



Consolidated Clusters' Overview: Sept 2011-April 2012

1. Introduction

This report, covering the period Sept 2011-April 2012, summarizes and updates developments in the three major areas of reporting [the Karamoja Cluster¹, Dikhil Cluster² and the Somali Cluster³] within which CEWARN is operationally involved in monitoring pastoral conflicts. The report is based on field data collected by CEWARN and represents a consolidated overview of peace and conflict developments in the cross-border (AOR). Additionally, we draw on insight from analyses and information received from CEWARN "boundary partners", (including but not limited to the UN family, such as UNOCHA, FAO, WHO, and OHCHR), conversations with Civil Society interlocutors, and observations made by CEWARN throughout the reporting period. While the report synthesizes all of the above sources of information, it remains more closely linked with the monthly and quarterly reports submitted to the CEWARN Unit. Indeed, for detailed, location-specific analyses, reference to the latter reports is recommended.

The information contained here does not include updates from South Sudan and Somalia, since these two countries have just recently established their CEWERUs and are yet to start submitting information. In fact, with respect to South Sudan, there are infrastructural and treaty obligations that impede this process. The CEWARN Unit is however in close contact with the respective countries and will be working to overcome structural and treaty encumbrances with the relevant authorities. From another perspective, this report begins to mark the transition between the lapsed CEWARN strategy and the new Strategic Framework 2012-2019. The rest of the report presents a synopsis of key developments in all the Clusters, followed by Cluster-specific highlights of events occurring in the reporting period.

2. Clusters' Situation Synopsis

Despite socio-economic, geographical, physical as well as political variations in the areas of reporting, and the diversity of emerging issues, obvious patterns in conflict and peace trends are observable. Thus, while monthly and quarterly analyses disaggregate data by month and according to developments in each country, the similarities in patterns and trends observed were more striking than the differences. Accordingly, in highlighting the incidences, outcomes, and drivers of violence, generalisable patterns recur across the reporting areas and within each Cluster. In this synopsis, we highlight those generally recurring patterns within all the Clusters. In spite of, each Cluster and AOR, and indeed the relationship between country conditions and prevailing policies vary dramatically, making direct comparisons somewhat superficial.

¹ The Karamoja Cluster comprises some 23 reporting areas in total: 3 on the Ethiopian-side; 13 on the Kenyan-side; and 7 on the Ugandan-side. The 3 AOR in Ethiopia include Kibish in Nyangatom woreda; Bubua and Nebremus in Dassenech woreda of the South Omo Zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPR). On the Kenyan-side, the 10 areas of reporting are West Pokot, Trans-Nzoia, Turkana North-West, Turkana North-East, Turkana Central, Samburu North, Samburu Central, Baringo East, Pokot Central, and Lokichogio districts. The 7 AORs in Uganda are Amudat, Bukwo, Kaabong, Kapchorwa, Kotido, Moroto, and Nakapiripirit districts.

² The Dikhil Cluster comprises of As-Eyla South-West sector, As-Eyla South-East sector and Dikhil town.

³ The reporting locations on the Kenyan side of the Somali cluster are 8 including Moyale, Marsabit North, Marsabit Central, Isiolo, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Tana River. On the Ethiopian side, this Cluster includes, Moyale Oromia, Moyale Somali, Dire, Dolo Ado and Dilo

Conflict Trends and Drivers

In every one of CEWARNs operational areas, violent confrontation among and between pastoral groups remains extraordinarily high but is generally on the decline. Perhaps owing to its size, the Karamoja Cluster has routinely exhibited the highest number of violent incidents, while the Dikhil Cluster presents the lowest. The current decline in violence is, however, attributed to a number of factors, including but not limited to ongoing disarmament (in Kenya, Sudan and Uganda), deployment of civil policing mechanisms on the Uganda (Anti-Stock Theft Unit and the UPDF) and Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster, and new gun-registration and ownership regulations on the Ethiopian side. Factors that have continued to aggravate conduct include sporadic breakdown in inter-pastoralist group relations, terrorist activities, influx of internally displaced persons, negligible presence of law enforcement and the availability of, and easy access to small arms and light weapons.

While this aggravating behavior continued to be mitigated through the provision of social services, including education, and through CEWARNs Rapid Response Fund, it is undermined by corresponding fragmentation along gender and generational lines. For example, youth and women have been involved in peace processes in the Karamoja and Somali Clusters during the reporting period. Yet they have also played a role in furthering violence. Youth have particularly been implicated in violence-prone activities, for instance scouting for raiding opportunities without the sanction of elders. Communal Elders have in turn grown circumspect, having witnessed their social role as communal leaders diminished, and thief influence limited. The outcome of this vertical fragmentation is the emerging phenomenon, particularly among the Turkana, who are gradually resorting to raiding amongst themselves.

This vertical fragmentation combines with additional tensions arising from decentralization processes. While this trend is different in Ethiopia, in Moyale and Isiolo, conflicts over resources and power wrangles between communities have been attributed to tensions associated with the establishment of County governments. This shift is also taking place on the Ugandan side of the Karamoja Cluster, in which the rapid creation of districts has been linked to increased violence among groups in areas at the borders of new and old districts: attempts to extend social services closer to communities and mitigate conflict are therefore on the rebound, creating horizontal disintegration of the communities. This parallel process of fragmentation is further entrenched by other social services, such as education. While education has been known to have liberating consequences, for many pastoral youths, it neither culminates into meaningful education and at the same time uproots them from their social systems.

Peace Overtures

Field data received by CEWARN indicates that peace efforts are most durable when community initiatives and peace agreements are reinforced by both local and central governments' support, encouragement and cooperation, and acknowledgement of the intermediary role played by some NGOs. A case in point is the Natodemeru agreement between the Dassanech and Nyangatom, which, with the ownership of the community and the support of NGOs and local governments, went a long way to stabilize relations between these communities. Across all the Clusters, a number of alliances, symbolic peace ceremonies and peace meetings/dialogue/agreements were conducted, in some cases temporarily de-escalating tensions between communities or indeed cementing prior peace pacts.⁴ These peace gestures are typically directed at breaking cycles of revenge violence, and, or, facilitating resource sharing: the absence of mutual understanding

⁴ The commemoration of Lokirima Peace Accord celebrated every 9th September since 1973 between the Turkana of Lokirima and the Matheniko of Moroto, Uganda played a mitigating role among these communities.

around land and water resources is habitually considered a key site of confrontation among pastoral communities.

Yet, alliances of whatever nature can also be a harbinger of escalated violent confrontation. The recent (April 2012) deterioration in the relationship between the Dassanech of Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya⁵ confirms this observation and is characteristic of analogous tendencies in the relationship between other pastoral groups, for example the Dassanech and the Gabra.⁶ Thus, alliances between groups lead to intermittent and somewhat durable peace, but they also foretell deterioration in relationships with third parties, in the above case, the Turkana. This is especially the case in those circumstances where intermediaries have not arbitrated relationships and in situations where government support is lackluster. On the whole, field data points towards the existence of cross-border concentric systems circumscribing and simultaneously adapting to different features of pastoral interaction: interventions aimed at reducing intra- and inter-pastoral violence will, therefore, need to countenance these systems' dynamics.

Climatic and Ecological Extremes

Enduring ecological fragility in all the reporting areas cannot be overemphasized: the occurrence of droughts and associated disasters are observably increasing, negatively impacting on the relationships between respective communities in IGAD countries, with ripples frequently spilling across national borders as pastoralists migrate in search for pastures and water. Moreover, the interaction between environmental and ecological extremes, rapid urbanization, high population growth, prevalence and easy access to small arms, competition for land and water resources, developmental initiatives, the impact of both human and livestock epidemics, and climate variability, all foreshadow a scenario in which declining climatic and ecological conditions and associated conflicts transform into mutually reinforcing cycles.

By contrast, some CEWARN reports indicate that violence may decline in areas where developmental initiatives are underway due to increased security installations. While this scenario is plausible, the veracity of the assertion is moot. The trend in the Omo river basin and in the Isiolo triangle, where the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya respectively plan enormous infrastructural enterprises, may give birth to heightened tensions among pastoral communities and presents a counter-reality. This mixed picture implies that developmental initiatives in high-risk precincts may spur stability but they can also translate into intractable communal and crossborder tensions, such as the one mounting around river Omo and lake Turkana.

Moreover, within the last decade of CEWARN reporting, most of the Clusters showed evidence of chronic ecological exposure that typically presage looming disasters. Within the Kenyan-side of the Somali Cluster, for example, climate variability⁷ between October 2011 and April 2012 resulted simultaneously into outwards movements and concentration of livestock in Isiolo West, and a depletion of grazing resources in that area. Similarly, inadequate or irregular precipitation during the Karan/Karma season (July-Sept) negatively influenced food security within the Dikhil Cluster and destabilized the quantity of available water and pasture.

⁵ The spiral of events referenced here began 2009 with the decline of EPARDA and Riam Riam, two Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) accepted by the Dassanech, Nyangatom and Turkana as legitimate intermediaries. As a consequence, there has been no agency capable of de-escalating the situation for about two and a half years, in spite of two peace agreements of Natodemer and Turmi in 2011 and 2008 respectively. Refer to CEWARN Briefing to Mombasa Border Commissioners Meeting, April 2012

⁶ A similar situation arose in 2009, when the Dassanech and the Gabra conflicted, adding the Somali factor into the dynamic—the Somali were accused of instigating this latter situation.

⁷ For instance, in September 2011, some sections of the Cluster witnessed severe floods, while others, for example, lowland Samburu, where under drought. Between October to December, Turkana, Pokot and Samburu witnessed heavy rainfall and floods.

Within the context of easy access to small arms and light weapons, an unrelenting terrorism threat (such as which led the Kenyan government to launch '*Operation Linda nchi*', i.e., Operation Protect the Country into Somalia), and mutual suspicion (between the Turkana and Samburu on the one hand, and the Somali and Borana on the other), this phenomenon has the potential to stoke pre-existing vulnerability and precariousness within the Somali Cluster and increase incidents of violence. A similar situation prevails within the Karamoja Cluster, among pastoral communities at the intersection the of Kenyan, Ethiopian, Sudan and Ugandan borders, principally between the Turkana, Nyangatom and the Dassanech in Kenya and Ethiopia and the Turkana, Pokot and Toposa on both the Uganda and Kenyan sides of the border, and South Sudan respectively.

Counting the Cost: The Human and Animal Toll and its implications

The human toll resulting from this complex interaction between environmental vulnerabilities, socio-economic and physical phenomenon, and pastoral engagement is extraordinary. While the overall number of deaths is gradually declining, a total of 309 people are believed to have perished in the Clusters.⁸ From the available data, these deaths occurred in a total of 435 received incidents.⁹ The causes of human death are numerous and include, shooting by both security forces and armed elements among pastoral communities, fatal assault and banditry, and collateral death resulting from cross-fires. Furthermore, death emanating from shootouts involving the raiders themselves has and continues to be witnessed in the reporting period.

More recently, particularly on the Kenya-side of the Karamoja Cluster, public transport such as 'boda boda' (*motorcycle riders*) has been targeted in a new trend that also includes competition over fishing lines, banditry and rape. These previously uncommon occurrences indicate a sense of extreme social anxiety and above all, a shift in the nature of violence, its drivers and impact on human beings. Although each reporting area manifests differently, a shift differentiated by new forms of acute violence and crime is clearly taking place across all Clusters. Nevertheless, the more ominous cause of death reported is revenge killing, which from time immemorial, has been a grim trademark of pastoral transactions. Revenge killing involving an unspecified number of people were reported across all CEWARNs operational areas in the period between September 2011 and April 2012. Revenge and counter-attacks therefore represent a serial phenomenon enveloping all Clusters.

As with human deaths, there has been remarkable livestock loss, including cows, goats, camels and donkeys. According to our reports, a total of 12,110 livestock were lost in the reporting period as a result of raiding and or common livestock theft. Moreover, the nature of raiding is itself metamorphosing: large traditionally sanctioned raids are few between, ceding ground to smaller raiding cartels, with questionable motives. Notwithstanding, the majority of animal losses were recorded in the Karamoja Cluster, while the Dikhil Cluster continues to record fewer losses. For example, in the third quarter of 2011, no livestock losses were recorded in the Dikhil Cluster.

It is important to note that loss of livestock due to animal diseases or natural phenomenon such as droughts have not been systematically recorded and tracked within the Clusters. Not only does this leave a lacuna in our understanding of the impact of animal loss due to natural causes, it gives a wrong impression of the total numbers of animals lost. In the Dikhil Cluster for instance, reference was made to the effects of drought on animal reproduction and the associated livelihood consequences. Likewise, the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster experienced heavy rains leading to an outbreak of water-borne diseases. Associated with this was the occurrence of Pleuro

⁸ Data was missing on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster and for the Dikhil Cluster for Jan-April 2012.

⁹ This number does not include figures from the South Sudan-side of the Karamoja Cluster, the Ethiopian-side of the Somali Cluster, the Somalia-side of the Somali Cluster and the Dikhil Cluster. Within the reporting period, Dikhil Cluster reported no incident for Sept-Dec.2011

and Peste-des-petitis in Lokichoggio and an epidemic of foot and mouth disease, all affecting livelihoods, trade and animal reserves. Disease and droughts results in animal disequilibrium within the communities and catalyses raiding in as much the same way as other factors that reduce the overall livestock count in certain communities.

Crossborder Incidents

The locations within which violent incidents, including raids, human deaths and animal losses, occurred also vastly vary. While some incidents were in-country (an example reported between Sept-Dec 2011 includes tensions between Surma and Dezi and between the Dassanech and Hamar), a significant number were of a cross-border nature. Given that all the Clusters cut across at least one national border and indeed that pastoral communities often bestride national boundaries, border tensions (amongst communities and between communities and border security) echoed across all Clusters. Within the Dikhil Cluster, tensions and hostilities between Issa and Afar pastoralists along the Ethiopian border remain an on-going concern. Similarly, within the Ugandan side of the Karamoja Cluster, cross-border incidents involved the Turkana from Kenya and the Tepeth of Uganda, leading to loss of 16 goats in January of 2012. On the Kenyan side of the same Cluster, the Nebremus-Todenyang corridor common to the Dassanech and the Turkana remains problematic.

The impact of this violence is extensive and often disrupts social and economic activities, including trade and in some extremes, inter-states cooperation. An example was the violence between the Turkana and Nyangatom, which resulted in diminished social and economic interaction along the Kenya and Ethiopian border between January and April 2012 and culminated in a joint bilateral meeting organised, in part, to mend border relations disrupted by violent communal engagement. Extremely long and porous borders, lack of clear boundaries, few police posts, and the near absence of civil administrative units along the periphery of the countries exacerbate this situation.

In some cases, for example, around the Delta Dessanech villages, border beacon inspection teams were unable to conclusively decide which side of the border communities rightfully inhabit, stoking additional friction. Yet CEWARN data suggest that crossborder incidents have been on the rise since 2007. In other words, there is a governance dimension to the above phenomenon. CEWARN reports and the increasingly visible work of CEWERUs suggest the existence of linkages between governance, poverty, religious fundamentalism, ethnicity and violent extremism. Addressing these problems will not, therefore, immediately translate into resolution of pastoral conflict in the region, unless the governance vulnerabilities are also taken into account.

3. Cluster Highlights

Dikhil Cluster [Djibouti]

The Dikhil Cluster is geographically and demographically smaller than any other Cluster. Located at the Ethiopia-Djibouti border, the Cluster is topographically dissimilar and has few inhabitants who predominantly practice subsistence agriculture. This fact alone may start to explain the atypical characteristic of the Cluster. The information below is based on reports received up to December 2011.

- No incidences associated with pastoral violence were reported, chiefly as a result of limited contact between the main pastoral groups in the area, the Issa and Afar.
- No loss of livestock due to characteristic pastoral activity was recorded
- No deaths as a result of the incidences were reported. Since December 2007, only 3 people have been recorded as a result of violent incidents

- Competition for water and pasture remained relatively low especially. Consequently, few Issa pastoralists migrated from Dikhil region and Oudhaleh plateau from the Ethiopian border to coastal area in search of Hays/Dada rains.
- Food insecurity resulting from lack of access prevailed. This was tied with malnutrition among the nomads in the South and South Western parts of Djibouti
- Unresolved tensions around camel thefts and murders that took place in 2008 persist to-date and are the main source of tensions along the Ethiopian border with Djibouti
- Relatively stable conditions within the Cluster are attributed to continued provision of basic services and humanitarian assistance, sustained surveillance by the government and peace negotiation between the main belligerent communities.

Karamoja Cluster [Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda]

Amongst all clusters, the Karamoja Cluster is the largest in a geographic and demographic sense. Unsurprisingly, positive and negative precursors to pastoral conflict in this Cluster appear out of proportion compared to other Clusters. As noted above, the difference between this Cluster and the rest of the Clusters is in the nuance: Karamoja bears some resemblance to the rest of the Clusters. All the highlights below exclude information from the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster for the period between Jan-April 2012. No information is available for South Sudan

- The total number of incidents recorded between Sept 2011 and April 2012 is 337, resulting in 152, human deaths.¹⁰ Due to the absence of data from the Kenyan side of the Cluster, the overall human count is higher than quoted here.
- 9157 is the net Livestock loss reported. This figure excludes losses that took place on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster between Jan-April 2012 and losses from the South Sudan.
- In Uganda, 28999 guns have been removed from civilian possession since 2001. Number of weapons removed from the Kenyan side of the Cluster is not available. The Ethiopian side of the Cluster has not commenced disarmament but is in the process of registered weapons. Small arms and light weapons remain a menace in the whole Cluster.
- Harmonizing disarmament across the region has been and continues to be an on-going challenge.
- 23 Crossborder incidents reported: within these, the Pokot of Uganda, Turkana of Kenya and Toposa of Southern Sudan had encounter with the UPDF and Turkana of Kenya raided from the Tepeth of Uganda. The most serious incident in the Cluster sucked in the participation of the Kenyan armed forces and involved the Turkana (Kenya) and Dassanech (Ethiopia). Similarly, armed intervention was used by the Kenyan government to pacify the Toposa and Todonyang
- Alliances were both created and disrupted. For example, the Tepeth and Pokot allied against the Turkana of Kenya, while in Ethiopia relations flourished the government and the Dassanech, Nyangatonm and Hamer.
- Floods that started in August affected traditional migration process and public transport on the Ugandan and Kenyan side of the Cluster, particularly between Sept and Dec 2012, and compelled herders to move towards secure grazing areas and increasing tensions among communities.
- Compared to previous reporting periods, a general reduction in violence was observed. Moreover, warriors, particularly in Uganda were seen to be moving in smaller numbers, signifying a corresponding shift in methods.
- Developmental initiatives present both an opportunity and a challenge. Many of these enterprises are located at the heart of the Karamoja Cluster but do not appear to be

¹⁰ This total excludes figures from the Kenyan side of the Cluster for the period January to April 2012 and the whole of South Sudan.

responsive to pastoral dynamics in a way that prevents medium- and long-term risks of violent conflict.

Somali Cluster [Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia]

The section of the Cluster report does not cover the Somalia-side of the Cluster, since the Somali CEWERU has just been established and is not yet fully operational.

- Between Sept 2011 and April 2012, 157 deaths occurred and 3953 livestock were lost in a total of 98 incident reports.
- A small but significant number of these incidents were of a crossborder nature, involving parties from Somalia and Ethiopia. Violence was highest in October 2011 and again in March 2012
- The main protagonists in this cycles of attacks and counter attacks included the Turkana and Borana within Isiolo whose legacies of past violence precipitates new conflicts.
- Small arms and light weapons increased the intensity and severity of conflict as evidenced by high rate of fatalities and the number of livestock rustled.
- Deployment of security forces, efforts of the district peace committee, and provincial administration all conspired to de-escalate tensions. In addition, plans to undertake disarmament exercises were announced by the Provincial Administration.
- The launch of Operation Linda Nchi (Operation Protect the Country) introduced the Al-Shabab factor, a new player into the already volatile situation.
- Friction between the Boran and Gabbra epitomized crossborder violence in the Moyale area.
- The impending creation of County governments aggravates hostility in Isiolo and Moyale, is closely associated with the impending elections in Kenya and builds on drought-related resource conflicts to engender a complex and highly combustible situation.
- Environmental stress, i.e., scanty rains (in Isiolo West, Kipsing and Oldonyiro Divisions) and prolonged drought (in Merti, Garba-Tulla, Laisamis, Samburu East, Wajir and Garissa), caused animal congestion in Isiolo, resulting in decreased pasture and water resources between January-April 2012.

4. Response Actions:

Throughout the reporting period, a number of recommendations were suggested by CEWARN and CEWERUs. The following is a condensed version of the recommendation, focusing on the most salient. It is anticipated that these recommendations shall pay both short term and medium term dividends.

- Establishment of a mechanism for regular and inclusive consultation between a) different segments of pastoral communities; b) between pastoral communities and local governments; c) border administration and related intermediaries; d) and central governments. These consultations should aim to restore trust amongst the different actors and start to lay the foundation for long-term and sustainable collaboration across all the above levels. The forums should be anchored by skilled, trained facilitators at local and national level whose efforts feed into the different national and regional operations and strategies.
- Changing dynamics in the region, especially the complex confluence of environmental vulnerabilities, socio-economic and physical phenomenon, and pastoral excesses, call for dynamic solutions. Civil Society, Local and Central Governments, and International agencies ought to re-conceptualize their approaches to accommodate the complexity of the situation, and to deploy technology and knowledge as key ingredients of interventions.

- Given the multiplicity of actors that are involved in designing solutions, inter-agency coordination at the local, national and regional level will be imperative. Governments should ensure that national policies and their implementing bodies are fully aware of the cross-cutting nature of conflict early warning and indeed peace building. The proposed coordination infrastructure should include non-traditional actors within both public and private sectors. In this regard, national budgets should have items for facilitating coordination between the different actors. CEWARN, on the other hand, will take responsibility for coordinating efforts at regional levels.