system take us forward. Understanding the local context helps make it work better but nothing is automatic. Naturally there are always hurdles at the beginning. Still, the system is a work in progress and it will work better the more people recognise its importance. Much of
the training with the local CBOs focuses on monitoring and evaluation and building the capacity to facilitate small meetings. Since we have limited funds for the conflict response, this requires that we help teach them how to utilise the money available effectively. We assist them in developing the capacity to work with minimum supervision. If you do not do this, everything stagnates. We need to continue with the same people because they understand the early warning concept. When they bring different people, it’s a problem because we have to repeat and in effect start over.

We have also undertaken similar activities with the military by training the army personnel to work better with the civilian population. There is a lot of suspicion when people see someone in uniform. Once you put on the uniform, you are an enemy to them. This is why we brought the army, police, prison officers, and other security people together with local leaders and civil society actors. We held a week-long meeting where we discussed the frictions between the two and how both of them need to work together as one unit because if the peace process is going to hold water, they have to be on the same page. The civilians should not provide the wrong information when they are responding. The military are not sent there to kill, they are there to help calm things down. The process of interaction generated a lot of useful information and insights about how we all can work together better. We hope that this kind of activity can be extended to other areas.
How and where did the peace architecture model in Kenya start?

The Wajir peace committee model that emerged during the early 1990s was an innovative model created by communities, civil society organisations and government officials who came together to seek the peaceful resolution of conflict in Kenya’s North Eastern Province. Local activists brought together elders, women, and youth, who worked with the district administration and security heads to bring the region’s endemic banditry and clan warfare under control. This initiative became the forerunner of the peace committee model. The civil society groups working on peace-keeping and conflict management lobbied for the establishment of a national level steering team to coordinate peace activities. In 2001, the government accepted the idea of establishing a national steering committee on peace building and conflict management. That is how it all started.
The Wajir Peace Committee originated from within the community. Several prominent women leaders led by the late Deqa Ibrahim played key roles in starting the initiative. The committee also included Ambassador Mahboub Maalim, who later became the Executive Secretary of IGAD and another leader who is a former MP for Wajir, Mr. Elmi Mohammed. Adoption of the model by IGAD members to serve as the basis of the CEWARN model in effect revised the common perception that pastoralists are the people most prone to be involved in conflict.

I was in the ministry dealing with disaster management and humanitarian affairs at the time. In 2002 my Permanent Secretary asked me to form a team. I helped establish the new steering committee’s secretariat while at the same time working for the national focal point on the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW). After the member states signed the CEWARN protocol in 2002, there was a request from IGAD headquarters asking the member states to establish national conflict early warning and response units.

We started a directorate that also doubled as the CEWARN team on national and regional issues that began work on a policy framework for building this new peace building and conflict management architecture in 2004.

By 2006, we had completed the first peace building and conflict management policy draft. The idea was to come up with a national framework for handling and coordinating peace building and conflict management with a focus on pastoralist-related conflicts. Many of the rangeland communities felt they did not have adequate security, weapons were spreading, and commercial incentives were accelerating the traditional cattle rustling across the region. The Wajir community in Northern Kenya provided the framework for coordinating various actors to address conflicts in a non-violent way.

The Wajir model was used to resolve serious clan conflicts in the 1990s, not just cattle rustling in Northern Kenya. During 2000 to 2001 the Somali in Garissa and Borana of Isiolo agreed upon a community peace accord, the Modogashe Peace Accord. The problem was some said it was largely based on Somali and Islamic traditions. We initiated the communal process of developing similar peace accords during the Borana and the Gabra conflicts in Marsabit. We’ve lost several leaders along the way, but such tragedies are part of resolving these community problems.

In 2007–2008, the eruption of post-election violence led to an expansion of the Kenya steering committee’s work. We were asked to replicate the peace committee.
model in the areas outside the pastoralist districts experiencing post-election violence. A circular was sent to all districts to establish peace committees with a view to ensuring people or their communities resolved their conflicts in a peaceful way. We sent teams to the Mathare and Kibera informal settlements in Nairobi, and to the Rift Valley among other areas to convince them that they should adopt the peace committee model. These communities eventually agreed they needed to talk to each other in a formal way to resolve conflicts. They began assisting each other, even those who had lost their property. So that’s how the peace model spread to the larger nation.

The Maikona Peace Accord grew out of successful efforts to resolve the conflicts of 2005 between the Borana and the Gabra. It became a casualty of the fierce ethnic clan conflict in Marsabit and Moyale that emerged after the elections and during the implementation of the new constitution in 2013. The conflict was fanned by certain actors based across the border in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. This in turn led to a series of productive cross-border meetings that resulted in the complementary incorporation of the cross-border framework into the CEWARN model.

The CEWARN early warning mechanism is based on an expanded version of the Wajir model. In 2009-2010 we began supporting field monitors across the country, especially among communities that experienced the post-election violence. Things worked very well during the Constitutional referendum. We used the model to support monitoring by peace workers and to enhance the district security architecture.

The strategy is now open, and we’ve started monitoring all conflicts in the region based on the model borrowed from the Kenyan experience. We further modified the system by introducing an SMS platform so we could receive reports from a wider base of informants across the country, and by utilising other social media popular in the region. We used it to mobilise many Kenyans and organisations to campaign for peace, especially in the areas where we expected potential violence during the 2013 general election.

The hot spots, in this case, were identified in reports from the security and intelligence agencies. We also shared our reports with these agencies. And the communities likewise agreed that they were conflict areas. We worked around the clock with the security agencies, civil society, and other stakeholders to support peace campaigns during the elections.

We did a lot of work in peace building and conflict management to ensure the communities talk to
each other and while in regard to reconciliation the results were limited, through the influence of the peace building committees peace was maintained during the 2010 referendum and the 2013 elections. The result gives us hope for the implementation of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission’s (TJRC) report and other reports that highlight historical injustices in Kenya. At least we now have a framework that others can work with to not only manage conflict but also to promote reconciliation.

How can issues raised by the field monitors like making the Rapid Response Fund to be more responsive be addressed?

I am a big critic of the RRF framework because since its formation in 2009-2010 it has never been adequately responsive. There are always delays. A good example is a recent program we are implementing. We started in November with regional RRF steering committee, of which all of us in the CEWERU are members. We presented proposals on the conflict situation during September and October, but we only received the funds between June and July of the following year. Is that responsive? We should remove the ‘rapid’ and just say ‘response framework’, because since its inception there have always been delays. In any event, we are trying to address these glitches and lapses. That’s why we say we want to domesticate some of our mechanisms so that we have a working situation room with people designated to address various clusters. Every time we get a report we should be able to promptly inform the field monitor or whoever is reporting that we’ve received the information and to communicate what kind of action will be taken. That is what we’re trying to encourage, but sometimes early warning systems do not work as efficiently as they are supposed to.

The larger problem was difficulty in adequately facilitating a sizeable group of field monitors. These challenges are there, but sometimes it also depends on individuals. At CEWARN regional and national levels there are individuals who respond very fast while others do not, and delays are very frustrating for the reporters in the field. When you take action on a report after six months, it’s no longer ‘early warning’. We had the same issue before domestinating our own system to embrace new technology. Facilitating urgent alerts through SMS helps expedite coordinated responses. During the referendum and 2013 elections, we even introduced sending money via the mobile money platform Mpesa to the local committees to cover their response activities. From late 2011 to 2012 there were clear signs that a renewal of the Borana-Gabra conflict was imminent.
Why were the available mechanisms like the quick disbursement fund (RRF) not activated to at least mitigate it to some extent?

Remember in the same Marsabit region we almost achieved a lasting peace through the Maikona Declaration that addressed the earlier conflict between the Borana and the Gabra. But the new constitution and the devolved system of government generated new issues of people competing for power in the devolved county governments. The government funded peace campaigns spearheaded by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission during the referendum and elections. In some cosmopolitan areas like Nakuru and Isiolo it worked. But in Marsabit and Mandera, the campaigns encountered problems because there were coalitions of small communities, like the Regabu Alliance-uniting the Rendille, Gabra, and Burji against the previously dominant Borana. This brought a new dimension to the conflict. It was no longer triggered by traditional cattle rustling, but over access to power. The government addressed it by sending mediators to Marsabit. Although it took time to control the violence, the situation also highlighted new factors. The escalation of conflict did not imply the failure of the existing mechanisms, but it did lead to the improvements in cross-border communication noted above.

We are beginning to see tensions associated with the development of new infrastructural projects and issues related to resource extraction like oil in northern Kenya and the ambitious LAPSSET project’s impact across the larger region.

What kind of response is CEWARN planning to address the potential for new conflicts?

These issues underscore why we must address the new dynamics driving current and future conflicts. Some of these conflicts have their own challenges. In Lamu it is related to land; in Tana River, it’s related to the multi-national corporations investing in sugar production. The discovery of oil is a new development in the region and we’ve seen a different dynamic of conflict emerging around it. For instance, the traditional conflict between the Pokot and Turkana has shifted because the former are claiming their region extends to some of the areas in Turkana where oil was discovered.

So they also want a share of the proceeds from the oil. The problem also includes tensions between county and national governments in other areas over the sharing of mineral resources. Some variations on this problem include coal in Kitui, titanium in Kwale, and port development in Mombasa and Lamu. These are some of the new challenges and those in conflict prevention, management
and resolution are implementing training programs to sensitize both national and county governments, local clans, and the technical teams planning all of these mega-projects. There are a number of success stories and some have been documented. The international community has asked us to share our experiences with them. We are always working on improving the CEWARN mechanism to extend its capacity beyond the pastoralist-related conflicts. For example, the impact of the Kenyan post-election violence affected the whole region. Uganda and Rwanda suffered as much economically as Kenya due to the disruption of transport and supply chains. So we can’t pretend that managing pastoralist related conflicts is the only major objective when there are others that are even more complex.

We sponsored workshops on conflict sensitive reporting in partnership with the Media Council of Kenya and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This initiative also includes conflict education for technocrats, including policy makers like governors, and other politicians. We need to sensitize them on planning without causing conflict, and inform them about how they can negotiate for more resources without using violence. These are some of the strategies we are implementing. We may end up like Nigeria or the Democratic Republic of Congo, countries endowed with lucrative resources but lacking peace. We have learnt the lessons highlighted by other regions and we are committed to support conflict sensitivity programs when these mega-projects are being launched.

We have both anticipated and advised the government about these issues. There is, for example, a major problem in Isiolo over the construction of the international airport while the LAPSSET project has triggered massive land speculation. The County Governor is now claiming new county boundaries. These are problems we’ve documented through CEWARN, which has come up with a database for each county in Kenya on peace issues. We began with the national conflict mapping, then after 2010 we started the county conflict mapping that highlighted some of these problems now being witnessed now in the conflict profiles. For instance, we identified seventeen hot-spot counties and convened meetings to discuss how to address the issues highlighted in their profile. We did this in partnership with CEWARN, while encouraging each county to go forward in mapping conflicts in sub-counties.

We believe it is best for us to coordinate and let the other actors do their thing at the local level because each county has its own unique dynamics, whether urban or rural. We are going to work with them but they need to include
conflict sensitivity contingencies within their county integrated development programs, including active measures to address the conflict and peace challenges they face.

**What is the strategy for extending the model to matters of food security, and other problems, including the interest in extending the early warning mechanism to other entities such as ECOWAS and other regional variations on the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture initiative?**

To begin with, we have to work with our regional counterparts to implement the cross-border framework to resolve conflicts across the borders. That framework has worked well in Moyale and was adopted in the Turkana-Omo area. We have a good working relationship with our counterparts on the Ugandan side of the Karamoja cluster; we are also interacting with South Sudan, and we are currently trying to persuade Ethiopia to adopt the same kind of framework for managing the Mandera triangle.

Along the Somali border, there are people working with elders, borrowing from our model, while some of our peace monitors are in Mogadishu working with the CEWERU Somalia to train their local peace committees. We have also hosted many delegations from Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia who come to learn how we have domesticated this model to work for our country.

These are examples of some of the issues now being addressed. We have a regional framework with our bordering nations. The Joint Commissioners and Administrators Meetings also address some of these concerns, encouraging administrators along the borders and county governments to foster engagement with the neighbouring administrative units. Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia currently support effective frameworks through their joint borders administrators’ commission. They meet quite regularly.

This framework is also being implemented to address issues of epideemics, livestock diseases, and immigration and human trafficking. Members of the CEWERU sit in those committees and provide very valuable information. We’ve been invited to Zimbabwe to discuss with their national team on how to use an early warning system modelled on the CEWARN mechanism. In addition to sharing our experiences with ECOWAS, we have also travelled to international meetings abroad to share our experience and the UN system has been quoting our success.
The CEWARN Early Warning System’s Interface with the African Union

Early warning systems are critical to the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture. IGAD has made progress in this domain and CEWARN has pioneered efforts to promote peace and development in the Horn of Africa region. It was among the first organisations to start working on indicators and data modules. We learnt a lot from the experience of CEWARN and those who worked hard to develop the initiative should be commended for breaking new ground. The peace-support operations undertaken by the African Union have benefitted from IGAD’s political leading role in the development of peace architecture. Situations that require deployment of the military on the ground are unsustainable without the support of a genuine political process, and this is why we are happy that IGAD is now expanding their early warning model to cover other aspects of conflict management. You can’t do conflict prevention without the necessary tools and early warn-
ing is one of the most important methodologies available. It enables communication of information about an impending conflict to the decision makers. But early warning alone is not enough; we need early preventative action as well. We still have a long way to go to effectively prevent conflict. We have made progress in certain areas like policy and IT tools, but now we still need to break new ground in order to deal with the challenges ahead.

Early warning is based on the process of collecting information, analysing data and making relevant policy options available to decision makers. Acting on early warning is not an easy task. Prevention should address situations before they degenerate into full-blown conflict. You may be right, you may be wrong and at times there may be pushback from the parties who you’re dealing with on the ground. Sometimes you cannot necessarily provide all the evidence that you need to convince the key actors. The more we are able to encourage member states to support conflict prevention, the better. The 2013–2018 civil war in South Sudan was a case in point.

We wish we acted much earlier to prevent the crisis from turning into a full-blown conflict and we are still working hard to consolidate the September 2018 peace agreement that ended direct hostilities between the two main rival camps.

How do the early warning systems work within the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like IGAD and ECOWAS, and how do you assess the evolution of these mechanisms?

Each REC develops its own early warning system based on its own distinctive features and realities. IGAD began with pastoral conflicts. ECOWAS took on a larger set of issues, similar to the approach of the AU. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted an approach similar to ECOWAS. But all of them should be linked to the AU and form a continental system that ultimately operates according to the same modalities.

In all these cases, the AU needs to interact better with the decision-making organs of the RECs. In the context of IGAD, for example, this means developing linkages with the Peace and Security Council, the Assembly of Heads-of-State, and the Council of Ministers in order to ensure we improve our capacity to coordinate and to act on the information generated by the early warning systems.
In an ideal African Union system where the early response is up and running - would we perhaps see an increasingly interventionist AU?

Let’s make a distinction between two important things. In addition to the early warning system, we have the African Standby Force drawn from the regional brigades. The East African region is operating within the framework of East African Command based in Nairobi and Addis Ababa.

The African Standby Force and its regional components can also be used in preventive diplomacy. This is one of their mandates. They can also be used to reinforce the settlement of conflicts as an external force overseeing the implementation of an agreement, like the peace accord in South Sudan. So the deployment of forces is just one among the many tools available to the AU and regional communities for handling conflicts. For every single conflict or potential conflict, the best option to prevent it from degenerating into a full-blown crisis is through diplomacy and negotiation. There are a variety of ways to keep the peace, not just the deployment of armed forces.

How dynamic is your AU peace and security architecture, and can it keep pace with changing conflicts?

It’s one of the more dynamic and effective systems in the context of the other regional economic communities’ early warning systems. We have intergovernmental tools at various regional and continental levels. There are institutions operating at different scales, dealing with different stakeholders, and looking into the variety of conflicts and challenges we are facing. When you look at the way the AU, IGAD and other REC institutions have been operating, although they have shouldered great responsibility, this doesn’t mean they have succeeded. The many new challenges like terrorism that were not so prominent in the recent past are part of the problem.

Despite this dynamic, the system is flexible enough. The problem is mainly in the implementation. We have good documentation, useful agreements and conventions, but we need to work on implementation. Saying that what we have does not work effectively enough will only lead us to engage in an endless process of policy discussions.
Was there an early warning system in place that proved instrumental in determining the AU’s response to the Ebola epidemic?

The AU was not involved in the response because the continental early warning system (AUCEWS) is not designed to deal with epidemics. Other organisations, like the WHO in particular, were and still are better placed to do that than we are. The primary target of the early warning system in countries operating in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and their neighbours was related to the peace and security implications highlighted by the epidemic, hence the decision made by the Peace and Security Council to support an AU mission to assist in the Ebola zone.

Once again, this underscores the relevance of CEWARN’S efforts to expand their early warning mechanism to other drivers of conflict, like the current circulation of small arms and the long-term consequences of climate change.
The Contribution of CEWARN to the Region’s Future

We live in a region where a great number of people whose histories have often clashed live together in countries and areas that are undergoing rapid change. This is the basic underlying issue that make peace and security in Africa and in the Horn of Africa a challenge. Ultimately, problems of peace and security and violence mirror the problem of underlying structures and contradictions within the society. Insecurity is itself a signal that tells us that there is something about the evolving social arrangements that has yet to create proper mechanisms for mediation. It alerts us to act in order to ensure that the inevitable political, geographical, and demographic forces responsible for differences between people are resolved peacefully.

The IGAD region is characterised by its varied geography, including extensive semi-arid and arid lands inhabited by groups whose livelihoods derive from
pastoralist activities. With the exception of one country, the rest of the IGAD region has in common a particular colonial history, which has meant that a lot of the problems the region faces are quite similar. The mechanisms of state administration are based on histories of domination. The well-meaning governments of the day have struggled to reform those mechanisms, and to make them more aligned to the realities of the people of the Horn. These are two of the characteristics that make the countries of IGAD similar to one another in terms of peace and security.

The region is also characterised by the fact that given its geography, there is a great deal of current and historical contact between the different countries. For centuries, for example, the Ethiopian walled city of Harar plied its trade with the city-states of the Indian Ocean, evolving common patterns and intertwined histories among people. You find old migration routes, old routes of movement and even now it is not uncommon to find certain Somali people in Sudan during certain times of the year—and Nigerians in Sudan as well. The people of IGAD know each other very well and that brings the regions together and forces the governments to follow where their people are leading.

The IGAD region hosts the greatest concentration of pastoralists in the whole world. If there is anywhere on the planet that can be called a pastoralist zone, it’s the IGAD region.

Who are these pastoralist peoples, what are their characteristics beyond the modern tropes of food insecurity and resource conflicts and what is the impact of their movements?

The constant mobility in search of food and water gives rise to particular organisational forms and social technologies that are aligned with that lifestyle. The need for movement informs the politics and their transhumance shapes the socialising of pastoralist peoples. People who move without regard to borders or without regard to shifting boundaries are people who appear very curious to others in this age of settled states.

The important innovation here in the IGAD region, and it is a significant development, is that states now implicitly recognise the legitimacy of these movements. There is no single IGAD member state that tries to stop them. There is an understanding that this is the way the region is, even though we have our territorial integrity; the states understand that there are people in Ethiopia who will come to Kenya and that there are people in Kenya who will go to Ethiopia. The states here are now trying to facilitate their movements as much as they can. I think that is indica-
tive of our unique sense of the relationship between citizenship and geography. This is not something that is always recognised about IGAD states but you can see the dynamic at work all the time. Kenya was until recently host to the largest number of refugees on the globe. The movements of refugees in the IGAD region are massive and yet governments in the region have not moved aggressively to stop these flows. IGAD countries are actually very generous when it comes to letting in people who are fleeing drought or insecurity. The Horn of Africa is a region that is driven by people who move with a great deal of freedom but also by governments that acknowledge that this freedom of movement comes with the territory.

Naturally there is always a great deal of tension between tradition and present realities. If you look at the population of Kenya at independence in 1963, there were about 6 or 7 million Kenyans. Now there are over 48 million. When you compare the movements that were in northern Kenya in 1963 to the ones now, you find very different realities.

Are the social norms and technology evolving as fast as the realities; what forms of mediation can now be brought to bear as these groups move?

Because they have been moving historically for generations, pastoralists developed intricate ways of communicating and agreeing on their movements. There was no chaos. It was not just a matter of going wherever you are going; rather, it was a decision based on the supposition that wherever you are going, you will find people there. So you developed ways of agreeing with them about why you are there. The traditional methods for mediating these interactions have struggled to keep up with the changes impinging on their way of life. These include some positive developments in infrastructure and in economic development that have overtaken aspects of the pastoralist way of life and how they negotiate their physical and social environment. That is why sometimes we see spikes of very intense violence that suggest the way these groups on the move understand each other have become strained. The means of violence have changed.

Today 15 raiders with AK-47s can kill dozens of people where a generation ago those same 15 raiders armed with less lethal weapons would not have killed nearly as many. The social realities and technologies are in constant tension with one another. The great challenge facing the IGAD region and organisations like CEWARN is the prerogative to be part of something new, especially with respect to adapting social technologies to facilitate mediation and structures promoting peace.
James Scott’s book, The Art of Not Being Governed, speaks to the different experiences of colonial governments in this region. Colonial administrators tended to leave the region’s pastoralist people alone after the initial efforts undertaken to control them. The terrain was a factor as was the attitude of the pastoralists that conveyed to the colonial regimes they preferred to be left to their own devices. Also, through the colonists’ eyes, the dry and semi-arid conditions did not appear ripe for commercial exploitation in the same way as the highlands where they concentrated their economic interventions.

Early attempts to impose government on the pastoralist people in this region often failed. They tended to leave the pastoralists alone except for the occasional punitive expedition to teach them a lesson of one kind or another. That is simply because government in the modern sense of the word is not designed to govern people on the move. States emerged in the presence of settled populations that over time evolved economic activities that yield some form of revenue that central governments taxed in return for the provision of security and services.

People who are on the move and have been on the move for generations need to be given a similar social contract. The deal is very simple: by being part of this national project, you will benefit. Where the governments have been able to make that deal and impart substance to it, the result is a more peaceful environment and a much greater sense of attachment to the national project. This has been difficult in the IGAD countries. As mentioned, it is not an easy task taking over essentially colonial forms of government and, in the space of a few decades, reforming them to effectively govern socially and economically diverse communities. The representation of the central state in many arid and semi-arid areas is still very thin. As a result, there is still a great deal of reliance on traditional on-the-ground systems of management. The struggle is how to make these systems function together with other forms of governance and at the same time extend government security provision and all the other public goods that are known to people in Nairobi, Kampala, and Addis Ababa to their territories.

The delay in realising this objective comes at great cost for the poor. The slow extension of government services, on the other hand, was compensated for with a very robust sense of self-government from the pastoralist institutions on the ground. Indigenous structures are still able to deliver for their peoples in respect to mediation and conflict management and perhaps other public goods. At the same time, we need to reach a certain threshold of stability before the full rollout of government services can occur.
We are now making good progress towards achieving that threshold.

I like to think of CEWARN in several ways. On a philosophical and political basis, I think of it first as Pan-Africanism in practice, not in words. I think of CEWARN as a sort of messenger to the future. That is, today CEWARN reflects a region whose states have come together and even though sometimes our interests differ, we are creating institutions that bring us all together. In this sense, CEWARN is a sort of profound promise that institutionalises, that says we can do it together, and that we can work with those who are living with the threat of violence to prevent conflict through the use of openness and informational tools. Such a promise, which is itself a historical proposition, is always going to be difficult to fully roll out. In its fullest expression it is about working to make a more perfect union—to paraphrase the popular American term. It is an idea that you are constantly moving towards. CEWARN is predicated on the promise that governments of the region can, together with their people, create and evolve ways of anticipating violence and stopping it.

The people of the Horn and African people in general have been sold on the view that they live in a particularly brutal environment, perhaps even a brutish environment. They have been sold the idea that these are possibly the most violent of times and that your fellow citizens and people are possibly the most violent people on the planet. This is not true. If you look at it from the perspective of Europe between 1914 and 1945, there is no war no matter how brutal in the Horn even remotely comparable to the kind of violence that was meted out in that 30-year period. If you look at all the wars of independence of South East Asia, if you look at China during the Japanese invasion of the Second World War, the level of violence was immense. Let’s make it clear that in fact the Horn, given its contradictions, is far more peaceful than might be the case. In fact, the people of the Horn by and large are far more patient, far more flexible than many other people on the planet in light of the challenges we have here. The general rule has been live and let live, wait till another day. There is certain wisdom in the Horn. The violence is there, you can’t refute that. But when examined objectively you will conclude that the casualties are far fewer than the numbers of people in the Horn who died during the Cold War; the many people killed by gunshot wounds and bombs who were killed during proxy battles instigated by the two blocs. They called it a Cold War; for us it was hot.

Since the end of the Cold War we have witnessed the rise of institutions like CEWARN and African countries have taken the initiative.
in building up a peace architecture. IGAD began in 1986, during the Cold War, and quickly evolved into a peace and security institution. The moment that global struggle ended and our region was left to its own devices, IGAD quickly went into the business of building institutions and mechanisms to prevent violence.

Although the propensity of the region’s warrior peoples is to seek peace, we are moving into a period of more intensified conflict. The rapidly growing populations and the expansion of commerce means that the privatisation of the commons is accelerating. Land that used to be held in the commons is being transferred into private hands and being exploited for private gain because of this dynamic. This is leading to a significant disruption of old patterns and that leads to more social volatility. Economic progress does not necessarily ensure peace, even as a region becomes more economically independent.

The IGAD region has arrived at a very important moment. As we build more roads, railways, and airports, as we expand commercial farms and promote tourism, the challenge is how to maintain ways of mediating conflict and to institutionalise preventive measures so that conflict does not evolve into violence. The countries and governments will have to decide how exactly are we going to handle being prosperous and having much more economic activity in our territory. In the meantime, there is going to be a gap between now and the time when all the people in the countries are included in that prosperity. Handling that gap requires intensified peace-building, systematic social and economic inclusion and the awareness that since some people will inevitably be left behind we need to keep the peace with each other.

This region is a place of immense differences in lifestyle and economic livelihoods. Pastoralist peoples who depend upon their expansive herds of cattle should be free to continue to nurture their livelihoods based on livestock. Not only do they make a large contribution to their national economies, their unique way of life feeds into the region’s cultural tapestry. It follows that they should enjoy the option to pursue commercialisation of livestock production in a way that is environmentally sound and peaceful. This is not necessarily something that can be organised from the top. Policy makers and planners need to appreciate that pastoralists’ use of the region’s extensive rangelands may be very different but it is also productive and sustainable.

Harmonising the cultural diversity of our region would see the Horn evolve into perhaps the most unique political and economic system on the planet. It is not a ques-
tion of trying to make the Horn become like China, Singapore, or North America. It is a matter of shaping our geographical and cultural diversity so that other multicultural regions will ask, “how can we become more like the Horn of Africa?”

Even though we are different communities inhabiting different landscapes, we are on a continuum; all of us are on the same road. I hope we will see the new social technologies and innovative applications help take the Horn in its own direction. Sometimes you see a glimmer of that but we are still to get there; peace is part of the method and not only a goal in these circumstances.

Peace—and it is very important for me to say this—is not simply participation. These are two very different things. Nor is peace stability and by stability I mean the sort of slow-motion politics of northern Europe. We are in a time of rapid and highly compressed change. You cannot move from what we call poverty today to what experts call wealth in a stable manner. The transition is going to be volatile by nature because you are trying to move lots of people from being desperately hungry to not even thinking about hunger. It is important to recognise that everyone should work to prevent violence in these circumstances.

That work is building and experimenting and seeing what institutions on the ground the people respect, how we can work through those institutions and how we can assist those institutions to keep up with the times.

The volatility I am talking about here is the volatility of a young man coming from the countryside to Addis Ababa with all his dreams and aspirations. He’s been told that if he does A-B-C, he will succeed. But then he finds that actually he’s arrived too early, or too late and that our rapidly changing society has moved on. This young person starts to get desperate. That desperation leads him to seek some form of relief and that may come via participation in different social movements or criminal diversions and out of that emerges the volatility. Can you even stop that person from coming to the city with those dreams and expectations? But he will still come to a city where many people do not have jobs and there is no plan to alleviate the problem over the short term. We can’t just police the population. That is not enough.

**How do you actually create structures that understand this?**

These are ideas that will have to be taken on at some point but they are slow in coming and late in being applied. Too many people in the Horn of Africa continue to believe that the debate over models
of socioeconomic change is already settled. Unfortunately, it is not. All these things matter because underlying the quest in the Horn for greater prosperity is not so much a desire for wealth but more a demand for basic dignity and less humiliation. Being hungry is a humiliating condition. With the accelerating pace of change, we need to comprehend and factor for the incidence of humiliation and indignity that accompanies rapid economic development.

Approval of the new strategy was acknowledgement of CEWARN’s good work in the previous phase, and acknowledgement that the CEWARN mechanism is relevant. CEWARN created a unique presence within governments that was seen to be effective. The member states recognised this by ratifying the agreement to expand the work of CEWARN to different typologies of violence.

CEWARN is nevertheless best seen as an experiment that needs to be watched and supported very closely. It is like a sniffer dog or a canary in a mine. It’s a unique institution that can really make a big difference. The mechanism, in my opinion, should never become a large bureaucratic institution because there is a great deal of value in being small and flexible. It should be able to constantly change with conditions, it’s evolution based on experimentation and not bureaucratisation.

At the same time, governments must uphold the CEWARN mechanism in its totality and treat it as their common possession.

CEWARN is an organisation that works with governments and within government to resolve the security problems of the day. The mechanism does not set its own priorities. Its success is predicated on dealing with sensitive issues. This will be a function of demonstrating to member states that it is interested in solving problems and addressing issues of a political nature while the organisation itself does not have a political angle. The degree to which the member states can see that written into the institutional fabric of the mechanism will enable them to remain open to working with the mechanism on issues of the gravest concern to member states. Over the next ten years, I anticipate CEWARN employing the best and brightest young people from the IGAD countries. I see it as being a coveted vehicle for peace and security professionals and for others who can bring their expertise to bear on the issues—whether they are in technology, in communication, or even in event management. I see CEWARN being something that you can aspire to professionally.

I see a CEWARN that supports research done by social scientists who can use their findings to generate unique new approaches to the challenges we face. Finally, I
hope to see a CEWARN mechanism that is completely funded by its member states. In the coming years we will be living in a region whose economy has doubled or trebled in size. We will have a growing middle class, but we will also have a much larger lower class population. CEWARN must pioneer peace building within this economic paradigm. In the histories of economic change, rapid economic development revolves around industrialisation and urbanisation. The histories of urbanisation are driven by the growth of manufacturing. In China, for example, people are not leaving their farms to go get jobs in restaurants or tourism, but in factories. One of the great puzzles of our region is that economies are growing but without significant industrial development. Unless nations of the Horn find ways of being globally competitive in manufacturing or find a substitute that can play the same role, the volatility I talked about earlier is going to be more pronounced and governments are going to need the services of CEWARN even more.
CEWARN commenced operation in 2002 with the mandate to extend peace and security to the far-flung regions of their territories. The IGAD Member States did not expect at that moment that the technicians, analysts, and administrators implementing the system would pioneer a data-driven multi-tiered early warning mechanism that would come to be replicated across the continent.

The journey involved a matrix of inter-connected activities: testing different tools, compiling data-sets; operationalising Member States promise to work together on early warning and early response; engaging and demonstrating the value of working with different stakeholders; and empowering citizens at the grassroots to assume ownership of their efforts to sustain peace. CEWARN has been, in short, a workshop for putting ideas into practice, and a laboratory for testing different methodologies, integrating information from a range of sources, and factoring for sensitivities within a process that gradually built confidence among our governmental stakeholders.

CAMLUS OMOGO
Director, CEWARN
In 2011 the Member States re-affirmed their commitment by authorising CEWARN to go beyond its original focus on pastoralist conflict and to play a more central role in their security agenda by adapting its innovative early warning system to an expanded set of conflict drivers. CEWARN is now enlarging its operations in order to engage in reducing risks of violent conflict through early warning and responses, each stakeholder in the system contributing by utilising their comparative advantage.

Diversifying thematically and geographically required that CEWARN put in place a new Strategic Framework. The framework was developed through an intensive and extensive process that involved consultations with over 5000 participants across local, national and regional levels, and it was designed to evolve apace with the high priority conflicts and criminal activities the region’s governments expect to encounter during the coming years. The new strategic framework facilitates the formulation of preventive measures for diverse conflict drivers that work in tandem with existing early warning approaches.

To this end, CEWARN’s focus was broadened to address sixty conflict typologies synthesised into 15 conflict themes, and organised under five distinct economic, environmental, security, governance, and sociocultural sectors. This entails actively monitoring a comprehensive set of conflict trends and drivers that includes variables related to terrorism and violent extremism, border disputes, the surging youth population, migration and displacements, decentralisation of power, environmental degradation, exploration and extraction of natural resources in historically neglected borderlands, economic situations, pastoralism, and tensions accompanying electoral processes.

Navigating through the multiplicity of the conflict drivers in a manner that enables CEWARN to anticipate and prioritise prevention over intervention is a daunting task. The Strategic Framework anticipates this enormous challenge by identifying specific capabilities that CEWARN needs to cultivate if it is to respond efficiently to existing and emerging trends and conflict drivers. These include:

A. Ability to gather credible and sufficient data to turn into high quality analysis;
B. Skills to map and analyse violent conflict risks and responses from a complex systems perspective;
C. Ability to serve the appropriate decision-makers with risk and contingency assessments in a timely fashion;
D. Capability to effectively grow and evolve the network in line with the need to prevent violent
conflicts or enable successful responses;
E. Support for on-the-ground projects that reduce risks of violent conflict or mitigate it and promote scaling for widespread effect; use of in-built learning mechanisms that refresh and reorient strategy and operations;
F. Cultivating outstanding facilitative and collaborative capabilities at the local, national and regional levels.

Conflict prevention is a constantly evolving and transforming challenge that requires constant review of what we do and how we do it. CEWARN has upgraded its data collection and analysis software, the CEWARN Reporter, to better cater for the additional conflict themes and data sets. Partnerships and networks are being expanded, and the role of CSOs in data collection and analysis is being entrenched. GIS (Geographic Information System) technology is being rolled out; and we have improved our performance monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework.

CEWARN is developing a response strategy that will complement the interventions of other important players in areas of our operations while enabling us to evaluate the impact of our response capacity within the early warning system already in place. Improving the latter will involve ensuring closer contact with beneficiaries in the field to ensure that preventative responses align with the early warning feedback generated. Our capacity to do this will be complemented by deployment of a CEWARN Peace Facilitator Corps (trained local mediators) to help support peace negotiations, communal conflict mapping, participatory development of peace dividend projects, and participatory evaluation and learning of on-the-ground projects.

It is important we continue to envision CEWARN as the ‘laboratory’ noted above, dedicated to the mission of developing capabilities that anticipate and prevent conflicts from turning violent. CEWARN will continue to ‘experiment’ with diverse socioeconomic, environmental and political drivers of conflict in order to devise more effective conflict early warning indicators and response options. In this sense, CEWARN is not just a program; it is also a tool at the disposal of IGAD programs and the African Union’s initiative to develop the continent’s African peace architecture to enhance their objectives of regional stability, prosperity and integration.

CEWARN has performed better than expected up to this point. In the course of pioneering a multidimensional, data-based early warning system we have demonstrated
the value of incorporating CSOs and research institutions into the Mechanism while empowering the participation of local communities in order to make the Mechanism truly inclusive and broad-based in its work. By focusing on one of the most complex socioeconomic syndromes in Africa, the problem of pastoralist conflict, we have demonstrated the utility of a cluster-based approach to regional security and the synergies generated by fostering cross-border communications and peace-building activities on the local level. The adoption of the In-
formal Cross-border Trade (ICBT) policy framework in 2018 represents another critical achievement advancing the process of regional integration and cooperation in the IGAD region. The ICBT recognises the importance of borderland economies as a source of employment and capital for millions, while assisting IGAD member states’ governments to tackle the Horn of Africa’s borderlands’ larger and multifaceted security issues.

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BRIDGING VISION AND STRATEGY: THE FUTURE THAT IS NOW

CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES PRIORITISED BY MEMBER STATES

NEW CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES THAT EMERGED FROM NATIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT CONSULTATIONS 2012

60 HIGH PRIORITY TYPOLOGIES / THEMES

EXPANSION TO NEW THEMES

CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES SYNTHESIZED

ECONOMY
- Commerce and Trade
- Disruptions and Corruption
- Financial Conditions & Poverty

ENVIRONMENT
- Degradation & Pollution
- Natural Disasters & Accidents
- Scarce Resource Competition

GOVERNANCE
- Due Process and Dissent
- Elections and Campaigning
- Fairness, Equality and Justice

SECURITY
- Armed Conflict & Violence
- Crime and Personal Safety
- Terrorism and Torture

SOCIAL
- Identity, Gender & Tradition
- Pastoralism and Migration
- Health, Education & Quality of life

LAND (conflicts arising from population growth/ investment)
- Natural resource competition
- Violence between pastoral communities
- Land ownership and boundaries
- Food insecurity

INEQUALITY
- Entrenching peace through education and development
- Gender-based violence
- Murder/Killing/interpersonal
- Intra/inter group (tribes, pastoral groups)

CHILD ABUCTION
- Land ownership and dispute
- Border and boundary disputes
- Crime
- Violence between pastoral communities
- Constitutional (statutory vs Customary law)

NATURAL RESOURCES USE AND MANAGEMENT
- Resource conservation
- Conflict sensitive development
- Natural resource exploitation
- Issues around Pastoralism

SOUTH SUDAN

DJIBOUTI
- Election-related violence and devolution
- Boundary and border disputes
- Conflict sensitive development
- Natural resource exploitation
- Issues around Pastoralism

KENYA

Ethiopia

SUDAN

SOMALIA
GLOSSARY

Acholi: a Nilotic-speaking farming and pastoral people of northern Uganda and South Sudan.

Afar: also known as the Danakil, Adali and Odali, the Afar are an ethnic Cushitic community inhabiting the Afar region of Ethiopia, northern Djibouti, and the southern point of Eritrea.

Ambururu nomads: a nomadic community related to Fulani of northern Nigeria known for undertaking long migrations that take them as far as areas of central and southern Sudan.

Anthrax: bacterial disease of sheep and cattle, typically affecting the skin and lungs. It can be transmitted to humans, causing severe skin ulceration or a form of pneumonia.


ASAL: term referring to arid and semi-arid lands that is often used to refer to the vast drylands across the Horn of Africa region.

Ateker: the term identifying several closely related Nilotic groups and their languages comprising the Jie, Turkana, Karamajong, Nyangatom, Toposa, and Teso.

Bokora: a large Karamojong clan inhabiting eastern Uganda.

CEWARN Reporter: a sophisticated software package developed for compilation and analysis of the information compiled in the organisation’s database.

CEWERU: Conflict Early Warning and Response Units based in the capital cities of the IGAD countries.
Committee of Permanent Secretaries: the IGAD committee that works closely with the Peace and Security Council to implement conflict management policies.

Conflict early warning systems: standardised procedures for data collection, analysis and the timely transmission of early warning information and analysis to decision-makers and institutions that are mandated to take action.

Consanguinal relations: social ties based on kinship.

CPAE: Collaborative Policy Analysis and Engagement. A joint initiative between the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (IGAD-CEWARN) and civil society and academic organisations.

Dawa: Islamic ‘medicine’, often referring to the practice of Islamic advocacy and reform.

Dinka: the Dinka are a large agro-pastoralist group comprising a number of sections. They are the largest ethnic community in South Sudan.

Dodoth: the Dodoth (or Dodos) are a small ethnic group inhabiting the escarpment of north eastern Uganda that belong to the Karamojong Cluster, and featured in Colin Turnbull’s controversial 1967 book, The Mountain People.

East African Standby Force (EASF): an organisation designed to support emergency military support for ten member states from the East African Community and IGAD. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding for its establishment; South Sudan is expected to join soon.

Environmental disequilibrium: a concept developed by range scientists to describe the unpredictability and uncertainty associated with African lowland areas receiving less than 350 cm of annual rain.

IGADD: the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development formed in 1986 to combat desertification and to coordinate locust control.

Illemi Triangle: The Illemi Triangle is an area of disputed land straddling the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and southern Sudan. It has been under the administrative control of Kenya since the colonial area since a temporary border was created in 1930 to facilitate the movements of nomadic Turkana, although it is legally part of the Sudan (or South Sudan since 2011).

Incident Report (IncRep): reports submitted by CEWARN field monitors to identify local frictions and events that can or have already led to the outbreak of conflict.

Issa Somali: The Issa Somali clan is a large branch of the Dir clan family who comprise 50 per cent of the population in Djibouti and are also present in the Dire Dawa region of Ethiopia and areas of western Somalia.
**Indigenous technical knowledge:** the term used by scholars and rural development professionals to refer to the knowledge systems of indigenous peoples, ethno science, and traditional scientific practices adapted to local conditions that have been passed on for generations from person to person.

**Justice and Equality Movement (JEM):** A Movement (JEM) established early in 2003 by a group of educated, politically experienced Darfurians that has worked actively to recruit Darfuri Arab, including fighters from the government-supported Janjaweed’ militias.

**Kebele:** a form of peasant association established in Ethiopia by the new revolutionary government after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

**Jie:** a small Ateker-speaking community who separated from the migrating Karimojong and now inhabit Kotido District in eastern Uganda.

**Laaga:** the commonly used Swahili term for seasonal river beds.

**Laissez faire:** a policy or attitude of letting things take their own course, without interfering, or the abstention by governments from interfering in the workings of the free market as in the example of laissez-faire capitalism.

**Lang’o:** A Nilotic ethnic group inhabiting northern Uganda related to other Lwoo speakers like the Acholi, Padhola, and the Kenyan Luo.

**Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA):** the unorthodox Christian rebel group opposed to the Government of Uganda led by Joseph Kony has over time ranged from its base in northern Uganda, to South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Maikona-Dukana Agreement:** pact sealed in November 2008 that ended the long standing inter-communal conflict among the Borana and Gabra along the Ethiopia-Kenya border.

**Menelik:** the Emperor of Ethiopia credited with the territorial expansion and creation of the modern Ethiopian state and most famous for decisively defeating the invading Italian army at the battle of Adwa on March 1, 1896.

**Modogashe Declaration Peace Accord:** The Modogashe Declaration is the first and best known agreement based on the District Peace Committee model facilitated by Kenya’s National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management in 2001.

**Murille:** Also known as the Murle, are a Nilotic-speaking ethnic group inhabiting Pibor County and Boma area in South Sudan and areas of southwestern Ethiopia.

**Misseriya:** the Misseriya are primarily nomadic cattle herders who are a branch of the Baggara Arabs whose area extends from Western Sudan to Eastern Chad.
National Research Institutes (NRIs): bodies hosting the analysts responsible for verifying the information received from field monitors and undertaking thorough analyses, and generating recommendations regarding the options for responding to a given conflict.

National sovereignty: the supreme power or authority vested in the state, often referring to the authority of a state to govern itself or another state.

Nyangatom: the Nyangatom, also known as Donyiro, are Nilotic agro-pastoralists inhabiting the border of southwestern Ethiopia and southeastern South Sudan with populations residing in both countries who also move into the Ilemi Triangle on a seasonal basis.

Nyumba Kumi: a grass-roots initiative based on neighbourhood security cells promoted by Kenya’s former Provincial Administration in the coast and other areas of the country affected by Islamist radicalisation. The term is based on the Swahili words for ten houses.

Oromia: Oromia is one of the nine ethnically based regional states of Ethiopia, covering 284,538 square kilometres. It is bordered by the Somali Region to the east; the Amhara Region, the Afar Region and the Benishangul-Gumuz Region to the north; South Sudan, Gambela Region, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region to the west; and Kenya to the south. It also refers to the independent homeland envisioned by secessionist movements like the Oromo Liberation Front.

PANDA Project: Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action, an American civil society initiative based on Gandhian principles launched during the 1970s.

Pastoralist Parliamentary Group: the first pastoralist parliamentary association was formed by parliamentarians from minority communities in northern Kenya in a leaders meeting hosted by the Kenya Pastoralist Forum in 1997. The impact of Kenya’s PPG led to the formation of similar associations in Uganda and Ethiopia.

Pian: A clan of the Karamajong tribe who inhabit the Mt. Kadam area.

Regional Economic Communities: the eight African trade blocs (e.g. IGAD, ECOWAS), which are also active participants in the field of peace and security.

Rezigat: the Rizeigat, or Rizigat, or Rezeigat are a tribe of camel herding Baggara people in Sudan’s Darfur region. The Rizeigat belong to the greater Baggara Arabs fraternity off Darfur and Kordofan, and speak Chadic Arabic. Recruits from Baggara Arab tribes like the Rezigat joined the Janjaweed militia used by Omar Bashir’s government in Sudan to combat Darfur rebel groups when the conflict escalated in 2003.
**Rwanda genocide**: the mass slaughter of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu civilians directed by members of the Hutu majority government between 7 April and 15 July 1994.

**Sebei**: The Sebei are an ethnic group based in Kapchorwa District of Uganda and southern Sudan. They speak Sebei and Kupsabiny, both Nilotic languages.

**Shuka**: the Swahili term for the rectangular piece of cloth used as an all-purpose item of clothing by pastoralists like the Maasai and Turkana.

**Situation Report (SitRep)**: update of changing local conditions filed by field monitors in addition to the periodic reports on an as needed basis.

**Sudd**: the Sudd is a vast swamp in South Sudan, part of the world’s largest freshwater wetland, formed by the White Nile’s Bahr al-Jabal section. The Arabic word is derived from, meaning “barrier” or “obstruction.”

**Technical Support Units**: special teams created by CEWARN to handle capacity building and operational tasks, including review and monitoring of projects.

**Tepeth**: also known as So, the Tepeth, are a small Nilotic-speaking community who live on Mt. Moroto, a remote area of Uganda’s Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts.

**Teso**: the Teso (or Iteso) are a Nilotic speaking ethnic group inhabiting eastern Uganda and western Kenya who are notable for being the only community in the Plains Nilote group to undergo a complete transition from pastoralism to agriculture. The Ateso language is part of the Ateker cluster of languages that include Turkana, Karamajong, and Nyangatom.

**Toposa**: the Toposa are Nilotic-speaking cattle herders who inhabit the Kapoeta region of the Eastern Equatoria state in Sudan.

**Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report**: the findings of the commission established by Kenya’s parliament in 2008 following the prolonged violence following the failed 2007 national elections, with the mandate to investigate gross violations of human rights, economic crimes, illegal acquisition of public land, marginalisation of communities, ethnic violence, and historical injustices suffered by minority communities.

**Turkana**: the Nilotic pastoralist community inhabiting the large county on the west side of Lake Turkana.

**Usufruct rights**: the right to enjoy the use and advantages of another’s property short of the destruction or waste of its substance.

UWIANO: a national conflict prevention and response strategy named after the Swahili word for ‘cohesion’ that was supported by UNDP in Kenya to serve as a platform for early warning and response, conflict sensitive reporting by the media, and increased mediation capacity among various actors including the political parties.


Wajir Peace Committee: the Wajir Peace Committee was the creation of women in Wajir who decided they needed to take decisive action to curb the epidemic of raiding and banditry in Kenya’s Northeastern Province. The Committee was formed in 1999 and provided for coordination between community observers and the police to prevent violence.

Woreda: the third-level administrative division of Ethiopia that are further subdivided into a number of wards or neighbourhood associations.
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACFTA</td>
<td>the proposed African Union Continental Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>AREC</td>
<td>African Regional Economic Communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSG</td>
<td>Cross-border Security Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWERU</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Climate early warning systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAE</td>
<td>Collaborative Policy Analysis and Engagement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict prevention management and resolution methods</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDDRSI</td>
<td>Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDE</td>
<td>Ending Drought Emergencies initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBT</td>
<td>Informal Cross-border Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICPAT</td>
<td>IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>the Intergovernmental Authority for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSP</td>
<td>IGAD Security Sector Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPAC</td>
<td>IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRSI</td>
<td>IGAD’s Drought Disaster and Sustainability Initiative.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>Local Peace Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLA</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Oromia Pastoralist Association</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Pastoralist Shade Initiative</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Response Fund (CEWARN)</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SteCom</td>
<td>the CEWARN Steering Committee</td>
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<td>TSU</td>
<td>Technical Support Unit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for South Sudan.</td>
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This book was produced with financial support from USAID and the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response mechanism and do not necessarily reflect the views of the partners.

DISCLAIMER
As the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, I am honoured to endorse this timely and insightful book, which contains a comprehensive collection of perspectives on the inception and evolution of CEWARN. The book targets a multifaceted audience including policymakers and conflict analysts, and by documenting CEWARN’s unique journey it helps focus on the kind of support needed to enhance regional conflict prevention and peace building efforts in the IGAD region.

**AMBASSADOR PARFAIT ONANGA-ANYANGA**
Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

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The publication of Conflict Early Warning in the Horn: CEWARN’s Journey, could not be more timely. Today more than ever this kind of practical wisdom is needed. Based on both theory and deep reflective practice, these authors provide insight, strategy, vision for how early warning, analysis, and timely response can mitigate and address repeated patterns of violent conflict. From the grassroots to wider regional conflicts, this book offers practical insight into the challenges and what is being done to address them. It demonstrates how we can effectively coordinate communication and information in order to effectively both prevent violence and transform conflict. This compendium of best practices should be read and put into practice by leaders across the Horn of Africa.

**DR. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH**
Professor Emeritus of International Peacebuilding, University of Notre Dame

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CEWARN’s initial focus on pastoral conflicts in border areas positioned it to address and to support the interdependence among these communities through its early warning mechanism and complementary programmes. CEWARN proceeded to play a unique role in institutionalizing peace building and conflict management in the IGAD member states by establishing a regional network of national conflict early warning and response units. CEWARN’s most important contribution, however, is the conceptualization of a long-term strategy for peace and security. The lessons contained in the book provide invaluable insight into the region’s increasingly complex security challenges, a domain that has long been the exclusive preserve of actors in uniform and state decision makers. As someone privileged to watch the organisation grow since its inception, I can underscore the efficacy of CEWARN’s pioneering approach based on grass-roots agency, information sharing, and empowering the voices of those most affected by conflicts on the ground.

**AMBASSADOR MAHBOUB MAALIM**
Former Executive Secretary, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)